Iran's Nuclear Retreat and Its Impact on Regional Security Dynamics

The final phase of negotiations between Iran and the 1+5 group is nearing its conclusion. Despite the dangerous fluctuations witnessed over the past eighteen months, optimism is growing as we approach the end of this saga. Internal obstacles among Western countries, particularly the United States, have largely been channeled, and with the right to review the final agreement granted to Barack Obama's opponents in Congress, these oppositions are not significant enough to overshadow the essence of the deal. It is almost certain that an agreement is on the horizon. The scope of the nuclear agreement in Iran—while there has not been substantial support for the government from Ayatollah Khamenei, nor unconditional backing for the negotiation strategy, the implicit opposition from the military and the public dissent from the so-called 'concerned' factions have recently been sidelined. In this process, the Foreign Minister has faced accusations of treason and betrayal. However, the recent parliamentary resolution and the unexpected support from the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for the negotiators have currently silenced most of the noise and forced potential opponents into silence. (It is surprising that security and judicial officials have not classified any opposition to the negotiations or criticism of them as a crime or an affront to Islam!). In this context, however, a lingering ambiguity remains: it is unclear what type of agreement Khamenei will fully support. It is highly likely that his approval will be reluctant and conditional, aiming not to tie himself to any faction of the government’s supporters or opponents while temporarily achieving three underlying goals: a) Preventing an agreement that has broad dimensions and would expand normal relations with the West, especially the United States, as such an agreement raises concerns among traditional right-wingers and the fear of the collapse of the Islamic Republic underpins their theoretical backing. Groups that, as President Hassan Rouhani has described, have benefited from sanctions are strongly opposed to such a thaw in Iran's foreign policy. b) By positioning himself to limit the achievements of the final agreement, he aims to maintain the role of security and military organizations in various institutions, especially economic organizations, thereby preserving unlimited support for the leadership. c) The immediate achievements and impacts of the agreement will satisfy the general public, keeping them aligned with the regime and reinforcing their confidence in the leadership's wisdom. Of course, the fervor for fighting the West and supporting the 'brothers' in Syria and Hezbollah can still be kept alive through religious mourning ceremonies. On the other hand, involving the public in regional conflicts prevents the opening of society and the expansion of people's demands regarding civil society and human rights. Therefore, in summary, a minimal agreement that can remove sanctions from the path will serve as a complete victory for the Iranian political system in any form, and it can always be portrayed as the foreign 'enemy' being brought to its knees. The implementation of the agreement, its external dimensions, and regional impacts—evidence and signs suggest that the 1+5 will not engage in a minimal agreement since open systems must respond to a broader spectrum of rulers and the ruled and satisfy their foreign allies. Such a spectrum is entirely different from the composition of domestic parties in Iran. For this reason, the agreement between Iran and the 1+5 employs various mechanisms to avoid falling into the trap of Iran's behind-the-scenes calculations. This perspective necessitates a three-phase system where reaching a final agreement is the top priority. Following that, a period begins that can be termed short-term preparation, which essentially lays the groundwork for legitimacy and enforcement guarantees and may even utilize the UN's guarantee mechanism; subsequently, a phase will commence where the implementation of the agreement will begin. Assuming that all these stages proceed normally, and assuming that after reaching a final agreement many economic sectors of the countries do not wait for other stages and take practical actions, it seems entirely natural that governments outside the negotiating circle, especially Iran's neighbors in the Gulf and the Middle East, will prepare themselves for the challenges of the implementation phase and beyond. Short-term results—the implementation of Iran's nuclear retreat can create various outcomes concerning each of its neighboring countries. It is necessary to consider that Iran, even under sanctions, possesses actual and potential capabilities that are not pleasing to some neighbors and regional countries. Therefore, the implementation of the agreement will only strengthen those capabilities. Iran's international behavior concerning regional issues cannot be regulated by the nuclear agreement, and it seems natural that Iran, if equipped with the necessary tools, will continue and develop the same behaviors with greater confidence and economic power. The issues overshadowed by the agreement for nuclear retreat are numerous and encompass a wide range that exceeds the scope of a brief review. For example, in economic dimensions and long-term strategy, one cannot overlook the future relations of China and Russia or Japan and India with Iran. However, if we limit this scope to the Middle East, several significant international issues remain where Iran will play a sensitive (if not decisive) role. The Syria-Iraq-Turkey axis: With the increase in economic capability, support for Syria will intensify and elevate to a higher level. But does Iran necessarily need more money to have a winning card in Syria? Certainly, the improvement of Iran's economy in the post-sanction period will directly impact Iran-Syria relations, but such a relationship cannot be sustained indefinitely without considering Turkey's interests in the region. Syria is a responsibility for Iran, while Turkey is considered an asset and investment. Currently, Turkish military forces are positioned at the Syrian border. It is said that the purpose of this positioning is to counter any stabilization of the Kurds at the common borders with Syria and to confront the presence of Islamists. We know well that Turkey seeks the collapse of the Assad regime, while Iran desires to strengthen and preserve it. The stabilization of an independent Kurdish region as one of the outcomes of Syria's collapse will be inevitable. But if the Syrian regime lacks sufficient power and loses its ability to survive, it will inherently contribute to the formation of an independent Kurdish region. Is Iran opposed to the establishment of an independent Kurdish region in Syria, and can it express this opposition publicly without harming its good relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan or its relationship with Turkey? After the commencement of the implementation phase of the nuclear retreat