Iran's 'Retreat' from Syria Ahead of Russia's Military Return

The high-profile military retreat of Russia from Syria occurred as a result of an unofficial military shift accompanied by relative news silence: a significant reduction in the number of Iranian military forces in that country. The recent military action by Russia, which began five months after the bombing of Assad's opponents and with the return of several fighter jets on Tuesday, March 15, continued on Wednesday. The unexpected decision by the Kremlin, despite a reduction in the volume of Russian air equipment in Syria, including a halving of about 60 fighter jets, is intended to moderate Russian military operations in Syria and to stabilize their enduring military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Currently, Russia has four military bases in Syria: the naval base in Tartus, the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia province, the al-Shayrat airbase in Homs province, and the Kweiris military airport in Aleppo countryside. Moscow is determined to play the role of a regional power in the Mediterranean, and access to the naval base in Tartus facilitates the movement of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean waters. Considering the retention of parts of Russian military equipment at all four existing bases in Syria, including the S-400 missile defense systems and all helicopters, the announced military retreat can be seen as a revision of the previous decision regarding a full and increasing military presence in Syria; an action that prevents a repetition of the disastrous operations of the Red Army in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the five-month air operation by Russia in Syria, which primarily targeted the Islamist opponents of the Damascus government, was aimed at consolidating the military position and improving the political standing of Bashar al-Assad in that country. The re-deployment of Assad's forces in several villages in western and northwestern Syria, on one hand, and the presence of the Assad government in the Geneva peace negotiations as a main party to the peace talks, which effectively acknowledges the existence of a government that was previously considered a condition for the beginning of negotiations to form a transitional government in Damascus, is a direct result of Russia's five-month military operations in Syria. The announcement of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's immediate trip to Moscow to continue recent efforts to establish and maintain a ceasefire in Syria indicates the coordination of recent military developments with the political actions of Moscow and Washington. The symbolic return of part of the military forces from Syria has also resulted in financial savings and garnered public support in Russia. Concurrently with the start of Russian air operations in Syria, the ground military operations of the Islamic Republic's allied forces, composed of dispatched IRGC forces, referred to as advisory forces, Hezbollah of Lebanon, and also Shiite fighters recruited by the Islamic Republic from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan increased, and correspondingly, the number of casualties among these forces also rose. The direct involvement of the Islamic Republic in the Syrian civil war began in 2011 after the Arab Spring spilled over into Damascus, during which Tehran equipped Assad's government with equipment to counter urban uprisings and surveillance devices. However, within a year, street protests spread to other cities in Syria, and in 2012, the Islamic Republic sent Hezbollah to assist Assad while also deploying Quds forces in an 'advisory' capacity in the internal conflict. Due to the lack of a clear military exit strategy from Syria, advisory engagements gradually led to the direct military presence of Iranian forces in the Syrian civil war and the equipping of an infantry force composed of Shiite fighters from neighboring countries (Iraqis in 2012, Afghans in 2013, and Pakistanis in 2014). Despite Tehran's denials, the number of captured Iranian forces in Syria and videos released by Assad's opponents made the presence of Persian speakers on the battlefields of that country undeniable. In November 2015, a month after the start of Russian air operations in Syria, reports indicated that Iran organized a 'military assault' against Assad's opponents, in which between 2,500 to 3,500 Quds forces and up to 4,000 Lebanese Shiites and hired Shiite fighters were present. According to John Kerry's statements on February 25 of this year in the U.S. Congress, the dispatched Quds military forces to Syria were largely returned to Iran in February of this year, and currently, only 700 IRGC members remain in Syria. During the course of direct military engagements, Iranian casualties in Syria have been estimated at 340 killed, which should lead to a reduction in Iranian war casualties (ten percent of total forces) as a result of the shift in Russian military operations in that country, where the number of casualties did not exceed the fingers of one hand. Political negotiations and bilateral interaction between Moscow and Washington regarding the future of Syria take shape while, despite the declared objective of the airstrikes five months ago, the 'ISIS' regime still exists in Mosul and northern Syrian areas, and Bashar al-Assad, in his official statement regarding this matter, without the slightest reference to the Islamic Republic's share and the human and financial costs incurred by Iran to maintain his government in Damascus, only appreciates the 'courage and efficiency' of Russian forces. Thus, during a critical transitional phase in the Syrian civil war, the foreign military operations of Russia in that country have decreased, and correspondingly, the political participation of the Kremlin in the process of determining the current and future government in Damascus has increased; a process in which Tehran appears to be a 'sleeping partner' inevitably forced to submit to the selective policy of its larger partner.