Is Ahmadinejad's Return Alarming?

While Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained completely silent regarding the disqualification of his closest friend and associate (Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei), and subsequently stated several times, both explicitly and implicitly, that he does not wish to become active again, he has recently made meaningful appearances accompanied by ambiguous statements. This presence has been promoted and insisted upon by some of his supporters, despite his direct and clear positions. The behavioral analysis of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the function of Ahmadinejad's government, especially in relation to the leader, clearly indicated that despite the arrest of his deputies and close associates, he was informed and warned that his personal space would be preserved, but he must not err again. Ahmadinejad, despite his great ambition and special interest in being in the spotlight, has been cautious and risk-averse enough to heed these warnings over the years. Has anything changed since the elections of Esfand 94? Although some of his recent appearances at speeches commemorating war martyrs and those killed in Syria, along with the exchange of news and promotional battles in limited virtual spaces and Telegram networks, may not hold strategic importance, they have nonetheless led some journalists and political observers to ponder whether there is a plan for his return to the scene. This concern becomes more significant for this group of friends when placed alongside a serious and strategic issue: the Rouhani government, which has brought the nuclear negotiations to the JCPOA and will have a more cooperative parliament after the recent elections, has little time left and must make changes in the economic situation and daily life of the people in the remaining time of his presidency, even if he shirks his political promises. They are worried that if Rouhani fails in the remaining time, Ahmadinejad could rise again in the 96 elections. In this article, we will delve into this concern. A Fantasy Story It is clear that both Ahmadinejad's loyal supporters and those benefiting from his era have always supported him, directly and indirectly, and have desired the return of his golden age (of course, golden for this group). Some media figures from this group have always kept this desire alive despite Ahmadinejad's denials and rejections. Thus, it is natural that after the elections of the seventh of Esfand, especially after the conservatives' 30-0 defeat in Tehran, this same group would once again offer their gift to the conservative bloc and beat the drum of their propaganda that without Ahmadinejad, you will fail, so people should return to him, otherwise, you will be defeated by Rouhani, Khatami, Hashemi, Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, Larijani, Nategh Nouri, and the rest. Based on this, several speeches and promotional posters from this group should be interpreted as shaking their flag and banner to remind conservatives. Especially since the main conservative media, including their more radical factions, did not welcome these speeches much, and even in the Telegram channels of these radical movements, there was not much coverage of them. However, if this shaking of Ahmadinejad's banner continues alongside his inherent ambition, then one can consider the possibility that part of the radical movements is seeking to revive and reconstruct him. These movements have now almost clearly shown that they are nurturing the idea of making Rouhani's government a one-term presidency. The sharpening of some of the opposition against Hassan Rouhani in publications and their virtual spaces is clearly observable. Although it is evident that some of these radicals themselves oppose Ahmadinejad or at least have no interest in bringing him back due to his confrontations with the Supreme Leader and his disastrous record. The result is that Ahmadinejad could be the preferred candidate for 'some' (not all) of those who intend to make Hassan Rouhani's presidency a one-term affair and are also fearful of the conservatives' recent defeat in the Esfand elections. However, other factions within this spectrum may oppose Ahmadinejad and may not be confident in his victory against Hassan Rouhani, thus likely seeking other figures. The discussion about individuals and tendencies seeking to make Hassan Rouhani's presidency a one-term affair requires another opportunity. It should only be noted that so far there is no strong and documented evidence that this faction of radicals has been able to attract the Supreme Leader's support for this demand and policy. This is because Mr. Khamenei knows well that presidential terms in Iran are usually two-term due to various reasons. Therefore, it can be said that the Leader's indulgence and even sometimes guidance and support for the radical movements' confrontations with Rouhani's government is more aimed at weakening Rouhani's front in favor of the faction and tendency favored by the Leader. Especially since the Leader is both fearful and angry about the strengthening of the moderate front in the recent elections. Now let us hypothetically take another step (even with low probability) in the assumptions we have considered in this article (in strategic discussions and internal political group think tanks, one can usually think and discuss both on the main and stronger plans and probabilities and on weaker probabilities and secondary plans). For example, let us assume that for any reason Ahmadinejad becomes a candidate for the next presidential election, should this be considered a worrying event or an opportunity that could also benefit the democratization process in the country? The results of Ahmadinejad's advance for the presidential candidacy would naturally first need to be resolved between the Supreme Leader and some radicals who hypothetically and presumably support him. Ahmadinejad has both openly mocked the Leader and his government's destructive record in the economy and domestic and foreign policy has revealed some of the Leader's shortsightedness. The Leader's acceptance of his candidacy would be a kind of spitting in his own face. Moreover, the severe economic corruption of his close associates would further undermine the Leader's anti-corruption slogans. For these reasons, the likelihood of the Leader's approval and satisfaction for his candidacy should not only be considered zero but rather below zero. Now, for whatever reason, let us assume that Ahmadinejad's radical supporters manage to gain the Leader's approval for his candidacy (despite previous disagreements and anger and his dark record and despite the security risk posed by his promise of a 250,000-toman subsidy for the entire system), the schism and fragmentation and in fact the unofficial and public rift within the Leader's faction would deepen even more. Because a large part of this spectrum has had issues and even crises with Ahmadinejad and his lawlessness and defiance. A significant portion of the clergy within this political bloc associated with the Leader