Iran's Role in Syrian Ceasefire Negotiations: In the Text or on the Margins?

Since December 30, 2016, a ceasefire agreement in Syria between the central government and armed groups (excluding ISIS and Al-Nusra) has been implemented, with Russia playing the main role in establishing it. Despite its fragility, this agreement managed to gain the support of the Security Council. One day after the announcement of the ceasefire, the Security Council unanimously expressed its approval of the proposed Russian resolution (number 2336) as a sign of agreement among the major powers (with veto rights) on a path where Russia (not the US or other veto-holding countries) has played the primary role so far. Regardless of Moscow's prominent role as a supporter of the Syrian government in opening this diplomatic solution in the six-year Syrian war, a pertinent question arises: what is Iran's role in this round of ceasefire negotiations? Is Iran at the center of the negotiations or on the periphery? In other words, has the Islamic Republic played a significant role in this political process or is it merely a reactive player? The importance of this question is evident when we consider that the Islamic Republic has invested all its political-military weight in Syria and in favor of Bashar al-Assad's government to prevent his downfall. In addition to billions in aid to the Syrian government, the Islamic Republic has also suffered significant human losses among its senior military officials. This does not include the human casualties incurred by Hezbollah or the Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi Shiite combat units affiliated with Iran in the Syrian civil war. Therefore, given the financial-military-logistical-political support of the Islamic Republic for Bashar al-Assad's government, the above question is crucial: is Iran's presence in the ceasefire negotiation process central or peripheral? Russia and Turkey are at the center, while Iran and Syria are on the margins. The fact that Moscow's role in this negotiation process is so prominent that there is no mention of the US or other global powers in the formation of the ceasefire is not surprising. In the absence of the US, Russia has been able to play the leading role in the developments in Syria with its military presence and now with its diplomatic presence. Moscow has hosted several rounds of negotiations between the conflicting parties (excluding ISIS and Al-Nusra) so far. This means that Russia has successfully kept the negotiation channel open with the involved parties. However, in comparison to this prominent military and then political presence of Moscow in the Syrian developments, does the Islamic Republic also have a significant presence in the political negotiations after its military involvement in Syria? The claim of this note is that evidence and signs indicate that not only is Iran's presence peripheral in the negotiations, but Turkey's presence is central. This claim is supported by the fact that in the news of the ceasefire signing in Syria, only the names of Russia and Turkey were mentioned, not Iran. Additionally, in the text of the Security Council resolution, while Russia and Turkey are mentioned, there is no mention of Iran at all. Part of the resolution states, 'A joint Russian-Turkish committee will be formed to provide necessary proposals to the ceasefire parties regarding the responsibility for violations and to coordinate punishments for ceasefire violators. Representatives of this joint committee will be stationed in Moscow and Ankara, and there will be direct contact between them.' In simple terms, this resolution indicates that Turkey is the guarantor of the opposition's adherence to the ceasefire provisions, while Russia is the guarantor of the other side (the Syrian government and its allies, including Iran). The drafting of the resolution as described implies that Turkey has a significant role in the negotiations, while Iran's role is peripheral. The effective role that Turkey plays is evident in that Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, in announcing the ceasefire agreement, emphasized that his government would never agree to the continued rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This position from Turkey elicited a reaction from Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, who stated, 'President Assad is the elected president of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Turkish Foreign Minister must respect this reality.' In this context, it is understandable why the outcome of the last round of phone negotiations between Rouhani and Putin resulted in nothing more than the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) quoting Putin as saying, 'Russia, Turkey, and Iran are three guarantor countries [not enforcers] of the ceasefire.' The implication of such a statement is that Tehran is obliged to implement the provisions of an agreement that has been established by Russia and Turkey. It was not without reason that Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on January 4, called on Iran to pressure Shiite militias and the Syrian government to stop violations of the ceasefire in the country. While the essence of such a statement implies violations of the Syrian ceasefire by Iran-affiliated groups, the Turkish Foreign Minister used threatening language, stating, 'Turkey is cooperating with Russia regarding the imposition of sanctions on those who violate the ceasefire agreement in Syria.' From such a stance, it can be inferred that alongside Russia's prominent role, it is Turkey that plays the second role in the developments in Syria, including in imposing sanctions on ceasefire violators (even if it is Hezbollah). More importantly, Turkey's other position is that it considers the guarantee of the Syrian ceasefire to be the complete withdrawal of all armed militias (including Hezbollah) from Syria. Given Hezbollah's central role in the Islamic Republic's calculations, it is clear that such a condition set by any country (Turkey, Russia, etc.) signifies Iran's peripheral role in the ceasefire negotiations. How can it be imagined that Tehran has an effective role in the negotiations while accepting a ceasefire conditioned on Hezbollah's withdrawal from Syria? It was not without reason that Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, stated that despite the ceasefire in Syria, Hezbollah will not leave the country. He said, 'Hezbollah has sacrificed many martyrs and has provided the most assistance to the Syrian government, and the Syrian government still considers Hezbollah and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah as its very close friends, and this [Hezbollah's withdrawal from Syria] is enemy propaganda.' In line with this claim (the marginalization of Iran's role in the Syrian ceasefire negotiations), the remarks of Ali Khorram, a former Iranian ambassador to the UN, are understandable, as he wrote in the Shargh newspaper: 'Moscow's role and its cooperation with Ankara in sidelining Tehran is a testament to the fact that Moscow does not take Iran seriously.' In this context, the views of Dr. Nemat Ahmadi, a lawyer residing in Iran, are also noteworthy. He wrote: 'Turkey has packed its bags from the Syrian war. But where is Iran? The defenders of the shrine sacrificed their pure lives so that the Iranian team would be empty at the negotiating table? Where is Bashar al-Assad in all of this? I hope we are not sidelined again.' Conclusion: No war lasts forever. A conclusion is also conceivable for the Syrian civil war. However, what is important is with what baggage the parties involved in this war exit. Based on this, if we consider the Islamic Republic's strategy to be the preservation of Bashar al-Assad in the power structure, to the extent that Velayati considered Bashar al-Assad a red line for the Islamic Republic, has the Islamic Republic achieved its goal of ensuring Assad's survival in power? From the explicit mention of Turkey in the Security Council resolution to this country's positions regarding the removal of Assad and the withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria, it can be inferred that if a ceasefire is formed with these implications, the Islamic Republic will be left empty-handed. According to the proposed Security Council resolution, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, is set to be the venue for the next round of Syrian negotiations by January 15. It is certain that what the adopted Security Council resolution (proposed by Russia) emphasizes is the implementation of the provisions of the June 2012 meeting (known as Geneva 1), where all participating countries agreed on the necessity of forming a 'transitional government' and approving a 'new constitution' in Syria while 'the Islamic Republic was not invited.' Given that the Geneva 2012 resolution was strongly rejected by Tehran in the same year, it remains to be seen whether the Islamic Republic will participate in this round of negotiations? And will the outcome of the Astana meeting stabilize the two strategic allies of the Islamic Republic (Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah)? If the answer is positive, it indicates Iran's effective role in the Syrian peace negotiations, and if the answer is negative, it signifies the Islamic Republic's peripheral role after suffering financial and human losses.