Iran's Nuclear Policy: 'Pouring Water into the War Mill?'

The sending of a letter from Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency, regarding preparations to create a capacity of 190,000 separative work units for uranium isotopes, will be a costly political decision that could be used to justify military action against Iran. The announcement of the letter from the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization to the Agency seems to be part of Tehran's new policy of 'incremental threats in response to increasing external pressures' and a departure from the policy of 'appeasement and settling for continued cooperation with Europe.' Although the original text of Iran's letter to the Agency has not yet been published in English, and a precise assessment of its content based on the oral statements of Behrouz Kamalvandi on Tuesday is somewhat difficult, the implementation of even some of his statements could be directly considered a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the July 14, 2015 agreement known as the JCPOA. In Behrouz Kamalvandi's statements, the increase in uranium hexafluoride gas production capacity, testing and producing new generation centrifuges, and constructing a rotor production plant for new centrifuges were mentioned, which, despite appearing conditional and cautious, could be seen as completely provocative actions. Iran's recent and threatening movements began last week with the announcement of a letter from Javad Zarif to the foreign ministers of the P5 countries and the five proposals made on May 30 by Ali Akbar Velayati, an international affairs advisor to Ali Khamenei, regarding the resumption of certain nuclear activities in Iran, which took a clearer shape on Tuesday with the statements of Ali Khamenei and Behrouz Kamalvandi. The implementation of the Supreme Leader's recommendations before the expiration of the deadline set in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which contradicts the commitments outlined therein, has no technical or economic justification. Creating a capacity of 190,000 separative work units for uranium isotopes requires the operation of over 100,000 centrifuges capable of rotating P-1 type centrifuges, which the Islamic Republic has only managed to procure 19,000 of over 20 years despite having freer international markets to buy more than 120 different parts and materials, including 'Maraging' type motors and steel. Producing 'yellowcake' (uranium oxide) to create hexafluoride gas for feeding the centrifuges, considering the very limited domestic uranium resources available in two mines in Bandar Abbas (Saghand, with a reserve of 40 tons) and Natanz-Tabas (Gachin, with an estimated reserve of 1,000 tons), poses a greater challenge than the issues related to the construction and assembly of parts for 120,000 centrifuges domestically. Enriching uranium using 120,000 P-1 centrifuges could provide the necessary fuel for two nuclear reactors with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts of electricity, for which no contracts for construction have even been signed, and the construction time for each of the two plants would require 10 years. Due to the lack of economic justification and the complexity of the technology for producing nuclear fuel, which is a complex, sensitive, and dangerous process, the fuel needed for the vast majority of the 445 operational nuclear power plants in 31 countries and the 225 laboratory nuclear reactors in 50 countries is produced only in a few countries. Iran has never had serious problems purchasing nuclear fuel, and the supply of fuel for the only operational nuclear reactor in Bushehr is guaranteed by Russia. Nuclear power generation is not the cheapest and most reliable way to produce electricity, especially for countries with vast natural gas resources like Iran. The fate of efforts to produce nuclear fuel domestically is not clearer than that of producing non-competitive domestic cars; expensive, lacking quality, lacking basic standards, and always reliant on imported raw materials and parts! The heavy water production plant in Arak, whose product is likely to be dumped into the sea due to lack of buyers and legal storage limitations, and the 45-megawatt heavy water reactor in Arak, both of which have incurred tens of billions of dollars in costs and direct and indirect losses, are clear patterns for outlining the fate of facilities that must be established for uranium enrichment with a capacity of 190,000 separative work units in accordance with the Supreme Leader's political command. The new and threatening policy lines of the Islamic Republic regarding the nuclear agreement coincide with the arrival of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Berlin and his efforts to garner European Union support against what has been termed the regional and nuclear threats of the Islamic Republic. Mr. Netanyahu began his four-day diplomatic mission to Europe in Germany, where the people, due to the history of the genocide of Jews, the Holocaust, are seen as more supportive of the people of Israel than any other European country. The positions of the Islamic Republic among European societies are sufficiently criticized due to military interventions in the region, engaging in missile activities, and also threatening Israel with destruction, and in this situation, adding a nuclear dimension to the set of tensions attributed to the Iranian political system leaves little chance for improving relations between Europe and Iran. Engaging in a policy of threats and intimidation in the current situation has changed the policy of Rouhani's government, which was apparently based on compromise and cooperation with the global community, placing Iran in a position of oppressor rather than victim. Inflexibility and even taking the initiative in foreign relations can only yield results when the levers of power are available for the implementers of this policy, as the small but wealthy country of Qatar, one year after the imposition of sanctions by Saudi Arabia and three other Arab countries (Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain), not only did not succumb to its opponents but also improved its external and internal situation by relying on sufficient wealth and support from other countries. The Islamic Republic, with a crisis-ridden economy, an empty treasury, a government deeply in debt, and internal demands and external commitments exceeding its financial capacity, threatens to 'launch 10 missiles in response to one missile' while lacking even the minimum military capacity necessary to defend Iran's skies and land against potential foreign aggression, and this new approach can only turn Iran's security challenges from potential to actual.