Is Iran a Paper Tiger?

Jalil Roshandel, a political science professor at East Carolina University in the United States, examines the article 'Iran: A Paper Tiger' by Shirin Hunter, a professor at Georgetown University. The term 'paper tiger' has been used in leftist and Marxist literature primarily to explain the nature of imperialism, aiming to instill self-confidence and courage among local forces to combat great powers by portraying them as hollow and denying their strength. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of leftist powers worldwide, this term lost its classical meaning, and countries that separated from the sphere of communism gradually competed to become new paper tigers. Iran, which had undergone a revolution twelve years before the fall of communism, although unable to make a significant theoretical shift in the use of power, practically turned to power accumulation. The result was a heterogeneous collection of soft and military power centered around Islamic ideology, which is perceived as a threat to peace and security by other countries in the region and great powers. This power, thirty-eight years after the revolution in Iran, has been examined by Shirin Hunter, a research professor at Georgetown University. She titled her May article published on the website of the American University in Cairo 'Iran: A Paper Tiger.' For Iranians, Shirin Hunter is a well-known researcher, and her writings and interviews are often utilized in Persian-language media and within Iran. Interestingly, the Mehr News Agency, which has frequently engaged with Ms. Hunter as an 'Iranian-American thinker' and selectively published her statements, has not reacted to this article, which was published about five months ago. Ms. Hunter refers to various factors in Iran's foreign policy performance where power has been used for political purposes. The examination of multiple cases in this study indicates the limitations of Iran's power or its inability to leverage power. This inability presents an image of a 'paper tiger' for Iran, and in the examples examined, it consistently reaches similar conclusions: all of Iran's clients may prefer other offers to continue their relationship with Iran under certain conditions. The only case that Ms. Hunter does not clearly dismiss is Iran's relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon. A classic example of this is Iran's support for the Palestinians. The article refers to Iran's relations with Palestine at the beginning of the revolution, which 'despite the heavy costs it incurred for Iran in relation to the U.S. and Israel,' had an unexpected ending, as 'in 1980, Yasser Arafat supported Saddam Hussein against Iran.' Another case that Shirin Hunter points to is Yemen. Yemen is a country that has been completely 'flattened' due to Saudi bombings, yet 'Iran is recognized for supporting and financially assisting Yemeni rebels against the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, while there is no evidence for Iran's military support for Yemen.' According to Ms. Hunter, 'the Houthis are not Iran's puppets. If a fair offer is made to the Houthis, they are likely to cut their ties with Iran.' Ms. Hunter's judgments are based on the content of Western and Arab media, reflecting an image they present of Iran. This image is generally built on the belief that 'Iran controls at least half of the Middle East,' and the scope of this authority lacks clear boundaries. While Iran has been unable to establish strong relations with many of its neighboring countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan), in Ms. Hunter's view, it has control in Iraq, Syria, and parts of Lebanon ('thanks to Hezbollah') and supports forces opposing the status quo in parts of the Persian Gulf and regions from Bahrain to Yemen. Following the signing of the nuclear agreement 'JCPOA,' Iran has been able to establish close relations with 'Moscow and Beijing.' However, Ms. Hunter believes that if we take a 'close and impartial look' at the achievements of Iran's foreign policy, compared to 'what it has spent in its neighborhood with money and blood,' the results are meager, and the outcome of 'partnership with Russia and China has also been very limited.' Authoritarian regimes often exaggerate the results of their actions in economic, political, and strategic dimensions. Especially if these types of systems rely on ideology, they can portray their actions as somewhat progressive and successful without measurable or observable practical success. For instance, the Soviet Union could not accept until its collapse that military engagement in Afghanistan was costly or one of the reasons for the system's fall. This country continuously emphasized the values of communism over evaluating its achievements. Similar exaggerations can be observed in Iran's performance. Despite the historical background of competition and conflict with Iraq and the irreparable financial and human costs imposed on the country by an eight-year war, Iran decided to expand its influence in Iraq to support the Shiites. Ms. Hunter believes that Iraq's turn towards Iran during Nouri al-Maliki's premiership occurred at a time when Iraq had been pushed away from the camp of 'Arab states.' Since September 2014, when Haider al-Abadi became Prime Minister of Iraq, the country has tried to use Iran as a card against 'multiple Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which supported several Sunni extremist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.' Despite the valuable assistance Iran has provided and continues to provide to Iraq, the Iraqi government, as the legitimate regime succeeding Saddam Hussein, has not yet recognized its borders with Iran based on the '1975 Algiers Agreement,' which is essentially the basis for the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolution 518, nor has it engaged in any negotiations regarding compensation payments. Shirin Hunter points to other instances of Iraq's non-cooperation with Iran that are usually less discussed within the framework of the two countries' relations. These include 'the refusal to lift visa restrictions for Iranian pilgrims despite the significant income that pilgrimage travel brings to Iraq; and the refusal to cooperate on dust storms that cause significant damage to Iran.' According to Shirin Hunter, this indicates 'the behavior of a country that is not under the domination of another.' There is no doubt that strengthening Iraq's relations with the U.S. since the late presidency of President Obama has been one of the effective factors in this positioning of the Iraqi government, whose leaders