Iran's Path from War Chaos to the Mediterranean Sea

In February 2011, following the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, the government of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, leading to a period of turmoil during which Mohamed Morsi came to power. It was during this chaotic period in Egypt that a small event introduced new calculations into Iran's strategic outlook: the possibility of the Iranian naval fleet making a friendly visit to its ally, Syria. The only way to realize this was for the Iranian fleet to pass through the Suez Canal. Since the 1979 revolution, no Iranian ships had passed through the Suez Canal. Although according to Egyptian laws, the passage of warships from other countries is permissible as long as there is no war between Egypt and those countries, the passage still required approval from the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. Following the severing of diplomatic relations since 1979, the two countries' relations were managed only through a interests office. However, Egypt was in a chaotic state, and it was eventually announced that it had agreed to the request for the passage of Iranian warships. Iran had specified in its request that the ships carried no nuclear or chemical weapons. Ultimately, the ships passed through the canal on the evening of February 19, 2011, after crossing the Red Sea, and headed to the Syrian port of Latakia. This passage was met with strong objections from Israel. Then-Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman described the passage as "provocative," and U.S. officials stated they would be "monitoring" it. From Israel's perspective, Iran's goal was to increase its "sphere of influence" in the region. Naturally, the Iranian ships navigated through international waters, safely distanced from the adjacent waters of Gaza and Israel, before reaching Syria and the port of Latakia. The timing of this journey indicates that it occurred just a week after the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime, and the chaos of that time likely played a role in the issuance of the passage permit. Less than two weeks later, the patrol vessel "Alvand" and the support ship "Khark" were allowed to pass through the Suez Canal for a second time to return to Iran. The Mediterranean Sea and Iran's Goals Over the nearly seven years since that date, no other Iranian warships have passed through the Suez Canal. The question remains: what necessity drove such passage, and what results did it yield? In ancient Iranian history, Darius issued a decree in the late sixth century BC for the construction of a waterway between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean via the Nile River, enabling Achaemenid ships to navigate and trade in the Mediterranean. However, in the 21st century, the motivations of the Achaemenid kings are hardly suitable for a religious government to traverse the path of a nation's ancestors and revive the glory of the Achaemenid era, recalling the first charter of human rights presented to the world by Cyrus the Great. Although Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the Navy, at that time described this journey as a "normal" visit with a message of "peace and friendship to the countries of the world." In late August of this year, Admiral Sayyari, speaking to a group of students, emphasized: "We have a history of seafaring, and we have had the science, technology, and knowledge of it since ancient times." However, Admiral Sayyari had previously stated after that visit seven years ago, "In Syria, we agreed to continue these reciprocal visits, and the Syrian commanders asked us to send our experts and high-ranking officials to familiarize themselves with the naval centers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it was also agreed that the Syrian naval group would visit the southern ports of Iran." None of these promises were fulfilled, and Iran's goals of reaching the Mediterranean Sea by sea were not realized. Due to existing challenges in the regional environment, Iran was unable to establish a regular program for utilizing the Suez Canal, which is an international waterway open to all countries. Naturally, the lack of diplomatic relations with Egypt, the existence of a hostile relationship with Israel, and Western concerns about Iran's long-term objectives in the region have been the root causes of this failure. Shortly thereafter, with the emergence of the so-called "Islamic Caliphate" in the operational scene of the region and the occupation of areas in Syria and Iraq, regional relations became more complex. All these negative factors have not only remained unchanged to this day but have also created new conditions that have called into question Iran's regional intentions. An article on August 22 in The Spectator examines Iran's regional objectives from a new perspective. The article's author, Ayman Jawad Al-Tamimi, an Oxford graduate and researcher at the Middle East Forum, believes that the continued retreat of Islamic Caliphate forces in Iraq and Syria opens the door to a new dialogue that connects today's situation to the Iranian warship's maritime journey to Syria in 2011: "Iran's land route to the Mediterranean through Iraq and Syria." Al-Tamimi references a June 9 article in The New Yorker by Dr. Philpott, which discusses Iran's new route to the Mediterranean shores of Syria. The author cites officials from the Kurdistan Regional Government, stating that Iranians can traverse from their border to the Mediterranean without hindrance. The Kurdistan officials told the New Yorker author that in 2012, the Kurdistan Regional Government opposed Iran's request to use its territory to reach Syria, but today the situation has changed, and Iran can access the Mediterranean shores without passing through Iraqi Kurdistan. By connecting its supported groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, and the Iranian-influenced government in Iraq, Iran has managed to establish a land line from Iran to the Mediterranean, and now the Kurds are seeking President Trump's intervention to block this "Iranian road." This land line is also known as part of the Shiite crescent. The strategic geography of the Shiite crescent starts from Iran and passes through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to Gaza. Currently, this concept has only theoretical and political significance and lacks a tangible geographical structure. The Sunni triangle of Iraq (between Tikrit, Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi) and the Sunni areas of eastern Syria effectively create a barrier against the Shiite crescent's land line and obstruct its communication routes. Two-thirds of the northern lands of the Euphrates Valley, which separates eastern Syria from western Iraq, have a homogeneous Arab and Sunni population. Another potential obstacle to Iran's land route to Syria is the Syrian Kurds, who control the cantons in northeastern Syria. The People's Protection Units (YPG) in these areas are supported by the U.S., although the Turks vehemently oppose them, considering them linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and terrorists. Some other areas in eastern Syria and western Iraq, which are not entirely Kurdish, have a mix of Turkmen, Assyrian Christians, and Yazidis, none of whom sympathize with the Shiite leadership from Tehran or the formation of the Shiite crescent. In these areas, the Syrian Democratic Forces, particularly those that have attracted a significant number of Sunni Arab fighters, are under U.S. air support and represent a significant barrier to Tehran's plans for the region. So far, the U.S. has not shown support for the fragmentation of Syria or Iraq, but if support for the plan to divide Syria and Iraq is given, history will witness a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Arabs, and the Sunnis will naturally obstruct Iran's influence along the Shiite crescent, dragging Iran into a war in the region whose end and results are unpredictable. Both Damascus and Baghdad seek to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq. For this, the Iraqi government is willing to assert national sovereignty with full authority in the Sunni triangle (between Tikrit, Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi) to eliminate any grounds for internal rebellion motivated by Sunni and Shiite sentiments and to prevent the emergence of another rebellious group like the Islamic Caliphate. It should not be forgotten that Russia's entry as an influential power in regional issues and disputes is a significant factor that must be considered in this strategic game. Russia will strive to keep the Assad regime in power, and both Iran and Syria are committed to and in need of an active role for Russia in this region. In this regard, the continuation of conflict in the Middle East may be Russia's best option. Changing Iran's Route to the Mediterranean However, The Guardian in May addressed Iran's change of route to the Mediterranean in light of the U.S. supportive stance towards the YPG. According to The Guardian's author, Iran has changed its route 225 kilometers southward to avoid friction with the areas where U.S. forces are concentrated for the fight against ISIS. In fact, based on a map published by The Guardian, Iran's new corridor enters Iraq after crossing border points, heads towards Bakuba north of Baghdad, and from there passes through Tal Afar to Mayadin and Deir ez-Zor, then to Damascus and Homs, and finally from Homs to the port of Latakia on the Mediterranean coast. The Guardian claims that the order to change the corridor was issued by Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force. The Guardian cites European officials stating that the establishment of this route has gradually taken shape since 2014, aiming to transport goods and passengers between Iran and the Mediterranean. This route could transform Iran's presence in Arab territories. Almost all foreign sources attribute the clues of this strategic route to the control of the Quds Forces and its commander, Qassem Soleimani. Iranian Officials When looking at Iranian sources, we see the remarks of Mohammad Kazemi, a representative of the people of Malayer in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, regarding the development of railway lines in the west of the country directly related to this plan. According to ISNA news agency, during a visit to the Malayer railway on Thursday, December 9, 2016, the representative of Malayer expressed his hope for the swift realization of the project, stating: "The western railway of the country begins from Arak, then reaches Kermanshah and the port of Latakia in Syria." The remarks of the Malayer representative, who is also the head of the Judicial and Legal Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, do not clarify how the national railway network, while domestic roads require continuous development and maintenance, will solve any problem by passing through a second country (Iraq) and reaching a third country (Syria) to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and how it will be operational. Two years prior, similar statements were made by Seyyed Masoud Nasr Azadani, the Deputy for Construction and Development of Railways, who said, "The railway route connects to the railways of Iraq and from there to the port of Latakia in Syria and the open waters of the Mediterranean Sea and Europe." These statements, which have been made in various forms for two years, are interpreted by foreign observers and countries concerned about Iran's long-term objectives as reflecting Iran's intentions to reach the Mediterranean Sea, especially when at least simultaneously over 40% of Syrian and Iraqi territory was occupied by ISIS forces. Even today, parts of key points of this corridor remain under ISIS control. The Mehr news agency criticized that the utilization of the western railway project has taken 27 years and seen five governments, reporting the inauguration of its domestic section to Kermanshah within the next three months. However, it is unclear how long it will take for a 600-kilometer railway that has taken 27 years to complete to pass through Iraq and Syria and connect to the "Mediterranean Sea and Europe." Instead, the mere proposal of such claims has sufficiently harmed Iran's international image. Conflict and Aggregation of Interests According to the aforementioned Spectator article, before the Syrian civil war, the theoretical land route from Iran to Syria and Lebanon through Iraq existed, but Iran primarily used air routes to support its influenced forces and deliver supplies. This method continues today, and in general, the U.S. and its allies cannot prevent the use of air routes. However, for Iran, if air routes to its influenced groups in the region are blocked, "the existence of a land route is attractive." But such a route for transporting military support, given the obstacles described and the presence of Islamic Caliphate forces, especially in the desert areas between Iraq and Syria, is not simple and devoid of danger. For this reason, the interests of Iran's supported forces are in moving towards eastern Syria. Syria's own interests also lie in controlling those areas and opening communication routes with Iraq. Some important agricultural resources in eastern Syria are essential for the country's survival. Otherwise, the Syrian regime will become increasingly dependent on its allies, Russia and Iran. Iraqi Shiite militias also have their own rationale for attacking areas in western Iraq adjacent to eastern Syria. The Spectator's author quotes Jaafar al-Husseini, spokesman for the Kata'ib Hezbollah group, stating that the connection of forces on both sides of the border "by securing the Iraqi border, preventing the movement of armed [Islamic Caliphate] individuals, helps liberate Syrian territory and is part of our belief that the battle of Syria and Iraq is common." This article has attempted to highlight some of the strategic complexities of the region for further discussion. Each actor pursues its own logic, interests, and long-term goals, which are not necessarily aligned with those of other actors and can even be contradictory or pose a threat to others.