Is Khamenei Responsible for All Mistakes or is Hassan Rouhani Also to Blame?

The cabinet introduced by Hassan Rouhani to the parliament was contrary to the expectations of voters and caused dissatisfaction among many, part of which was reflected in the political structure and social networks. Rouhani, in line with the electoral institution and to win votes against a rival who, according to Ayatollah Montazeri, is 'one of the criminals in history' due to the 'massacre' of several thousand political prisoners, expressed the most radical slogans and promises during the electoral competition. These slogans and promises were so disruptive and taboo-breaking that some expected Rouhani to lead a revolution against the Islamic Republic with his cabinet. After the elections, Rouhani not only did not deviate from his slogans and promises but also raised even more radical slogans and spoke of a 'military government of the IRGC.' He insisted that the cabinet should symbolize the demands of the 24 million votes. However, the cabinet was not accepted. What happened behind the scenes? When Hassan Rouhani visited Ayatollah Khamenei, he was so angry that Rouhani asked him: 'It seems you are very upset about my election?' Khamenei replied: 'Not about your election, but I am very upset about the slogans and promises you made.' Rouhani explained that those radical statements were related to the electoral competition, which has now ended, and that a consensus should be formed to achieve the goals agreed upon by everyone. Khamenei asked him to present his cabinet list, and Rouhani said he would coordinate the entire cabinet with him. When this news was published, social networks sparked widespread protests, questioning why ministers were to be appointed with the leader's approval if elections were held. Ayatollah Khamenei was forced to falsely claim that he only played a role in the appointment of six ministers. Khamenei opposed the appointment of women and Sunnis as ministers. For example, Hassan Rouhani proposed Shahindokht Molaverdi for the Ministry of Education, but Khamenei did not accept it. He also insisted that Massoumeh Ebtekar be removed from the Environmental Vice Presidency. Rouhani introduced 12 ministers for Science and Higher Education, all of whom were rejected by Khamenei. He proposed female ministers for cultural ministries—Education, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Science and Higher Education—but Khamenei rejected all of them. For the Ministry of Interior, he first introduced Mousavi Lari and then Shariatmadari, both of whom Khamenei rejected, insisting that the current minister remain. Ali Larijani shared the same view. Rahmani Fazli was initially one of Ali Larijani's quotas in the cabinet. For the Ministry of Justice, after much discussion, he managed to replace Mostafa Pourmohammadi. He introduced Majid Ansari instead, which Khamenei and Sadegh Larijani strongly opposed. According to Article 160 of the Constitution, 'the Minister of Justice is responsible for all matters related to the relations of the judiciary with the executive and legislative branches and is selected from among those proposed by the head of the judiciary to the president.' Thus, Alireza Avaei, a severe human rights violator, became the Minister of Justice. What kind of individuals does Sadegh Larijani intend to propose for the Ministry of Justice? Ayatollah Khamenei demanded the removal of Ali Younesi and Majid Ansari from the government. He also opposed the replacement of the Minister of Labor. Khamenei even deemed the current Minister of Intelligence insufficiently qualified for the position and intended to change him as well. He was dissatisfied with the level of his confrontation with opponents and social networks. Hassan Rouhani selected all his ministers and deputies during this period in coordination with Ayatollah Khamenei. Responsibility of Hassan Rouhani: Is the governance according to the arbitrary will of the Sultan (according to Article 57 of the Constitution, he has absolute authority) not condemnable? Certainly, Ayatollah Khamenei is the main responsible party for the oppressive and dictatorial regime and must be criticized and condemned for this, including his obstruction in forming a cabinet compatible with the votes and demands of the people. However, this reality does not negate Hassan Rouhani's responsibilities. First, Rouhani expanded the tradition of the Islamic Republic in favor of the absolute rule of the jurist by innovating the coordination of all ministers and deputies. He is responsible for this major error. Second, he did not resist the appointment of any new qualified individuals and did not want to pay the price. Accepting the impositions of the Sultan is subject to criticism and reproach. Third, he retained members of his party despite many weaknesses. For example, everyone opposed the presidency of a weak individual like Mohammad Baqer Nobakht over the