are in constant contact with the United States. Another perspective on Iran and Syria - the relationship between Iran and Syria is a subject that attracts many researchers. Mohammad Reza Jalili and Thierry Klenner, in their joint article, which incidentally has also been published by the American University in Cairo, consider Iran's military presence in Syria and 'cooperation with Hezbollah Lebanon since 2012' as a step towards 'strengthening Shiites in the capital of Syria' and believe that Iran has invested to 'establish Shiites in the suburbs of Damascus, especially around the shrine of Sayyida Zainab.' According to Jalili-Klenner, this action has been taken to 'change the demographic composition' so that Shiites are established in sensitive areas. These two researchers believe that this plan has been implemented by relocating Sunnis in important Syrian cities, such as Homs, and border areas with Lebanon, and similar plans are being pursued in Lebanon and Iraq as well. Iran's investment and the Revolutionary Guards' interest in rebuilding Syria, as well as investment aimed at exploiting Syria's internal resources, are among the issues criticized by the opposition in that country. In this regard, Karim Sajadpour, a prominent researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the Middle East, believes that 'Iran behaves with Syria as if Syria is one of its provinces.' The aforementioned article by Jalili-Klenner refers to Iran's use of soft power in Syria. It states that 'as a sign of solidarity with Iran,' in Bahman 1395 (January-February 2017), official celebrations were held in many Syrian cities on the occasion of the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Iranian revolution. 'The Iranian Cultural Center in Damascus, in cooperation with the Iran-Palestine Association,' turned the anniversary of the revolution into a support for the Palestinians and opposition to Israel to 'divert public attention from Iran's actions in Syria to opposition against Israel.' Part of Iran's influence has been achieved through the application of soft power in the region, while the use of military power has been associated with higher costs. However, Shirin Hunter's attention, in addition to Iran's 'accusation' of reviving the Persian Empire and creating a 'Shiite crescent,' is also focused on Iran's relationship with Bashar al-Assad. In her article, it is stated: 'Iran has spent billions of dollars in the Syrian war to support Bashar al-Assad's regime.' The point that Shirin Hunter emphasizes is that despite all the resources Iran has allocated to Syria during the seven years of war, this relationship remains very fragile; and 'if Bashar al-Assad reaches an agreement with Israel regarding the Golan Heights,' he will undoubtedly 'betray' Iran. She considers a similar relationship possible regarding Iran's friendship with Russia, stating that Iran serves as a 'bargaining chip against the West' for Russia. In other words, if 'Russia secures Western cooperation in reaching an agreement regarding Syria, Iran's opposition cannot prevent it.' In practice, we have often seen that Iran is merely executing Russia's demands and does not have a specific vote, especially concerning how to deal with the Syrian opposition. China and Russia - despite its close relationship with Russia and China, Iran has not even been accepted as a main member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 'Pakistan, with the support of China, will soon become a full member,' while Uzbekistan apparently opposes Iran's membership, and 'Russia makes no effort to accept Iran,' somewhat hiding behind Uzbekistan's significant opposition. The main question in this situation is whether for Iran, the use of soft power is more useful and effective than the application of military force? One might say that soft power gradually has an effect, but military power does not possess such a characteristic. This concern arises from a non-constructive foreign policy that, according to Shirin Hunter, stems from an undeniable reality: 'Iran's leadership, especially the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, act more like an Islamic movement than representatives of a government.' In fact, this mode of action, which means the simultaneous integration of soft and military power, exposes its application to greater risks. The mutual fear created from such a relationship, as in the case of Syria, considers the disruption of the relationship as one of the possible alternatives. Iran and the independence referendum in the Kurdistan region - following the referendum on September 25 in the Kurdistan region, the area has witnessed joint maneuvers by Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in the border areas of the Kurdistan region. These maneuvers are immediate reactions and perhaps uncalculated actions aimed at quelling the first step in the independence-seeking movement of the people of the Kurdistan region. The areas where the maneuvers are conducted are against the borders of Iraq with Iran and Iraq with Turkey, and each country has its own meaning and strategic importance. In a sense, these maneuvers can be seen as displays of power in conditions where negotiation and dialogue are not even tested as a more effective option. The continuation of such actions could drag Iran into a new conflict in the region, the consequences of which are unpredictable and will certainly not serve Iran's national interests. Perhaps the use of soft power in this context would be more effective than military power, and perhaps Iran should apply its special approach regarding Kurdistan and avoid following Turkey and Iraq. The aggregation of interests of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria regarding the Kurdish issue is certainly due to a lack of in-depth study on the matter and is practically an illusion. The use of military power in this case could present a different image of Iran as a 'paper tiger.' Developments in the international relations arena are dynamic and time-consuming, and if a system engages in self-correction with an understanding of this dynamism, it will have a greater chance of survival. If this dynamism is not utilized, Iran will have limited choices in the face of pressures from the U.S. President. Unfortunately, the reformists in the Iranian government also neither have the desire nor the ability to change the fundamental values of this 'Islamic movement' from within; and to transform it into a dynamic and effective manner that aligns with Iran's national interests and security. For this reason, the possibility that Iran may also take on the role of a 'paper tiger' increases.