Iran's Foreign Relations in the Shadow of Rouhani's Presence at the United Nations

Hassan Rouhani, upon returning from the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Friday, stated that the United States has promised to rectify its actions regarding the outcome of the nuclear agreement. According to him, this was the result of a meeting of the ministers of the Joint Commission overseeing the implementation of the nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1. On Thursday, during his speech at the General Assembly, Rouhani accused the U.S. of procrastination in fulfilling its commitments. The Iranian president, after his speech at a press conference, cited delays in issuing permits for the export of Airbus and Boeing aircraft and the intimidation of major banks from cooperating with Iran as examples of Tehran's problems with Washington. While the U.S. claims it has fulfilled all its commitments related to the JCPOA, another notable point in Rouhani's speech at the UN General Assembly was his criticism of Saudi Arabia's role in the Middle East and the country's support for what he described as 'terrorism and crimes in Yemen.' Conversely, Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government consider the Islamic Republic of Iran a factor in regional instability. The three guests of this week's 'Views' program discuss the results of Hassan Rouhani's fourth appearance at the UN General Assembly: in New York, Mansour Farhang, former Iranian ambassador to the UN and senior professor of international relations; in New Jersey, Mohsen Milani, professor of political science and international relations at the University of South Florida; and Hossein Alizadeh, former diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Finland. Mr. Farhang, what was the most important point you observed in Hassan Rouhani's presence at the UN General Assembly this time? Mansour Farhang: My impression from his speech and interviews here is that he spoke as a representative of that faction in the Iranian regime that is interested in improving the country's relations, meaning moving towards normalizing Iran's international relations. That is, Iran seeks to normalize its relations especially with European countries, and what was interesting, particularly in Rouhani's speech, was that one of the main goals of this effort is attracting foreign investment to Iran. Investment that creates production and, of course, the contradiction that exists here, that he emphasizes more on Europe, speaks with the British Prime Minister and Canada, but when it comes to the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, American observers know that Rouhani is powerless. Rouhani and Zarif have no role in Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East and this confrontation with the U.S. Therefore, Rouhani's problem is that as long as Mr. Khamenei considers the U.S. the main enemy of Iran and talks about the destruction of Israel, it is very difficult for them to create the kind of security in Iran that would be appealing and acceptable to foreign investors. This is, after all, a contradiction that exists between Rouhani's and Khamenei's positions in Iran, and this contradiction was clearly presented in the speech and foreign observers and policymakers understand this reality well. Mr. Milani, what was the outcome of the 71st UN session for understanding the remaining issues in Iran-U.S. relations? Hassan Rouhani said the U.S. is procrastinating in implementing the results of the nuclear agreement, but the U.S. claims Washington has fulfilled all its promises. Mohsen Milani: The main point he raised, as Dr. Farhang mentioned, is the issue of normalizing relations with Western countries. Another important point was that this returns to the question you asked about a new model in the Middle East, and this is a model that was used in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the six countries of the world, which is a model of diplomacy and negotiation. That is, when you look at the scene in the Middle East from Yemen to Libya and Syria, there is war. He is somehow indicating that this model is not leading us anywhere and we need to use another model, and this model is the model of negotiation. Regarding the U.S., it is true that Mr. Khamenei determines Iran's policy. But it is not the case that other forces like the President of Iran or Mr. Zarif have no influence in determining Iran's foreign policy. In my opinion, they have a lot of influence and can bring about changes. I just ask you to think about whether if someone had said three years ago that Boeing would return to Iran and even talked about Boeing technicians returning to Iran, would anyone have accepted this or not? The relationship between Iran and the U.S. is not something that can be easily resolved. But we have seen the beginning of the normalization of relations between Iran and the U.S. One issue is the JCPOA, and in my opinion, as important as the JCPOA is the issue of selling Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Mr. Alizadeh, on Saturday, the Iranian newspapers showed two different reactions to Hassan Rouhani's presence at the UN General Assembly. Among the government-supporting press, the newspaper Shahrvand highlighted that representatives of other countries did not leave the hall during his speech, and the newspaper Ebtekar considered his speech economic and effective, as Mr. Farhang also mentioned. However, among the critical press, the newspaper Javan described Mr. Rouhani's rhetoric as victimized and neutral, and Kayhan criticized why Mr. Rouhani remained silent in the face of the U.S. State Department spokesman who said Washington had fulfilled all its promises. What conclusion can be drawn from this collection of reactions in Iran regarding Mr. Rouhani's presence at the UN General Assembly this time? Hossein Alizadeh: Note that when Mr. Rouhani made his first trip to New York and had that historic conversation with Mr. Obama, upon his return to Tehran, Mr. Khamenei said that an inappropriate action had occurred in New York. I should even remind you that when he entered Tehran airport, eggs and stones were thrown at the president's car. This was the situation because he entered a dangerous area, a dangerous area from the perspective of the regime, Mr. Khamenei, which was the issue of the U.S. Even the police chief of Tehran said that nothing important had happened. The president's car was attacked, and he said nothing important had happened. I want to conclude that before Mr. Rouhani's trip this time, there was much talk about whether this was the last term of Mr. Obama's presidency and whether that final connection would come together or not. Therefore, serious warnings were given that this should not happen because it is not your area. It is obvious that the faction known as the 'worried ones' will play a discordant tune with Mr. Rouhani's government in everything. We have two esteemed guests here, and I hope they agree with me that we witnessed a nearly modern speech. That is, you summarize your speech in 18 minutes and make your way and leave. Not that like Mr. Khatami started with discussions of mysticism and philosophy, or