Is Mohammad Khatami's National Reconciliation Achievable?

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami is a "national figure" and "social capital." Therefore, his actions, plans, and prescriptions create waves and discussions. On February 8, 2017, Khatami reiterated the necessity of "national reconciliation" while referring to the foreign military threat posed to Iran with the onset of Donald Trump's presidency. Many, including Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei's lifelong representative in Kayhan, and Sadegh Larijani, Khamenei's representative in the judiciary, harshly criticized him for this reason. What does this proposal or demand mean? Is there a possibility of its realization and acceptance by Khamenei and the Islamic Republic? If it is feasible, are Khatami and the reformists willing to accept Khamenei's and the principlists' conditions for national reconciliation? This article attempts to clarify at least some of these questions. The application of concepts: Words have meanings beyond "application." Therefore, it is necessary to clarify what meanings are applied to key terms. First - Reformism: Reformism, in contrast to revolutionary fervor, has at least two different applications in the political landscape of Iran. A - Reformism as a non-violent struggle to transition from the Islamic Republic to a "democratic system committed to freedom and human rights." B - Reformism as a practical commitment to the revolution, Islam, the constitution, and efforts to implement the constitution without compromise, particularly emphasizing the implementation of Chapter Three of the constitution - the rights of the people. Second - National Reconciliation: National reconciliation is a topic that arises in dictatorial systems to address the gap between the nation and the government. In the political landscape of Iran, this term also has at least two different meanings. A - National reconciliation as a dialogue between the leadership of the Islamic Republic and the "opposition table" - composed of representatives from all social strata - to hold free elections with the participation of all individuals and groups. In a fair free election where opponents and representatives of the established regime compete, if the opponents succeed, power will be transferred from the ruling authorities to the opponents (experiences from Chile, South Africa, etc.). B - National reconciliation as the reconciliation of the leadership of the Islamic Republic and the principlists with the reformists. In this case, reformists would return to power through electoral institutions, restrictions would be lifted, political prisoners would be freed, and all groups committed to Islam and the constitution would be recognized. What meaning does Khatami apply to reforms and national reconciliation? Mohammad Khatami advocates the second meaning of reformism and national reconciliation. Our claim is not that Khatami opposes the first application of reformism and national reconciliation, but what he explicitly defends does not necessarily equate to the first meaning of these two terms. Perhaps Khatami and the reformists believe that the path to achieving the second meaning requires transitioning from the first meaning and actualizing it. Perhaps Khatami and the reformists do not believe in the first application of reformism and national reconciliation or consider their realization impossible under current conditions. At what stage might "dialogue" and "national reconciliation" be possible? Dialogue between a dictator and opponents and national reconciliation occurs when the dictator realizes that the opponents are "something" or a "weight." That is, they have a substantial social base. If the dictator does not consider them to be anything, why would he engage in dialogue with them? Why would he open the path to national reconciliation through concessions? As long as the opponents are "nothing," "few," "a small minority," and their emergence and presence have "minimal consequences" for the dictator and dictatorship, there will be no news of dialogue and national reconciliation. However, when "opponents with a substantial social base" demonstrate themselves in such a way that their existence cannot be ignored, as this "existence" takes the dictatorship out of its normal state and creates crises that threaten the regime's continuation, in such circumstances, General Pinochet in Chile, General Jaruzelski in Poland, and De Klerk in South Africa engaged in dialogue with their opponents and paved the way for national reconciliation. Dialogue between a dictator and opponents and national reconciliation occurs when the dictator realizes that the opponents are "something" or a "weight." That is, they have a substantial social base. If the dictator does not consider them to be anything, why would he engage in dialogue with them? In all cases, social movements had established social networks and consolidated leadership. From Portugal to Spain. From Chile to Brazil. From Poland to South Africa. The reality is that such a thing does not exist in Iran. "Political dissatisfaction" of the people with the regime is one thing, and "political protest" of a broad social movement with established leadership is something else. For this reason, I have previously explained that the political protests following the 2009 presidential election should be considered an "electoral movement." That is, the opportunity of the elections allowed for electoral headquarters to be formed across the country and for social networks to emerge among them. Those very established networks were able to organize the "political protests" following the elections. The regime's first action was to destroy those headquarters and arrest individuals who were organizing the established networks. When network communications were severed and the cost of "political protest" increased significantly, the primary demand of "political protest," which was the annulment of the elections and holding new elections, did not materialize. The leaders of the movement, as long as they were free, transformed and expanded the demands, but those established social networks no longer existed. Khamenei and his followers falsely spoke of the presence of tens of millions and even 40 million people on December 30, 2009, against the "sedition" and "seditionists." The Sultan, who had diluted the "electoral movement" through severe repression, saw no need for dialogue and national reconciliation, but rather imprisoned the leaders of the "electoral movement" and imposed various restrictions on Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. Even Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was pushed further to the margins. What is the fate of Khatami's "national reconciliation"? Khatami has pursued the ideal of "national reconciliation" for years. He seeks national reconciliation between reformists and the regime, lifting the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement, freeing