Iran's Power in the Middle East: From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics

The region referred to by the West as the 'Middle East' is undergoing one of the most tumultuous periods in its history, and its future is more uncertain than ever. The borders remaining from the famous Sykes-Picot agreements, signed in 1916 between the colonial empires of France and England, appear to be shaky, and the upcoming referendum in the Kurdistan region of Iraq will naturally add to the ambiguities. Whether countries like Iraq and Syria can return to their previous political normalcy within their old borders, or whether Lebanon and Jordan can remain stable within their current boundaries, faces various uncertainties. Beyond the Near East, which was formed on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, other countries like Yemen and Libya are at risk of fragmentation. From the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, Iran, due to its population, history, and geographical dimensions, is one of the most important countries in the Middle East, and its role in contemporary regional events has unexpectedly increased. Given the severe developments occurring both within and around Iran, assessing its real power is of great importance for both its ruling apparatus and for other countries at both regional and global levels. In defining the concept of 'power' in international relations, we rely on the definition of Raymond Aron, one of the most renowned theorists of international relations during the Cold War, who stated: 'Power in the international arena is the ability of a political unit (country) to impose its will on other units.' The tools that countries use to impose their will on the international stage encompass a wide range, from military power to economic power and even ideological and cultural power. If we take Raymond Aron's definition as a criterion, to measure Iran's power in the Middle East, we must consider the impact this country has had on events to date, as well as its degree of success or failure in imposing its will on other regional countries. From the perspective of the theorists of the Islamic Republic, Iran is the only regional power that can redefine the rules of the game in the Middle East. The presence and influence of Iran in the 'four capitals' (Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa), and more importantly, its established influence along the Mediterranean coasts, are emphasized as the most important signs of the country's rise by several military and civilian figures of the Republic. A significant portion of Western observers of Middle Eastern affairs also share this assessment. Here, we refer to the latest example of this viewpoint, an article by Alain Frachon, one of the prominent writers of the French newspaper 'Le Monde,' published in the Friday, September 8 issue of the same newspaper. Given the influence of 'Le Monde' in France, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, its perspective on Middle Eastern issues cannot be overlooked. 'Le Monde' writes that for the first time since the Persian Empire, Iran has established itself from a position of power in the Middle East. According to him, among the events that have brought misfortune to the Middle East in recent years, only one regime has consolidated its power, and that is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 'Shia house' in a large part of this region is under the control of this regime, and the leaders of the Islamic Republic have a veto right in matters concerning Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps Yemen. Alain Frachon writes that, given Iran's position, an unprecedented situation has arisen in the Middle East, and the Iranians have a seamless land corridor between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, and they do not need a visa to move within it. From his perspective, the 'Sunni front' against Shia Iran lacks unity, and Tehran has been able to get closer to some members of this front, from Turkey to Hamas and Qatar. However, Alain Frachon states that the excessive expansion of Iran's sphere of influence in the Middle East could be dangerous for the country. He likely means that such expansion could unify Iran's rivals. The perspective of the 'Le Monde' writer regarding the dimensions of Iran's power in the Middle East, like similar views expressed within the country by some theorists of the Islamic Republic, does not align well with reality. It is likely that some experts within Iran, who are well aware of the country's fundamental weaknesses in various fields, would be surprised to read the article in 'Le Monde' and would evaluate its perspective as superficial. The analysis of this French newspaper reminds the author of this note of the writings of Western media and even some European and American politicians in the 1980s and 1990s about the regime of Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current dictator of Syria. There were many analysts during this period, especially after Syria's grip on Lebanon, who described the Damascus regime as a symbol of the reconstruction of the Arab Empire during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, who was recognized as a great strategist, had no qualms about calling Hafez al-Assad the 'Bismarck' of the Middle East (referring to the famous Chancellor of Prussia in the 19th century). Today, we know that Hafez