Iraq in 2014; Between the 'Islamic State' and the Islamic Republic

Following the June 2013 elections, Iran acquires a new president who bears little resemblance to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the previous president. Hassan Rouhani, the new president, is known for his moderation and manages to secure over 50% of the votes in the first round of elections, allowing him to assume the presidency without a runoff. For a country that had endured eight years of Ahmadinejad's disastrous presidency, this outcome was satisfying. Less than six months after the elections, representatives of the Islamic Republic engage in serious negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program with major European countries and the United States in Geneva. The result of this effort is a relatively swift entry into the implementation phase of an agreement aimed at ending Iran's political isolation and lifting economic sanctions against the country. Throughout 2014, Iran and the so-called 5+1 countries spent considerable time seeking practical solutions to reach a final agreement and implement the Geneva accords, but negotiations are expected to continue until the first half of 2015. Domestically, significant differences are largely hidden behind the protective veil of Shia religion and 'concerns' for Islam, but it seems that most factions are more worried about the towers of Niavaran than about Islam and its champions. In the absence of political parties, various factions fight each other through different platforms, spokespersons, religious edicts, or specific office statements; whenever the pressure is high, they either act against the opposing side or expose 'the offspring of the elite' or save the entire string by sacrificing a piece like Babak Zanjani. However, across the borders in Iraq, the situation is different. Iraq, following the withdrawal of foreign forces, is engulfed in the bloodiest internal violence, with over 900 people killed in internal conflicts in just one month in October 2013, at the hands of extremist Sunnis. Two months later, the United Nations estimated the death toll for that year at 7,157, more than double the previous year's figure of 3,238. In the last month of 2013, at least 35 Christians were killed in church bombings in Baghdad on Christmas Day, indicating that the instigators of war have issues not only with Shia but with anyone or anything that is not Sunni. This reveals the purely religious nature of the killings and marks the peak of violence by insurgents and extremist Islamists in Iraq. The year 2014 is considered a year of expanding the influence of extremist Islamists in Iraq. In January, clashes between government forces and Islamist fighters in Anbar province escalate, and the government manages to wrest Ramadi from the hands of the insurgents, but Fallujah remains under their control. Events in April and May create problems for then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Shia). He, who enjoys unwavering support from Iran, holds parliamentary elections under very difficult conditions for the first time since the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2011 but fails to secure a majority and cannot form his cabinet without an alliance with other parties. Although Nouri al-Maliki, the Shia prime minister of Iraq, outpaces other competitors in the parliamentary elections (securing 95 seats out of a total of 328), he does not hold a majority of votes. This becomes the first significant barrier to forming an inclusive government, which was never achieved. While this fragile victory is welcomed in Tehran, in practice, Maliki's inflexibility in sharing power with Sunnis accelerates the rise of fighters who call themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is important to note that in the political-military arena of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the three main pillars of his regime—the feared intelligence organization, the Ba'ath Party, and the Ba'athist army (including Saddam's presidential guard), which were predominantly in the hands of Sunnis at high levels, completely collapsed and were not integrated at any level into the transforming Iraqi society. Since then, all key positions have been held by Shia. After the formation of Maliki's government, the role of Sunnis and Ba'ath party members in running the country remained diminished, and despite American pressure to create an inclusive government, Sunni participation decreased day by day. This factor became one of the main reasons for the formation of groups like ISIS. ISIS, shortly after its emergence, targeted vast areas of Iraqi territory and population. Attacks, according to UN statistics, claimed the lives of more than 5,500 civilians from June to October 2014. The death toll over the year reached 10,000, and if the number of injured is added, it exceeds 26,000. Gradually, some of these killings took the form of mass executions of Kurdish ethnic groups and smaller, more vulnerable groups such as the Yazidis. In fact, the 'Islamic State,' while lacking the legitimacy of a government, has committed crimes against humanity. ISIS uses young children as soldiers and subjects women and girls to brutal attacks and killings or sells them as slaves in markets. Additionally, it has killed lawyers and doctors in areas under its control for not cooperating. The international community's finger of blame for the crimes committed by the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria is not solely pointed at the Islamic Caliphate, as Iraqi government forces and government-backed militia groups also face similar accusations. Meanwhile, the Islamic Caliphate has officially claimed the killing of at least 1,500 military personnel as a propaganda effort and has publicly beheaded many foreigners and Western journalists on television. Between April and June, the popularity and desirability of the prime minister diminish daily, and he is accused of monopolizing power and depriving Sunnis of government and military positions. Ultimately, Maliki is forced to resign with the emergence of the armed group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has been reduced to 'Islamic State.' The process of Maliki's resignation was tumultuous, and prior to that, several moderate Sunni and Kurdish ministers in his cabinet resigned in protest. Finally, under comprehensive pressures and in the face of widespread public protests, Maliki resigned from the premiership on August 14, 2014, while threatening to pursue the matter through Iraq's Supreme Court. His successor is Haider al-Abadi, who was tasked with forming a new government three days before Maliki's resignation by Iraqi President Fuad Masum. Maliki's government had been in power for at least two terms and systematically sought to marginalize Sunni groups, leaving Shia predominantly in charge while Sunnis were deprived of essential positions, especially military