Iran's Nuclear File: From Negotiation to JCPOA

In the early hours of a summer morning on July 14, 2015, in Vienna, Iran and the P5+1 group reached an agreement on Iran's nuclear program after more than twenty days of negotiations in the final stage. The final marathon in Vienna was only a few weeks away from a long process that lasted about 13 years, which began with the disclosure of the dimensions of Iran's nuclear program regarding the Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002. At that time, the United States accused Iran of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, three European countries, Germany, Britain, and France, known as the European Troika, began negotiations with Iran to halt this nuclear program, a process that was not approved by the United States. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, was a non-governmental nuclear inspector at that time, collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Iraq case. He stated about the U.S. disapproval: 'The Bush administration opposed the Europeans' negotiations with Iran and asked me to go to Berlin and tell the Germans that what they were doing was very bad. I did this. The Europeans needed to do better; they lacked sufficient information about Iran's military nuclear program until 2003, but their quick actions to stop these steps were very significant. I was an American who was asked by the government, and I went and delivered the message, but I told them that I personally agreed with this action.' Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration somewhat supported the Europeans' actions and praised Russia's efforts to encourage Iran to continue nuclear activities in cooperation with Moscow on its territory. The Europeans' negotiations with Iran led to a temporary suspension of Iran's enrichment program for a short time, voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, and increased cooperation between Iran and the Agency. However, all of this changed with the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration. In the first year of Ahmadinejad's presidency, after the Natanz facility resumed operations despite previous agreements, the Agency referred Iran's case to the United Nations Security Council for the first time. This marked the beginning of Iran's troubles, the issuance of multiple sanctions against Tehran, and endless negotiations. Nowadays, as a year has passed since Iran and the P5+1 reached a nuclear agreement, many consider Hassan Rouhani's election as president in 2013 a turning point in the nuclear negotiations. Rouhani was not unfamiliar with the nuclear file and had previously led negotiations with the Europeans. Qasem Shaleh-Saadi, a former member of parliament and lawyer in Iran, evaluates one of the reasons for Rouhani's election as fundamentally linked to the status of the nuclear file, stating: 'Rouhani's rise to power in the 2013 elections could have been influenced by the nuclear issue. In fact, I believe it is the result of the sanctions imposed on Iran. If those sanctions had not existed, perhaps some of the flexibility shown in the 2013 elections would not have happened.' The impact of Rouhani's election on reaching the nuclear agreement has been one of several controversial topics in recent months, especially among political and analytical circles in Washington. Although in Iran, the Supreme Leader has repeatedly emphasized that these negotiations began before Rouhani's administration took office. Among the latest examples of this was on June 15, when he stated in a meeting with a large group of officials: 'The JCPOA has both positive and negative points; it has advantages and disadvantages; its advantages are what compelled and encouraged us to engage in these negotiations; of course, you know these negotiations began before the eleventh government took office due to these motivations.' A group of staunch critics of the JCPOA has recently emphasized that the Obama administration, led by Ben Rhodes, senior advisor to the U.S. president, exaggerated Rouhani's moderation, arguing that the final negotiation process began before Rouhani's presidency. Cliff May, founder of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, agrees with this group. He told Radio Farda: 'We now know that negotiations began even before Rouhani was elected president. Obama created the impression that because Rouhani is moderate, negotiations and agreements could be reached with him. This was not true, and negotiations were already underway.' What Mr. May refers to are the secret talks between Iran and the U.S., mediated by Oman, which began during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. Although this topic has become very prominent in Washington today, for those who were following these negotiations, the secrecy of these talks was revealed shortly after Iran and the P5+1 reached a temporary agreement in Geneva in 2013. At that time, the website Al-Monitor and the Associated Press uncovered these discussions. The initial steps of these secret talks were taken during Ahmadinejad's presidency and Hillary Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State in the U.S. At that time, Dennis Ross was a special advisor to Ms. Clinton on Middle Eastern affairs. He, who is now active at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, believes that although the talks began during Ahmadinejad's presidency, no change in Iran's policy was seen until Rouhani's election. Mr. Ross told Radio Farda: 'A government that sought to lift sanctions had to come to power to negotiate so that the U.S. government would be convinced that dialogue could lead to a real outcome. Before this time, there were serious doubts about achieving anything in negotiations with the Iranians. The Obama administration made it clear from the beginning that it was ready to talk to Iran. The initial reactions from the Iranians contained signs that they were not interested in this issue at all, they were hesitating, and were not ready to negotiate even within the P5+1 framework, and if a bilateral dialogue occurred, the Iranian approach was that nothing was possible until all sanctions were lifted. However, later they entered serious negotiations when sanctions were fully imposed.' The nuclear talks, which began with the rise of Hassan Rouhani's administration and the new composition of Iran's diplomatic apparatus led by Mohammad Javad Zarif in 2013, quickly led to a temporary agreement in Geneva just a few months later, paving the way for continued negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. A tumultuous period occurred between December 2013 and July 2015. In Tehran and Washington, two contentious capitals in this regard, supporters and opponents of the negotiations