Iran's Strategies to Counter New US Sanctions

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA should primarily be seen as a declaration of 'economic war' against Tehran. In other words, Trump has taken the Iranian economy 'hostage' to extract the concessions that were not achieved in the JCPOA. Initially, it was believed that the JCPOA would serve as a 'roadmap' to end all challenges between Iran and the West (the US and its allies). Barack Obama pursued the JCPOA with the motivation of 'changing the regime's behavior.' However, it is now clear to all negotiating parties that the JCPOA was a flawed product from the beginning. Among the numerous disputes that have developed over decades between Tehran and Washington, while Iran's nuclear capability was the primary concern for the US, it was not the only concern. The expansion of Iran's regional influence and its increasing missile capabilities are other worries that Trump is using to try to bring the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table by taking its economy hostage. It should not be forgotten that when Ayatollah Khamenei changed tactics and called for a 'heroic flexibility' to open dialogue with the US, he admitted that this change was made to 'ward off the evil' of the US (read: to relieve economic pressure). Given the lack of economic improvement from the JCPOA, what are the political options for the Islamic Republic to counter the US's economic war? This question is significant because even officials of the Islamic Republic acknowledge the severity of the country's economic situation. If Obama's hostage-taking of the Iranian economy (crippling sanctions) led to the Supreme Leader's heroic flexibility, then Trump's motivation should be seen as a direct repetition of Obama's model. But will he succeed in this approach? How do the sanctions regimes differ between the Trump and Obama eras? Trump's lack of global consensus-building power is notable. Obama's success in bringing Iran to the negotiating table was the result of two key factors that he successfully combined, compelling Ayatollah Khamenei to accept negotiations with the 'Great Satan.' These two factors were: First, Obama's global consensus-building power against the Islamic Republic, much of which was due to the destructive and anti-national policies of Ahmadinejad. Second, Obama's reassurance to the Supreme Leader that the US was not seeking regime change in Iran. Therefore, he consistently used the full title 'Islamic Republic of Iran' in his numerous messages, including Nowruz greetings, and never sought to create a divide between the leader and the people in his speeches. The increase in military confrontations between Iran and Israel has the potential to shift the troika's support towards Trump in favor of Israel. Russia, due to its good relations with Israel, will not side with Tehran in the military conflicts between Israel and Iran. Thus, it is possible that in the dire economic situation of the country, a widespread war could engulf Iran, completely altering the equations. In the economic war that Trump has launched against Tehran, modeled after Obama, both of these factors are absent. So far, he has not brought his closest allies (Britain, France, and Germany) along for new sanctions against Tehran; rather, he has sufficiently alienated his allies by unilaterally withdrawing from UNESCO and, more importantly, the Paris Climate Agreement. He has even threatened to exit NATO if its members do not increase their financial contributions to the military costs of the organization. This means leaving Europe alone in the face of Russian threats. This indicates that although European countries are not pleased with Tehran, they are also not pleased with Trump. For example, from Europe's perspective, the US's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, while Iran has adhered to all its commitments, legally constitutes a breach of contract by a country like the US. However, the second absent factor is the threats that Trump has directed at the survival of the Islamic Republic. Although he has never explicitly spoken of regime change in Iran, the arrangement he has gathered around him has deeply reinforced this perception. Appointing someone like John Bolton as National Security Advisor, who has explicitly spoken of overthrowing the Islamic Republic, is a clear example of such a reading of Trump's objectives. In his recent message, he clearly attempted to create a divide between the people and the Islamic Republic's government. As mentioned, not only does Trump lack global consensus but the current conditions have shaped in such a way that, similar to the Khatami era, the European troika (Britain, Germany, and France) will not side with the US despite all their differences with Tehran, keeping the door for negotiations with Tehran open. This is the strength that led to Tehran's reaction, even from Ayatollah Khamenei, to the US's withdrawal from the JCPOA being a 'conditional survival' in the JCPOA. How far Europe can resist Trump's pressures is another issue, but at least so far, the two sides of the Atlantic do not agree on applying pressure on Iran. Furthermore, Trump does not have Moscow and Beijing, who joined Obama's sanctions regime, on his side; rather, he is in tension with them. The Syrian quagmire has the potential to draw Iran into war with Israel and to lead to the troika's exit from the JCPOA as Israel and the US desire. On the other hand, it is no coincidence that the 'Look to the East' approach is once again being heard from Islamic Republic officials as a method to counter the sanctions. This approach first emerged during Ahmadinejad's era when sanctions intensified; an approach whose decay and deterioration became evident at that time. This is why the 'Look to the East' approach was never emphasized in the statements of the Supreme Leader. Instead, he has recommended a model of resilient economy after four decades of the Islamic Republic's existence, the effectiveness of which against Trump's economic war remains uncertain. As stated, although the components of Iran's sanctions during Obama's era are not observed in Trump's era, this does not mean that this situation will not change. Evidence can be found that the European troika may once again align with the US. Now, Syria has not only become a bottomless pit for consuming Iran's financial and human resources but, according to the latest developments, it has also turned into a battleground between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Israel has attacked the positions of the Quds Force in Syrian territory several times, and Iran has responded once by sending a drone and another time by firing 20 missiles at Israeli positions in the Golan Heights (which it did not officially claim). The repetition and increase of military confrontations between Iran and Israel have the potential to shift the troika's support towards Trump in favor of Israel. Russia, due to its good relations with Israel, will not side with Tehran in the military conflicts between Israel and Iran. Therefore, it is possible that in the dire economic situation of the country, a widespread war could engulf Iran, completely altering the equations.