al-Assad, the Ba'athist 'Bismarck,' by establishing a bloody dictatorship in Syria, paved the way for his country to sink into the current abyss and its irreparable destruction. Regarding Iran's presence in the 'four capitals,' and how such a policy can contribute to the sustainable interests of the country, one must be very cautious. What the current Middle East needs is not Shia flexing against Sunni or Iranian against Arab. Succumbing to illusions related to the reconstruction of ancient empires to provoke nationalist instincts is also very dangerous. In the current conditions of the Middle East, the primary priority is to mobilize civil societies and intellectuals in the region to prevent the flames of religious, national, and tribal wars from flaring up even more. However, beyond these general considerations, the firm emphasis on the rise of Iran's power in the Middle East has another major flaw, which is the neglect of principles that are considered in the definition of power in the 21st century. In this definition, both geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives must be taken into account. A deep and comprehensive examination of these two perspectives is not possible in this article. Simply put, it can be said that in geopolitics, elements such as territory, population, the number of mobilizable military personnel, the quantity and quality of armaments, and other similar factors are emphasized to define a country's power, whereas the geoeconomic perspective considers a country's role in international trade and investment, gross domestic product, the level of people's welfare, the weight of the national currency, the number of large enterprises, technological capability, etc. These two perspectives complement each other, and both must be considered in assessing a country's power. The theorists advocating the rise of Iran's power in the Middle East, and foreign observers (including the writer of 'Le Monde') whose analyses about Iran and the region reach the same conclusions, completely overlook Iran's enormous weaknesses in the geoeconomic field and, conversely, often superficially exaggerate some aspects of the Islamic Republic's geopolitical advances in a piecemeal manner without regard to their long-term consequences. In today's world, real power is one that can rely on strong economic foundations. And this is the very factor that the Islamic Republic is entirely deprived of. For example, Iran has fundamental problems in water, the main source of a country's survival. Eisa Kalantari, the former Minister of Agriculture and the newly appointed head of the Environmental Protection Organization, recently stated: 'Studies show that over seventy percent of the country's environmental problems are in the water sector, and the continuation of the current trend for the next fifteen years will lead to the destruction of our several-thousand-year history.' He had previously stated that given the water crisis in the country, if no solutions are found, a large part of the population will have to leave the Iranian plateau. How can a country facing such a significant internal problem become a sustainable power in the Middle East? Can such a fragile country take on the role of a power that governs the fate of the Middle East? There is no doubt that in a region with the characteristics of the Middle East, Iran cannot and should not be deprived of a strong military capability. But the best way for Iran to achieve sustainable power is to create a strong economic foundation by unleashing energies and easing tensions in the country's international relations. Other factors such as an oil-dependent economy, severe weaknesses in the industrial sector, unemployment, corruption, lack of economic foundations including a real banking network, foreign trade focused on low-quality goods, a weak currency, etc., block the path to Iran becoming a real regional power. For geoeconomic reasons, Iran not only cannot become a real power, but it also faces the risk of internal collapse. Four years ago, during the sanctions related to the nuclear issue, this danger loomed over Iran. This is a point that Hassan Rouhani, the President of the Islamic Republic, highlighted in his electoral program under the title 'Iran Again' for his second term in office. He writes: 'Few can deny the truth that in 1392 (2013), the country was on the brink of financial bankruptcy, and if oil exports had reached zero, the government would have faced serious problems in managing the country's current affairs and meeting the basic needs of the people (such as paying employees' salaries and providing essential goods). At the same time, the inflation rate would have increased unprecedentedly and alarmingly, and the value of the national currency would have fallen by more than four times or more.' Hassan Rouhani continues: 'If such conditions prevailed in the country, there would be no need for a large-scale military attack from the enemy, as the country would have collapsed from within.' Can such a fragile country take on the role of a power that governs the fate of the Middle East? There is no doubt that in a region with the characteristics of the Middle East, Iran cannot and should not be deprived of a strong military capability. But the best way for Iran to achieve sustainable power is to create a strong economic foundation by unleashing energies and easing tensions in the country's international relations.