agreement, with hundreds of billions of dollars flowing into Iran's economy, will the balance of power in Syria be dictated by Iran? Will this not lead to a confrontation between Iran and Turkey, and is Iran willing to sacrifice its multi-billion-dollar exchanges with Turkey for the costly relationship with Bashar Assad's regime? Here, the discussion is not about the correctness or incorrectness of the Turkish strategy regarding Islamist groups like ISIS, but rather to demonstrate the complexity of Iran's regional relations, which will soon rise to a higher level with the influx of released dollars. A less significant point related to Syria is the provision of human resources involved in supportive operations within Syria. To supply this force, in addition to Iranians, a considerable number of Afghans are also recruited by Iran and sent to the theater of operations in Syria. The burial of about four hundred of these forces, who were recently brought from Syria to Iran, indicates the depth of the matter and possibly the existence of recruitment centers for war. This axis will inherently connect and engage Iran with its eastern border neighbors, primarily Afghanistan. The Iran-Iraq-Kurdistan Region axis and the fight against ISIS: Iran supports the Assad regime in Syria and provides unlimited financial, military, security, and personnel support to the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq. Sometimes this support is carried out by commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, mainly the Quds Force, in operational, organizational, and armament forms, with Iranians playing a direct role in tactics and execution, or in operation design, or merely providing financial and logistical support. The fight against ISIS deep within Iraqi territory inherently strengthens the Shiite-led Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Region, whether we consider Kurdistan an independent state or an autonomous part of Iraq; this support influences Iran's positioning regarding the Kurdish issue in the region, and here Turkey, which is also involved in the Kurdish issue, comes into play. However, for Iran, the relationship with Iraq holds greater long-term strategic importance. On the other hand, direct confrontation with the group known as the 'Islamic State' (ISIS) at a very short distance from Iran's borders threatens Iran daily, depending on their advances or retreats. Revolutionary Guard commanders have repeatedly spoken about these threats, marking certain pilgrimage and holy areas known as 'Atabat Alaliyat' as geographical red lines. Here, nothing other than the nuclear agreement serves as the driving force of the strategic game, and that is the beliefs of the people that have formed over more than fourteen centuries. This is a relationship of faith and sanctity that can generate financial capacity from within for its survival. People are willing to spend their money, lives, and property to protect and safeguard the holy cities of Karbala, Kadhimayn, and Najaf. When this connection is strengthened with Iran's economic power after the implementation of the nuclear agreement, it will create an impermeable structure that can, as much as it contributes to regional peace, also facilitate increasing confrontations between Shiites and Sunnis in the region, putting regional security at risk. The Saudi Arabia and Israel axis—the nuclear agreement with Iran reaches its conclusion while both Saudi Arabia and Israel openly oppose it, and the Gulf Arab countries have a dual stance on it; while it is said that some Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia support the group known as 'Islamic State.' On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, relying on its oil wealth, can allocate unlimited economic capacities to military expenses. With the conclusion of the Iranian-Western nuclear dispute and the sense of danger that Saudi Arabia feels from Iran, the possibility of Saudi investment in military fields will increase. Additionally, Saudi Arabia will seek to use OPEC to control Iran's oil production and prevent an increase in Iran's quotas, although this may not be feasible in the long run. Currently, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have turned to defense weapon producers regarding Iran's missile systems (which could even be strengthened due to the nuclear deal) and have stimulated the missile and radar interception market. Continuing this trend, if Iran and Russia reach a final agreement on the S-300 missile system deal, it will inherently engage the Gulf region in an arms race and military technology. The Iranian-Western nuclear deal somewhat reinforces this trend. The region possesses high economic capabilities and represents a significant market for global industries, especially military industries. An industry that, among many of these countries, only makes sense in a one-sided import form. It is natural that, for example, Saudi Arabia and France would engage in studies and research for building nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia and reach agreements. Although this project, as its title suggests, has a study aspect, the logic of Saudi Arabia and France in entering such a project primarily revolves around confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran. Israel has never agreed with the essence of the nuclear agreement between the West and Iran. Israel's perspective on the issue is largely security-oriented, and the fact that Iran does not recognize the existence of the Israeli state and seeks its destruction forms the basis of Israel's security concerns. Iran's support for some radical Palestinian factions and Hezbollah in Lebanon reinforces the belief that Iran intends to use the nuclear agreement to push back economic sanctions and secretly complete the financial and technological capacity necessary for producing nuclear bombs (according to the Israeli government) to use against Israel. For over two decades, Israel has resorted to this scenario, and it seems that knowingly and deliberately, it ignores the principle in nuclear strategy that when a country with nuclear weapons attacks another nuclear country, it essentially facilitates its own destruction in a retaliatory attack. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has once seen its survival in nuclear retreat, cannot risk its survival again in a short time by producing a few nuclear bombs and using them against Israel. In any case, such reasoning does not change Israel's position towards Iran under current conditions, and Israel will continue to build its regional alliances with a sense of security threat from Iran even after signing the nuclear retreat agreement. Since any Israeli airstrike against points in Iran requires refueling in airspace outside of Israel, possibly in Saudi Arabia or Turkey, or even Central Asian countries, Israel's proximity to any of these countries could create tensions and disrupt the balance in regional military calculations. Last winter, Israeli publications reported on promises of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel against Iran.