Iran's Military Objectives in Syria and Russia's Inconsistent Positions

Officials from the Islamic Republic insist that Iran's presence in Syria is advisory, and that the dispatched soldiers and military personnel are not directly engaged in combat against Assad's opponents. Besides the IRGC forces, Iraqi and Afghan militias linked to the Quds Force, Iranian army personnel are also present in Syria. Recently, five commandos from the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade (Nohed) were killed in southern Aleppo, leading to contradictions among military commanders. Major General Ataollah Salehi, the army commander, emphasized that the fallen soldiers were advisors, stating: "The army has no responsibility for advisory assistance to Syria, and there is an organization in the country that carries out these actions." Salehi did not clarify which organization or individuals are responsible for sending soldiers but stressed that some army personnel went to Syria voluntarily. Brigadier General Pourdastan, commander of the army's ground forces, also noted that the army has no unit "present" in Syria, saying: "We have sent individuals as advisors to effectively utilize the operational and training environment and enhance the operational capabilities of the Islamic Republic's army to confront the main enemy, which is certainly America." While the statements of General Salehi and Brigadier General Pourdastan reveal reluctance to send troops to Syria, the Fars news agency described this task as a duty, stating that according to law, one of the army's duties is to be prepared to cooperate with the IRGC in assisting Muslim and oppressed nations that do not oppose the Islamic world in defending themselves against military threats and aggression upon their request and orders. It seems that the dispatch of soldiers to Syria has occurred under a kind of division of labor within the armed forces, which the army commanders have reluctantly accepted. The insistence on "advisory presence" persists despite the deaths of 13 IRGC members, injuries to 21 others, and the capture of at least six more IRGC members in the strategic village of Khan Tuman (15 kilometers southwest of Aleppo). The Islamic Republic still considers the presence of military personnel and dispatched IRGC members and militias in Syria as advisory. Meanwhile, according to Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the IRGC, "Iranian military advisors are present in Syria at four strategic, operational, tactical, and technical and aid levels," and based on a study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Islamic Republic lost at least 342 IRGC members in Syria between January 2012 and February 2016. According to the London Daily Telegraph, 700 military and paramilitary personnel dispatched from Iran have died in Syria, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that about 2000 members of the IRGC's Quds Force are present in Syria. The Islamic Republic entered the Syrian battlefield in 2012. At that time, some experts believed that Syria would become Iran's Vietnam. Others thought that the Islamic Republic would have a dominant role in shaping the political developments of the country, similar to Iraq after Saddam's fall. However, none of these speculations have materialized. Over the past four and a half years, the Islamic Republic has provided significant financial and military assistance to Assad's regime, and despite bringing many Iraqi, Afghan, and Hezbollah fighters into the Syrian battlefield, there is still no clear horizon for ending the war in Syria and stabilizing Assad's power. One reason for this failure is the numerous fighting groups in Syria, some of which receive support from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the United States. For Russia, which does not insist on keeping Assad in power, any agreement with the United States that secures Moscow's security, intelligence, and strategic interests in Syria would be acceptable. However, for Iran, the goal is complete victory over the fighters, expanding its influence over Damascus, and continuing Assad's rule in Syria, or at least in the western part of the country. The most important objectives of the Islamic Republic in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in place, maintain the routes for sending weapons and equipment to Hezbollah, and expand the presence of its controlled militias in Syria, which it has somewhat succeeded in achieving. Despite suffering human losses over the past four years, there are no signs of a decrease in Iran's presence in Syria or a change in its position. Recently, Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei on international affairs, stated that keeping Assad in power is a red line for the Islamic Republic. While Velayati spoke of Iran and Russia's firm resolve to support Bashar Assad in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, according to RIA Novosti, "Bashar Assad is not our ally. We actually support him in combating terrorism and also in his efforts to maintain unity and governance in Syria, but he is not our ally in the way Turkey is an ally of the United States, and he currently is not." According to some Russian media, Moscow and Tehran do not share the same positions in Syria, and Assad, encouraged by Iran's extensive support, resists some of Russia's demands. Moscow has asked Assad to cooperate more to pave the way for ending the war based on an agreement between Russia and the United States in February of this year; to release detained opponents from prison; and to show tangible flexibility at the negotiating table regarding the demands of the opponents. According to the same media, Russian officials have informed their American counterparts that "they can give advisory opinions to Assad but cannot control him." These officials have stated that Russia's relationship with Assad's father (Hafez Assad) was deeper and broader, whereas it is not the same with Bashar Assad. In contrast, the Islamic Republic recommends different paths and preconditions. In this context, Ali Akbar Velayati stated in an interview with Al-Mayadeen last week, "Undoubtedly, two important issues must be realized regarding Syria, and both of these issues must occur together: one in the operational section, first the government, regime, army, and popular resistance forces of Syria must be able to cleanse various parts of Syria from the presence of terrorist groups... The other issue is the readiness to participate and be present in political negotiations, just as there has been readiness for the Geneva political negotiations, as you know, the Syrian government... had presence and participation, while the opponents who are supported by Saudi Arabia left the Geneva negotiations without any justifiable reason." Velayati implicitly rejected an agreement between the United States and Russia, stating that the two countries may reach agreements regarding Syria, but we have no role in this and do not want to have a role. However, in the meantime, we know, and Syria knows, and the countries aligned with Syria know well, and even Syria's enemies should know that no one can impose a solution on the Syrian people,... [otherwise] the conditions that have continued for five years will continue again. Given the unwavering support of the Islamic Republic for Assad and its desire to keep him in power, he has increasingly relied on Iran. Before the civil war, Bashar Assad even allowed the Islamic Republic to send military weapons to Hezbollah through his country and frequently held discussions with Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus, something that was taboo during Hafez Assad's time. Currently, Hezbollah's support for Assad on the front lines, along with the extensive financial, military, and logistical assistance from the Islamic Republic, combined with the presence of Iranian soldiers and Afghan and Iraqi militias, has kept Assad in power. Nevertheless, these forces are unable to push back the fighters without Russian air support and bombings of opposition positions. In fact, these forces, along with Syrian government units, serve as ground forces for Russian air power. For Russia, which does not insist on keeping Assad in power, any agreement with the United States that secures Moscow's security, intelligence, and strategic interests in Syria would be acceptable. However, for Iran, the goal is complete victory over the fighters, expanding its influence over Damascus, and continuing Assad's rule in Syria, or at least in the western part of the country. Therefore, pushing back the fighters in the west of the country and driving them out of Aleppo to reclaim northern areas bordering Turkey is a priority for Assad and Iran, and the ongoing intense conflicts around Aleppo are pursued to achieve this goal. While U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov discuss the agreement between their two countries regarding Syria and strive for a diplomatic solution to end the civil war in Syria, the Islamic Republic and Assad are the key players in resolving the Syrian issue, and there is no short-term hope for an end to the civil war in this country, a war that has claimed more than 300,000 lives and displaced about eight million Syrians.