Planning and Budget Organization, and even reformists suggested that Rouhani replace the weak Nobakht with Dr. Nili, who is one of his own faction. However, Rouhani stated that Dr. Nili would do his job and is not under my command. The Central Bank president is also weak, and Rouhani was not willing to change him. Ali Rabiei, the Minister of Labor, also had many opponents and managed to remain a minister by buying everyone off. Fourth, Hossein Fereydoun, Hassan Rouhani's brother, is his biggest personal problem. He is accused of major financial corruption. Ebrahim Raisi stated in the third debate that the Deputy Chief of the Judiciary, Mohseni Ejei, came to you with documents of your brother's corruption, and you did not accept it. Hassan Rouhani did not respond to this claim. Mojtaba Zolnouri, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament, elaborated on the details of his corruption in a detailed interview. One night, the arrest of Hossein Fereydoun brought him to the hospital. When there is so much talk about this person, Hassan Rouhani should not only expel his brother from the government but should also transparently demand his public trial to clarify the truth of the accusations. This article does not claim that Hossein Fereydoun has necessarily committed corruption and embezzlement. For example, Mehdi Hashemi, who was tried and imprisoned for the same accusation in a non-public trial, demanded that the court session videos be broadcast on television so that everyone could judge, but the judiciary did not accept this demand. The trial of Hossein Fereydoun should be public, and if he has committed embezzlement, he should be punished. The people did not vote for Hassan Rouhani so that he would pay the price for not addressing the case of a financial corruption suspect, but they voted for him to defend the rights of the nation and national interests and to pay the price for them. Domestically, Rouhani must stand up for the rights of religious, ethnic, and gender minorities and pay the price, but he was not even willing to pay the price for defending the appointment of women as ministers (refer to the articles 'Hassan Rouhani Against the Political Participation Rights of Women,' 'Why Did Ahmadinejad Have Women Ministers Without Promises While Rouhani Does Not Have Women Ministers Due to Broken Promises?' and 'Two Different Types of Demands from Hassan Rouhani: Female and Party'). A Good Deal, A Bad Deal: Contrary to the 'political culture' of the decades before the revolution, compromise is not a negative and treasonous act. Dialogue and compromise are the basis of democracy. Dialogue with an autocratic leader and compromise with him is a desirable and legitimate approach. However, due to the lack of social power of the opponents of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has not been willing to negotiate and compromise with them. When the opponents gain social power, the dictator will be forced to negotiate and compromise with them. Hassan Rouhani's negotiation and compromise with Ayatollah Khamenei is inevitable because Rouhani has not been and is not an opposition figure to the Islamic Republic. He has always been one of the powerful figures of the Islamic Republic. However, when Hassan Rouhani requested and promised that with over 70% participation, major issues could be resolved, it should be examined what compromises he made with the backing of 73% participation and 24 million votes and what he received in return. If he could— or can— obtain permission for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th JCPOA in exchange for what he gave, it means he could enter regional and international negotiations regarding the remaining disputes with Western and Arab governments, especially the United States and Saudi Arabia, which would represent a significant step forward for Iran's 'national interests.' One of the contentious issues is the systematic violation of human rights, which must be negotiated with European governments and the UN Human Rights Council. Resolving the issue of the freedom of the Green Movement leaders and all political prisoners is the work of a corrupt and repressive judiciary that has turned into an extremist political party (refer to the article 'How the Judiciary Became the Front of Steadfastness?'). Fabricating cases is primarily the work of the IRGC's Intelligence Protection Organization and then the Ministry of Intelligence. The house arrest of the Green Movement leaders occurred in 2009, during the mutual infatuation period of Khamenei/Ahmadinejad. The judiciary has increased the restrictions on Seyyed Mohammad Khatami during Rouhani's presidency. Hassan Rouhani has been the head of the Supreme National Security Council since August 2013. He could have and can place the issue of lifting the house arrest on the council's agenda. He did not do so in the first four years of his presidency. This weakness of Rouhani has two