Iran's Security Institutions as 'Hostages'

The website 'Start Four' has reported on the detention of dual nationals in Iran by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of which is as follows: The IRGC will continue to detain foreign citizens and Iranian nationals with citizenship or residence permits in Western countries as a tool to defend its interests and maintain its legitimacy. With the increase in the return and travel of Iranians living abroad due to the reduction of Iran's international isolation, these arrests may increase. These actions contradict the efforts of Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, to reintegrate Iran into the global economy. Although in January 2016, coinciding with the implementation of the nuclear agreement, the Iranian government released five Iranian-American citizens, during 2016, five dual nationals living in Western countries were arrested, and according to public statistics, 16 of these individuals are currently imprisoned in Iran. The Iranian government has a long history of suppressing and imprisoning political opponents, journalists, and dissidents. However, currently, the arrest and imprisonment of a small group of dual nationals highlight the significant role of Iran's security institutions in the fate of Hassan Rouhani's reform efforts. Since 2008, Iranian security institutions have arrested at least 29 individuals with strong ties to abroad, and about half of them are still in prison. Most of them are dual nationals who hold citizenship from the USA, Canada, the UK, and other European countries. Their professional backgrounds and employment are very diverse. Most have been convicted of espionage, collaborating with foreign governments, and alcohol consumption. However, some of them were imprisoned for months without being charged with a crime or even given an official explanation, and then were released in the same mysterious manner in which they were arrested. Some of these arrests have clear political or national security motivations. From Sabri Hassanpour, a host of an anti-government television program, to Amir Hekmati, a former U.S. Marine who was still working on defense research programs in the U.S. at the time of his arrest in Iran, to Robert Levinson, a retired FBI agent and CIA contractor, who, at least on the surface, Iranian security institutions should be sensitive to such individuals. However, it seems that in other cases, prisoners have been somehow lured to Iran. At least in two cases, individuals who traveled to Iran with official invitations from government institutions were arrested and imprisoned. Nizar Zaka, a Lebanese citizen with permanent residency in the U.S., was invited by government officials to participate in a conference in Tehran and was arrested at the airport upon leaving the country in September 2015. A year later, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for espionage by the Revolutionary Court without any evidence being presented. In April 2016, Ahmad Reza Jalali, a senior emergency medicine and disaster researcher residing in Sweden, was arrested after attending a conference at the invitation of Tehran University. According to his wife, the judge threatened to sentence him to death. It is unlikely that any of these sentences will be fully executed, as Iranian-American prisoners have also been sentenced to death or long-term imprisonment, but each was released in some way, either through prisoner exchanges or mediation by the Sultan of Oman. The motivations behind these arrests are that Hassan Rouhani has been trying since his victory in the 2013 presidential elections to resolve the nuclear crisis with the international community on one hand, while also creating an environment for attracting foreign investment and encouraging Iranians abroad to return to Iran. In contrast, the powerful IRGC seeks to benefit from Rouhani's reforms. Although the lifting of nuclear sanctions has alleviated some pressures, the continuation of missile tests has intensified sanctions against the IRGC. Therefore, this institution must act in two directions to defend its interests. First, it must always have cards in hand for negotiations with the U.S., and second, as the economic space in Iran opens, it must protect its extensive economic interests. This explains why the IRGC has conducted at least 11 of these arrests over the past nine years out of a total of 29. The release of Iranian-American citizens in January 2016 clearly demonstrated what an important factor could be in negotiations with the U.S. However, for the IRGC, the issue is not limited to prisoner exchanges. For this institution, which considers itself the absolute guardian of the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran, foreigners or Iranians with foreign citizenship can only engage in economic activities in Iran if they adhere to the political and ideological frameworks of the regime. This stark difference between the IRGC and Hassan Rouhani in how to open Iran's doors to foreign capital and investors is evident. The lack of transparency has led to a clear divergence between government policy and security institutions, especially the IRGC, revealing their disagreements and, of course, the judiciary regarding the cases of some prisoners. However, these cases get caught in the corridors of factional disputes and power struggles, with families of prisoners being the only source of information. Finally, from a legal perspective, another problem is that Iran does not recognize dual citizenship for its citizens. Ultimately, what is certain is that the number of arrests is on the rise. The number of arrests in 2016 was eleven, which is equivalent to the total number of arrests made between 2011 and 2015. This is a number that has been made public so far, and the actual figure may be higher. If, considering the lifting of sanctions and the improvement of Iran's economic relations with the West, the return of Iranians living in the West to their country increases, it is likely that we will witness more arrests in the future.