Mr. Ahmadinejad came and wove the worlds of East and West together. Eighteen minutes of useful talk. Of course, [Mr. Rouhani] also had some illogical rhetoric in some places. Like when he said the Iranian economy is dynamic and the best secure economy in the region. Well, of course, he makes these statements to create a façade for the Iranian economy, and it is not surprising. But overall, I think [Mr. Rouhani] made a reasonable speech that was directed at the post-JCPOA atmosphere. The post-JCPOA atmosphere is one where Mr. Salehi has expressed concern that the next U.S. president, whoever they may be, poses a risk to the JCPOA. Even if Ms. Clinton goes to the White House, this risk exists. Mr. Rouhani spoke that no one can unilaterally violate the JCPOA. Mr. Farhang, there is a difference of opinion here between you and Mr. Milani, as far as I understand. From Mr. Alizadeh's statements, I did not understand exactly where they stand, but I think they are on Mr. Milani's side regarding the fact that, in any case, there is a difference in tone and results of Hassan Rouhani's statements at the UN General Assembly compared to previous effective approaches. Hassan Rouhani accused Saudi Arabia in his speech of supporting terrorism and creating crises in the region and what he described as crimes in Yemen. What do these statements indicate about the quality of Tehran-Riyadh relations following the General Assembly? Mansour Farhang: When we talk about the foreign policy of a dictatorial country like Iran, we examine developments from two completely different angles. One angle is the regime's interests, meaning stability and dominance and, in general, the regime's ambitions and ideology, and one is national interests. That is, welfare and security and the dignity of society. One policy can be against national interests but in favor of the regime. For example, hostage-taking was a disaster for Iranian society but a success for the regime in eliminating its critics and its ambitions. The continuation of the Iran-Iraq war after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran was a disaster for Iran but a very effective tool for the regime to maintain and root its dominance in society. As Mr. Khomeini said, war is a good thing. Mr. Rouhani's speech was undoubtedly better than past speeches regarding Iran's national interests, and in this regard, we should truly welcome this issue. But the fact that Iran still has an ambitious ideological policy in the Middle East, not in Europe or northern Iran, in Arab countries [exists], and considers Saudi Arabia its main enemy. Khomeini even stated in his will that Saudi Arabia does not have legitimacy to maintain Mecca, etc., and we must strive for their destruction. That is, the beginning of the Islamic Republic was this anti-Saudi position, which became part of the essence of the Iranian regime until Khomeini's death. And after 1990 until about 2004, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially with the support and manipulation of Mr. Rafsanjani, progressed towards normalization, with Rafsanjani going to Saudi Arabia and Khatami going there. They even signed contracts together. While during the Iranian Revolution, when the King of Saudi Arabia congratulated Mr. Khomeini, Khomeini's response was aggression and threats. Iran and Saudi Arabia are identical in relation to terrorism. Iran has executed more than 15,000 political dissidents in the past 38 years. It has assassinated over 100 Iranians abroad. In the past five years, it has given more than 25 billion dollars to one of the most criminal regimes in the Middle East, namely Bashar al-Assad's regime, which has killed 500,000 of its own population, 90% of these deaths being due to the bombings of the Syrian government itself. Mr. Farhang, but what impact do his statements regarding Saudi Arabia at the UN General Assembly have on these relations? Your comments so far have addressed the history and background. Mansour Farhang: None. For observers who know both countries, it is the same slogans that Saudi Arabia uses against Iran. Otherwise, Iran and Saudi Arabia have no national interest conflicts, and if they cooperate, they can play a very effective and beneficial role in each other's economies regarding oil production and export. But the ambitious ideology, true Islam, and both of them constantly bring verses from the Quran. As Shakespeare said, even the devil can bring verses from these books for his own interests, and in this regard, both act against their own national interests but hope to achieve something in relation to the regime's ambitions. Mr. Milani, despite listing the differences between Tehran and Riyadh, Hassan Rouhani said at the press conference on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that Iran's problem is with Saudi Arabia's role in the region, otherwise, according to him, Iran and Saudi Arabia have no problem with each other. The issue that Mr. Farhang referred to in part of his statements. Saudi Arabia, on the eve of the OPEC meeting in Algeria, offered Iran to reduce its oil production in exchange for freezing Iran's oil production. What can be the sum of the shared interests and differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia, considering Mr. Rouhani's statements at the General Assembly about Saudi Arabia? Mohsen Milani: The differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia are the most important issue in the Middle East today. This cold war that has started between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the recent insults added to that cold war, in my opinion, contradict the national interests of both Iran and Saudi Arabia. [The speaker's sentence is not clear due to static] ... the Iran-Iraq war, where these two countries fought each other for eight years, and in the end, instead of one country emerging victorious, we saw that both countries were defeated. In this war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, [neither] regional countries nor global powers will allow Iran to win this war, nor will they allow Saudi Arabia to win this war. The sooner Tehran and Riyadh understand this point, the better the situation in the Middle East will become. However, the differences that Iran and Saudi Arabia have are serious differences, and since the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein in Iraq, it has reached a new stage, and today not only are they fighting in Iraq, but more importantly, they are fighting in Syria. The Yemen issue is not a significant issue for Iran, and in my opinion, it is not an important issue in the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The most important issue in the Middle East for Iran and Saudi Arabia is Syria. Both Tehran and Syria believe that whoever wins the Syrian war can significantly influence what the new geographical and political map of the Middle East will be. Therefore, both sides are trying to support their forces. Those who only attack Iran, attack the Islamic Republic, which is the government that has caused these issues to arise in the Middle East, should also look around Saudi Arabia and see what kind of support it has given to these terrorist organizations.