reasons: First: According to Article 176 of the Constitution, 'the resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council are executable after being approved by the leader.' The leaders of the Green Movement have been imprisoned in their homes by direct orders from Khamenei, and he is strongly opposed to lifting their house arrest. Second: The members of the Supreme National Security Council include: the heads of the three branches (Hassan Rouhani, Sadegh Larijani, and Ali Larijani), the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri), the head of the planning and budget affairs (Mohammad Baqer Nobakht), two representatives elected by the leader (Saeed Jalili and Ali Shamkhani), the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mohammad Javad Zarif), the Minister of Interior (Alireza Rahmani Fazli), the Minister of Intelligence (Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi), and the highest military officials (Brigadier General Ataollah Salehi and Brigadier General Jafari). Will these members of the National Security Council vote to lift the house arrest? If the issue is raised and they do not vote in favor, the continuation of the house arrest will become a resolution during Rouhani's presidency. Four of them (Sadegh Larijani, General Baqeri, General Jafari, Saeed Jalili) are certainly in favor of continuing the house arrest. The two other military members (Shamkhani and Salehi) are not extreme, but according to military laws, they are subject to the command of the commander-in-chief. Only regarding Hassan Rouhani and Zarif can it be firmly said that they oppose the house arrest. On the other hand, if the council votes to lift the house arrest, Khamenei will reject it. For this reason, Hassan Rouhani has personally raised and pursued this issue with Khamenei, which has not yielded results so far. However, in this case, it can also be said that Hassan Rouhani has not firmly stood up and has not turned it into a demand for which he would pay a price. Personal Future Vision of Hassan Rouhani: The experience of the status of Ayatollah Khomeini's deputy leader (Ayatollah Montazeri), Prime Minister of Ayatollah Khomeini (Mir Hossein Mousavi), and past presidents (Hashemi Rafsanjani, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) during Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership has taught Hassan Rouhani what fate awaits him if he diverges and stands against the leadership. Nevertheless, in the first term, their work often led to open conflicts, and the structure of the Islamic Republic is a tension-generating structure between the leadership and the president. On the other hand, given Ayatollah Khamenei's illness and the possibility of his death in the coming years, Hassan Rouhani has also had an eye on the succession of leadership. Reformists and moderates lack representation in the Assembly of Experts. However, 55 clerics of this Assembly of Experts have requested Ebrahim Raisi to run against Hassan Rouhani. Radical conservatives in this assembly hold a majority. Rouhani has not been and is not their candidate for succession to Khamenei and the IRGC unless he acts in such a way that they have no choice but to elect him. Hassan Rouhani promised 'to create an economic revolution' during the inauguration ceremony on August 12, 2017. If he could fulfill this great promise, a good future awaited him. However, with this cabinet and the tension-generating performance of Ayatollah Khamenei, court theologians, and military personnel, even achieving an 8% economic growth as planned seems out of reach. Role of the People in Mistakes: In democracies, when people elect presidents or parliamentary representatives, they constantly pressure them through media, social networks, parties, organizations, and demonstrations to fulfill their promises and counter their wrongful and dangerous actions. In Iran, where people face a non-democratic regime, they must exert even more pressure on rulers for their demands than in democratic regimes. For example, women and girls actively participated in the gatherings of Hassan Rouhani and his victory. However, after the elections, there was no significant activity from them for the appointment of women as ministers. At the very least, they could have created a massive wave on social networks regarding this issue, but they did not. Thus, what could the lack of active response from women lead to? Without a powerful presence of the people, demands cannot be achieved. The political system is a garment that fits the size of society. If society becomes powerful through organization in civil institutions, it will tear off the garment that has been forcibly imposed on it. Community-oriented approaches—rather than state-oriented ones—demand that democracy seekers turn their gaze back to society and seek power-building and social bases there so that a democratic system can emerge as a result of creating a balance of power.