has also had this dissatisfaction with him and his confrontations (and still does). The Leader's approval and support for Ahmadinejad's candidacy would increase the underlying and sometimes public dissatisfaction with the Leader. A symbolic example of this was the former head of the Astan Quds Razavi, who explicitly drew boundaries. With the arrest of Ahmadinejad's close associates by the judiciary due to financial corruption and the exposure of their corruption during Rouhani's government, this dissatisfaction has been further inflamed. Many prominent figures within the conservative movement have explicitly stated against Ahmadinejad and that his government 'will not be repeated.' Naturally, in this regard, the Leader has cleverly remained silent and will not officially endorse him, and it may even be said in a two-layered manner in some private circles that Ahmadinejad has personally and independently become a candidate and the Leader has no endorsement in this regard, and he has the right to run according to the law! So that eventually his candidacy becomes normalized. Let us continue our fantasy! The next step is the issue of Ahmadinejad's candidacy in terms of how the Guardian Council will deal with him. It is very natural that a large number of conservative factions want to disqualify him. His disqualification by the Guardian Council would confirm the Leader's shortsightedness who had supported him. Moreover, if Ahmadinejad has reached this stage, the Guardian Council, which in recent periods has advanced the plans and programs of the radicals and in fact the Leader's office, would be under pressure from that faction and would not be able to easily disqualify him. His approval would also be a slippery slope towards the other edge of the sword. This would exacerbate the dissatisfaction of a significant portion of conservatives and further deepen the rift between the radicals and moderates within this political spectrum. Just as it would increase their dissatisfaction with the Leader since his approval, despite the many reasons and documents for his disqualification presented by various factions, would practically be seen as effective lobbying and pressure from the Leader's office in this regard. Now let us take this hypothetical scenario one step further. Ahmadinejad's presence during the campaigns and debates would create the largest political dichotomy in the country in three decades. Although he may still have a base among some very low-income groups, exaggeration should not be made in this regard. Many of these groups are politically very aware and will not vote for him again. He is no longer an unknown candidate who has not been tested and can deceive the public as an opponent of the system who has come to reform it for the poor. Currently, significant portions of low-income groups have access to audio, visual, and virtual media outside the official framework of the system. Moreover, the young and student demographic has also become a reference group among these classes. Only segments of low-income groups will vote for him due to their living conditions and sometimes geographical isolation and the severity of their poverty, which places them at the lowest level in terms of access to independent media and political awareness. Even at this hypothetical stage, Ahmadinejad's severe defeat in this polarized atmosphere and the so-called resolution of his political fate is almost certain (in 88, if that major fraud and cheating had not occurred and the first and second rounds of elections had been held fairly, Ahmadinejad's government would not have even reached a second term). Thus, his defeat would further add to the fragmentation and discord within the conservative camp and their dissatisfaction with the Leader and the radicals who caused this defeat. Let us again imagine and suppose that he encounters no problems throughout these stages (and the system also allows him to enter the electoral competition with his destructive and unsupported slogan of a 250,000-toman subsidy and deceive the people) and for whatever reason, he wins votes and assumes the presidency. Here, we must not forget that he is not a zero-kilometer president either. His presidency will not be a repetition of his first four-year term but will be in continuation of the experience of his second management and presidency. Ahmadinejad in his second term had just learned what was happening in the world and had somewhat grasped the calculations of affairs. Both domestically, where he had become more familiar with the smuggling brothers of the IRGC, and internationally, where he was making significant efforts to get along with the world's leader. This hypothetical stage is just the beginning of the main story! In Ahmadinejad's second presidential term, he tried to offer many concessions to the West to resolve the nuclear issue. Distrust and obstructionism were more pronounced from the Western side, primarily due to Iran's very delayed response, as its experts spent two months trying to convince the Leader and other opposing and radical factions. Ahmadinejad's hypothetical third government would also not be faced with a treasury full of money and oil prices above $100. His interactions in the second government indicated that if he danced to the tune of the Leader's office (which he also had disagreements about regarding the Ministry of Intelligence, etc.), he would seek to negotiate and trade with the West, especially the Americans, in a new economic situation facing a severe drop in oil prices and a desperate need for foreign investment. This would itself mark the beginning of a conflict with the Leader's office. Both types of the Leader's responses, whether approving this government's policies or opposing them, would be detrimental to the Leader's office. 'Opposition' would create problems for the government and the country's executive system, which in this scenario would not come to power (and also would not remain) without the Leader's support, while 'approval' would lead to a discursive and identity erosion of the Leader's teachings among his field forces, who have been trained with radical teachings, resulting in their demotivation and fragmentation. Of course, if we overlook this fundamental issue in the fantasy and hypothetical journey we have had so far, that when Ahmadinejad's closest associates have been imprisoned on corruption charges, with what team and allies does he intend to navigate this entire path and manage the country! Or overlook the fact that he has no idea where he would get the money for the 250,000-toman subsidy to prevent the dissatisfied people from rising up and protesting! But let us continue this hypothetical story to the end. His candidacy would squander the opportunity and possibility of utilizing a more sophisticated populist figure by the conservative faction. A faction that has shown it can maximize the exploitation of the weaknesses and failures of the moderate and reformist movements in the economic domain among low-income groups due to some of its social and religious connections. Ahmadinejad's candidacy in that situation is the worst option.