IRGC on US Terrorist List; Speculations and Consequences

One of the interests of American media is to uncover important points of the President's speech before it is delivered. This process begins days and weeks in advance, with journalists trying to validate their speculations through direct questions. For this purpose, they question everyone from the President himself to the White House spokesperson and ministers believed to have information on the subject, as well as advisors and those who write the President's speech. As the President prepares to deliver his third report to Congress regarding Iran's compliance or non-compliance with the nuclear agreement, one of the most pressing questions is whether the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will be placed on the US terrorist list. Why the IRGC? - Most signatories of the JCPOA and even some American officials distinguish between Iran's actions within the framework of the nuclear agreement and its foreign policy in other areas. The International Atomic Energy Agency considers Iran compliant with the JCPOA. European countries also trust the Agency's report, but when other calculations come into play, a gap emerges between Iran's actions and other matters considered the spirit of the JCPOA. From their perspective, the JCPOA is the result of diplomatic coordination, while Iran's destabilizing and security-threatening actions in the region stem from the actions of military organizations, particularly the IRGC. The IRGC's footprint can be seen in all missile activities, cyberattacks, support for terrorism and terrorist groups (Hamas and Hezbollah), threats to Israel's security, and also in groups involved in proxy wars in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Yemen). According to various reports published annually by the US State Department, Iran ranks at the top of the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Such actions, by definition, constitute state terrorism or direct state support for terrorist operations, differing from the actions of terrorist groups. A look back - For years, Iran was labeled as the 'largest state sponsor of terrorism.' During President Obama's administration, on June 2, 2016, the US State Department published a report on terrorist attacks in 92 countries worldwide (in 2015). This data showed that 11,774 attacks had occurred, resulting in 28,300 deaths. This list once again identified Iran as the 'largest state sponsor of terrorism.' The 2016 report and the repetition of this accusation were significant because the US had just finalized the outlines of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which the Obama administration considered one of its major achievements. Meanwhile, 2015 and 2016 were the peak years for the terrorist operations of the so-called 'Islamic Caliphate' in Iraq and Syria, and it was expected that in light of these two important issues, Iran's name would be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, this did not happen, as the global criteria for this title revolve primarily around Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah, which has not only not improved but has also increased. Less than three months ago (July 15, 2017), a new report from the State Department - this time in the first six months of Donald Trump's presidency - was released. Iran remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism alongside Syria and Sudan. Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, who is known for his disagreements with the President regarding foreign policy and the preservation of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), was the last US Secretary of State to emphasize Iran's role in supporting terrorism. He accused Iran of supporting anti-Israeli groups as well as proxies involved in conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The referenced report also emphasizes Iran's continued role in supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is currently portrayed not only as an anti-Israeli force but also as a force acting alongside Bashar al-Assad against the Syrian opposition. Previous reports typically mentioned a unit within the IRGC known as the 'Quds Force.' However, the 447-page report released this summer, just days after new sanctions against Iran for missile tests, targeted elements of the IRGC and the Quds Force for their 'destabilizing role in military conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen,' describing them as the 'executing arm of foreign policy goals, providing cover for espionage operations, and creating instability in the Middle East.' Iran's name was mentioned 112 times in this report, with a full chapter dedicated to it. If the IRGC is placed on the terrorist list - so far, the Quds Force and its commander have repeatedly been listed as supporters of terrorism. Some military commanders of the IRGC and units involved in military trade have been included in such lists, and even after many nuclear-related sanctions were suspended, those that were non-nuclear remained on the list. However, when we look at the overall sanctions, they actually involve individuals or military-industrial institutions that are scattered and whose sanctions alone do not lead to a change in the government's political behavior. The logic of the US President is that sanctioning the IRGC may help change Iran's behavior or force Iran to reconsider its regional actions and align them with international requirements. The goal of the US government is to create a much larger problem for Iran to induce a change in its non-nuclear behavior. However, if the IRGC is actually placed on the extensive US sanctions list, it would mean that any known commercial, economic, communication, and military activity of the IRGC would be scrutinized under sanctions, and any entity globally that attempts to establish a relationship with the IRGC would be subject to US sanctions. Other countries may contest this law, arguing that the US has no right to impose its laws on others, and may even file complaints against it with the United Nations. Reactions in Iran regarding the potential listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organization have sparked a wave of responses within Iran in recent weeks. The most severe reactions have come from IRGC commanders, who have also attempted for the first time to leverage the diplomatic credibility of Iran's foreign minister to bolster their threats. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, stated on Sunday, October 8, at a strategic council meeting of the IRGC that if the US, out of 'foolishness,' considers the IRGC 'a terrorist group,' 'the IRGC will also regard the US Army as equivalent to ISIS worldwide, especially in the Middle East.' He then added, perhaps to soften his statements, that 'new US sanctions will eliminate any chance of interaction forever.' Meanwhile, in another statement, he eliminated any positive interpretation of 'interaction,' stating that 'the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to resolve regional issues outside the negotiating table; there is neither anything to negotiate nor any party for it.' When we put all these statements together, they convey one meaning: a declaration of military conflict in the event the IRGC is placed on the terrorist list and sanctions are implemented. The rejection of any negotiation in any form and the resolution of issues on the battlefield has no other meaning. Jafari clearly outlines the boundaries of his threats with his next statement: 'If the new US sanctions law is implemented, this country must relocate its regional bases within a radius of two thousand kilometers of the range of Iran's missiles.' The interpretation of this threat by US military observers and analysts is that Iran, relying on its produced ballistic missile capabilities, can target many US bases neighboring Iran with missile attacks, and thus the IRGC's option is military confrontation. Politically interpreting these statements, one must ask whether the sanctions are not precisely due to these missiles and the threats arising from them? Does General Jafari consciously and with this reaction preemptively confirm the rationale for US sanctions? Instead of resorting to provocative rhetoric, Iran could optimally utilize the protective umbrella of the international community and organizations of which it is a member. Concurrently, any direct or indirect negotiation is preferable to military provocations. Military confrontation is not only not a solution but also provides solid justification for legitimizing the cause of sanctions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The day after the statements, Bahram Qasemi's remarks leave no doubt that General Jafari's statements were made consciously and with an understanding of the current sensitive situation. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed hope that the US would not commit this 'strategic and significant error' of placing the IRGC on the list of terrorist groups; otherwise, 'Iran's response will be hard, decisive, and crushing, and the US must bear the consequences.' On the same day, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister, also announced a 'reciprocal action' if the statements attributed to the Trump administration were realized, adding that actions have been designed that will be implemented 'at the appropriate time.' Zarif's statements were confirmed by Major General Jafari, who believes there is 'good coordination' between his remarks and Zarif's. Government Spokesperson - On October 10, following statements from other officials, Mohammad Baqer Nobakht, the government spokesperson, who usually intervenes less in IRGC statements, interpreted the very declaration of the IRGC as a terrorist organization as a terrorist act and stated: 'If the US considers the IRGC a terrorist group, they themselves will undoubtedly be in the ranks of terrorists.' This statement, which simultaneously reflects the Islamic Republic of Iran's anger at the possibility of the IRGC being placed on the terrorist organizations list, also indicates the extent of coordination and planning that has taken place to express it. Five years ago (December 3, 2013), Zarif stated in a speech at Tehran University: 'The West does not fear our four tanks and missiles. They fear this people. Do you think that the US, which can disable all our military systems with one bomb, fears our military system?' At that time (December 12, 2013), in addition to sharp reactions from the IRGC, the Basij, the spokesperson of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and Friday prayer leaders, Mohammad Ali Jafari had responded to Zarif's remarks by saying: 'Today, the enemy cannot weaken our missile capabilities even with thousands of bombs.' Now, five years later, it seems that for sensitive issues related to the country's military capabilities, broader coordination is taking place. However, another important point that can be inferred from these coordinated statements is that the decision regarding the type of response in the event the IRGC is placed on the terrorist organizations list has been predetermined, and based on this decision, the likelihood of a range of friction - from low intensity to high intensity - is predictable: A - Low-intensity incidents and events: friction between the US fleet in the Persian Gulf and IRGC speedboats in Iranian coastal waters. The possibility of heightened tensions through reciprocal fire, claiming that the other side was the instigator. Iranian-supported forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, where proximity to US military forces exists, may act on their hostility. There is also the possibility that under certain conditions, these attacks may be carried out under a cover and appearance similar to that of the 'Islamic Caliphate' forces to obfuscate the issue. There may be bombings and explosions that appear to be carried out by ISIS but are actually conducted by individuals who have internal support and whose movements have been facilitated due to their access to classified information. US-supported forces and even American soldiers in parts of Syria may be attacked by Iranian-supported personnel, and for example, the implicit agreement regarding the demilitarized zone in certain border areas of Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan may be effectively violated. There is a possibility of sabotage in the fight against 'Islamic Caliphate' terrorists and wasting resources that should be used for anti-terror operations. There is a possibility of harassment operations in Kurdish areas and the Kurdistan region that could be carried out with dual purposes against both the Kurds and the West. B - High-intensity incidents and events: such actions may occur at two levels: First, between the IRGC and US military bases using rockets and missiles. Second, between Iranian-supported proxy groups elsewhere in the region, which could include Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbollah and US-supported forces of some opposition groups against Bashar al-Assad. Both scenarios are extremely dangerous and could escalate the confrontation into a regional war. A war that cannot be termed World War III but one that would result in the further fragmentation of Middle Eastern countries. The tension and confrontation arising from the potential decision of the US President (the mechanisms for which are still unclear) is a wrong path that Iran must avoid. Just as France, Britain, China, and Russia have issued warnings about the possibility of this, such tension could have very broad and destructive ramifications. Instead of resorting to provocative rhetoric, Iran could optimally utilize the protective umbrella of the international community and organizations of which it is a member. Concurrently, any direct or indirect negotiation is preferable to military provocations. Military confrontation is not only not a solution but also provides solid justification for legitimizing the cause of sanctions.