applications. The fact that Maliki had the best relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and received help from Iran was not an advantage that satisfied all of Maliki's associates, particularly the Iraqi military. However, suddenly, Maliki unexpectedly lost Iran's support, and some sources even claimed that this was the reason for his resignation. Haider al-Abadi is also a member of Iraq's Dawa Party, which was formed during the exile of its leaders in Iran. Abadi, like Maliki, is supported by Iran, although Iran remained silent for at least 24 hours before announcing this support. Western circles question how billions of dollars from the U.S. in Iraq failed to create a relationship as strong as that between Iran and the Dawa Party. It is worth noting that a significant number of Iraqi Shia fled to Iran after 1979 and were hosted by the Iranian government until 2003. The warm relationship that exists today between the Shia of the two countries is partly related to the historical ties of Shia belief and largely the result of a quarter-century of the Islamic Republic's support for Iraqi political actors who had once sought refuge in Iran. The issue of Kurdish independence and Iraq's territorial integrity - one of the political consequences of the military occupation of Iraq in 2003 was the emergence of a disjointed federal system in Iraq. In early summer 2014, given the inability of the official Iraqi government to exert sovereignty over all Iraqi territory, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region attempted to indirectly declare Kurdish independence by emphasizing the will of the people and testing the reactions of regional countries. In an interview with a CNN reporter, he stated, 'The time has come for the people of Kurdistan to determine their future, and we will stand behind the will of the people.' He emphasized that 'after the recent events in Iraq, it has been proven that the Kurdish people must take advantage of the opportunity created – the people of Kurdistan must now determine their future.' However, the events that followed this unofficial declaration of Kurdish independence did not allow the long-held dream of the Kurds to become a reality but demonstrated how the Peshmerga of Kurdistan were willing to sacrifice to achieve their aspirations. They stood against the 'Islamic State' and fiercely resisted against ISIS's encroachment in areas of Iraq and against the attempts to invade Kobani and Sinjar, despite Turkey's obstruction. In any case, while Kurdish independence was delayed, it strengthened the possibility that under suitable conditions, the Kurdistan Region could officially become an independent country from its current unofficial independent status. Iran and the U.S. alongside the Kurdistan Region In August 2014, news agencies reported the flights of cargo planes to the Kurdistan Region, apparently from Iran to Erbil, delivering weapons to the Kurds. While the Iranians do not seek Kurdish independence, they are willing to help the autonomous region's government fight against ISIS forces, which have approached within 50 kilometers of Iran's borders. Simultaneously, the U.S. government is also strengthening the Kurdish Peshmerga by sending ammunition and weapons to counter ISIS's advance in Iraq. Alongside the strengthening of Kurdish forces, the Pentagon continues airstrikes against ISIS positions. Meanwhile, U.S. deployed forces in Iraq are training Iraqi military personnel to make the best use of available intelligence and to halt ISIS's advance within Iraq. At the same time, Iran's Quds Force, led by Qassem Soleimani, is also organizing similar activities in other areas of Iraq regarding irregular warfare. From October onwards, ISIS forces impose an unprecedented war on the local population. On one hand, they control areas like Rawah, Ana, and Fallujah, and on the other hand, they occupy Heet and surrounding areas, continuing their battle with Iraqis in Ramadi, with the overall goal of occupying Baghdad. These areas form a long line on the map of Iraq, the maintenance of which requires considerable maneuverability and mobility. Overall, the provinces of Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar, and Nineveh are either under ISIS control or are exchanged between Iraqis, Kurds, and ISIS. Meanwhile, ISIS forces have ongoing movements in areas of Syria and cities along the Syrian-Turkish border and the Kurdistan Region, with Kobani being one of the most significant points. Other areas targeted by U.S. coalition airstrikes include the Sinjar mountains, the area known as the Mosul Dam, and Erbil. The occupation of any of these points by ISIS has caused the flight and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi families, with satellite maps and studies from the New York Times estimating that in major areas like Mosul, Tikrit, Sinjar, and Anbar province, this could lead to the flight and displacement of 180,000 families. Although many border areas have been under ISIS control, the Iraqi government has recently claimed to have regained them. A look at the future of Iraq and the region Some studies suggest that the formation of ISIS dates back ten years to the beginning of the occupation of Iraq by George W. Bush. ISIS is just one name among these groups, and there are other intermediary groups that are mainly active in Syria and occasionally in Iraq. It seems that in the last weeks of 2014, especially after failing in the Kobani operation, ISIS is engaged in internal purges or reorganizing the remaining forces that have remained loyal to it and have not been eliminated during the bombings. In 2015, new attacks and changes in ISIS's strategy should be anticipated. Currently, about three thousand U.S. forces have been tasked with accompanying Iraqi forces in operational areas while U.S. helicopters provide them with air cover. There is a possibility that more forces will be officially deployed to Iraq; however, it is unclear whether the increase in U.S. forces will face new resistances within the Iraqi government and what Iran's reaction to this situation will be. The movements of the Quds Force in Iraq and the potential presence of an unspecified number of Basij in various areas of Iraq could potentially complement the operations of U.S. coalition forces; however, as long as Iran and the West do not agree on how to cooperate to combat and eliminate ISIS, parallel movements could create friction in operational aspects. All these ambiguities and the uncertainty of the objectives of the parties involved in the operational scene of Iraq paint an unclear future for Iraq. Despite the tensions and the costly presence of ISIS, Iraq is a wealthy country with considerable potential. If the presence of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other extremist Islamic groups leads to the fragmentation of parts of Iraqi and Syrian territories and a new country emerges in the midst of this historic region.