spared no effort to support or oppose this process until ultimately, hours of sleepless nights, continuous travel, diplomatic and technical efforts, threats, and bargaining brought Iran and the six world powers to a comprehensive agreement regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Around noon on July 14, 2015, the achievement of this agreement was announced in a joint statement by Mohammad Javad Zarif and Federica Mogherini, the two leaders of these negotiations: 'Thanks to the constructive engagement of all parties, and the commitment and capability of our delegations, we have successfully concluded the negotiations and resolved a dispute that has lasted over 10 years.' Both sides described the agreement as historic while acknowledging the challenges they would face after the agreement. Federica Mogherini stated in Vienna as part of the joint statement: 'The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action consists of a main text and five technical annexes regarding nuclear issues, sanctions, cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy, the establishment of a joint commission, and an executive program. These documents are detailed and very complex, so a complete summary cannot be provided here. The full text and its annexes will be made available to the public and will be submitted to the Security Council by the P5+1 for approval in the coming days. We know this agreement will undergo deep scrutiny and consideration. However, what we are announcing today is not just an agreement; it is a good agreement. A good agreement for all parties and for the entire international community.' In the weeks and months that followed, precisely what senior diplomats from Iran and the P5+1 had predicted occurred. Particularly, the two capitals of Tehran and Washington became centers of support and opposition to the agreement. In Washington, Congress had to approve the agreement, and in Iran, the Iranian parliament had to present a report on reviewing and supporting the agreement for the JCPOA to enter the preparation stages for implementation. After many ups and downs, political shouting and disputes, ultimately, these two legislative bodies gave the governments a green light, and the groundwork for implementing the JCPOA was prepared, particularly in Iran, where the groundwork for imposing restrictions on the nuclear program began. To reach the JCPOA's implementation stage, one more step needed to be taken, which was the International Atomic Energy Agency's report on the PMD file, or the potentially military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. December 16, 2015, was that day. The Agency, in a special session of the Board of Governors, closed this file with the Director General's report, and Reza Najafi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, stated that the PMD file had become part of history and no longer existed. However, while the closure of the PMD file opened the way for the implementation of the JCPOA, even one year after the achievement of the JCPOA, it is still cited by critics as one of the flaws of the agreement. One of these critics, Olli Heinonen, who was previously the Deputy Director General of the IAEA, commented on this criticism to Radio Farda: 'The Agency presented its report on this matter last December and announced that it had found signs of uranium presence in Parchin, which means that for some reason, uranium existed in this facility, and we do not know if it was due to contamination or if related activities were conducted at Parchin itself. When the Agency announced that the PMD file was closed, no clear statement was made regarding the reason for the presence of these uranium pieces. The problem is that Parchin was not declared as a nuclear facility, so uranium should not have been there. I think this approach either does not address all findings with sufficient technical transparency or does not provide the opportunity for the Agency to report on them. Which of these two is the case, I do not know.' Mr. Heinonen refers to page eleven of Yukiya Amano's report on the PMD. This section of the report stated that after inspectors sampled the Parchin facility, they analyzed them and found no explosives or related materials. However, in a footnote on the same page, it is mentioned that after this sampling, two pieces were found that 'appear to be pieces of natural uranium that have undergone chemical changes.' However, the Agency states in this footnote that these pieces, given their specifications and limitations, did not provide sufficient evidence to be related to nuclear materials. The Agency concluded this matter with these findings. This reporting method regarding the PMD was analyzed at the time by Tarek Raouf, director of the Disarmament Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as follows: 'The accusations and security reports are remnants of the past and it was preferred to pretend that these issues no longer exist. This does not necessarily mean that Iran was moving towards militarizing its nuclear program; it means that this file was not closed according to the Agency's usual procedures, but was closed politically and at the behest of the major powers to the Agency.' Regardless of the reasons and methods by which the Agency closed the PMD file, this created an opportunity for the JCPOA to be implemented about a month later. After this international body confirmed Iran's actions based on the JCPOA, including disabling thousands of centrifuges and removing the core of the Arak heavy water reactor, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached the execution stage, and some of the sanctions imposed on Iran were lifted. The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has been subject to criticism and analysis since the day it was reached. Some called it historic and unprecedented, while others argued that trusting Iran and reaching an agreement with this country was a grave mistake. In Iran, there was also this dual approach. Iran's diplomatic apparatus and negotiators were recognized as national heroes by some, while others labeled them as traitors who had made agreements with the 'untrustworthy' West. A large group of disarmament analysts in the U.S. praised this agreement for blocking Iran's path to nuclear weapons. Daryl Kimball, president of the Arms Control Association in Washington, aligns with this group and told Radio Farda: 'There is no diplomatic agreement that can verifiably prevent a country's ambitions. However, diplomatic agreements in disarmament can create conditions that limit or prevent some of these ambitions. Therefore, I think it is important to emphasize that the JCPOA has closed all of Iran's pathways to producing nuclear weapons for over a decade.