all political and ideological prisoners, and political and social freedoms. He emphasizes that all of this is achievable within the framework of the Islamic Republic's constitution. This time, the threat of foreign military intervention is the most significant justification for his demand. I believed that this "justifiable and national goal" is unattainable. For this reason, in the articles "The 2009 Fraud: Khamenei's Dilemma or Khatami's Apology Requirement?" August 2, 2013, and "What Does Khamenei Want from Khatami?" January 7, 2014, I spoke on this matter. The passage of more than three years since those writings provides a good criterion for judging those claims. As far as I understand, Khatami cannot achieve this political and moral goal. Because: First - Khamenei considers him, the reformists, and the Greens to be "nothing." Khamenei has paid the cost of throwing the reformists out of the "lifeboat of the regime." Yes, Khatami, as a "national figure" and "social capital," can play a decisive role in elections. However, Khamenei has already disqualified so broadly that the remnants who have entered electoral institutions with the support of Khatami's social capital and the reformists and Greens will not be able to make any steps toward democratic reforms. Barack Obama stated several times that we had three options: first - negotiations and a nuclear agreement. Second - increasing crippling sanctions. Third - military attack on Iran. He added that crippling sanctions would ultimately lead to military action. As far as I understand, defending Hassan Rouhani and Zarif due to the extraordinary nuclear agreement and saving Iran from a war that would lead to its destruction has been and is politically and morally justified. Now, one must also defend Rouhani and Zarif against warmongers. However, Rouhani's cabinet includes a principlist faction that has never been aligned with reforms. According to the constitution, the corrupt suppressor Sadegh Larijani appointed a criminal justice minister (Mostafa Pourmohammadi) for his government, who openly states that he has executed "God's order" regarding his participation in the massacre of political prisoners in the summer of 1988. Among the ministers who are considered reformists, there are corrupt individuals like Nemat Zadeh, whose wealth from 38 years of power is skyrocketing. Most ministers are ineffective, and only Zanganeh - the oil minister - is efficient and has no personal corruption. Engineer Hojjati is also a decent individual. Has anyone in this government other than Hassan Rouhani dared to stand up against the warmongering extremists? Therefore, Khamenei can design the scene in such a way that Khatami's "national figure" and "social capital" will lead to the mayoralty of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. That is, he will approve candidates who, even if Khatami's and the reformists' list wins, will not pose any threat to him and will not be able to take any steps toward democratic reforms. Thus, the first issue is that he does not consider Khatami and the reformists to be a weight. Second - Khatami and the reformists are seeking to build trust. However, Khamenei does not trust them and will not do so. Khamenei explicitly stated why Khatami says in private meetings that no fraud occurred in the 2009 elections, yet he is unwilling to say this publicly and apologize for it (refer to the article "What Does Khamenei Want from Khatami?"). It is true that Khatami has never said that fraud occurred in the 2009 presidential election. However, his alignment with the leaders of the Green Movement, his continuous support for imprisoned leaders, and his request for the release of all prisoners have led to regime restrictions on him. Khamenei has demanded that to prove his "noble character," Khatami must first: officially declare that the claim of significant fraud in the 2009 elections was a lie. Secondly: apologize for this lie. Thirdly: take action to compensate for the damages inflicted on the regime. One thing is clear and one thing is unclear: without fulfilling Khamenei's conditions, there will be no dialogue and national reconciliation. However, it is unclear whether with the fulfillment of these conditions, Khamenei will necessarily open the path to dialogue and national reconciliation. Third - Max Weber explained about a century ago, distinguishing theoretical rationality (the relationship between reason and claim) from practical rationality (the relationship between means and methods with goals), that politics is the realm of practical rationality. In the political domain, politicians choose goals, and then they must select methods and means that lead them to those goals. Of course, the goals and means must be ethical, but first: there is no single morality. Secondly: in the realm of real politics (realpolitik), politicians - even in democracies - are not necessarily committed to ethical principles. Khatami, as a politician - not an intellectual with strong social capital - must calculate how "dialogue" and "national reconciliation" can be achieved. If Khatami and the reformists conclude that the only way to "dialogue" and "national reconciliation" is to officially deny the occurrence of fraud in the 2009 elections and apologize for it, is achieving this goal (national reconciliation, lifting house arrest, freeing political and ideological prisoners, etc.) through incurring that cost (denying fraud and apologizing) "rational" and "ethical"? Another heavy moral and political cost must also be considered in this calculation. This action would severely harm the credibility of Engineer Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnavard. In other words, it would not only reduce their social credibility but also separate many Greens from Khatami, the reformists, and the imprisoned leaders. However, for a long time now, almost all reformists and religious Greens have accepted Mohammad Khatami's leadership. In the 2013 presidential election and the 2015 Assembly of Experts and Islamic Consultative Assembly elections, the leaders of the Green Movement - through their children - expressed their support for Khatami's actions. In the 2017 elections, they will also confirm Khatami's leadership and centrality. If they take foreign threats seriously, they may not oppose Khatami's actions regarding the "necessary condition" for national reconciliation. Fourth - Political courage and political suicide: A political leader must be courageous and, at times - precisely against public sentiment and for national interests - courageously incur costs (let us not forget that the revolutionary era rejected Khalil Maleki). Suppose all reformists, Greens, and prisoners - including Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard - conclude that to achieve national reconciliation, such an action (denying fraud and apologizing) must be taken. Does Mohammad Khatami have the courage to do so? First: It is unclear whether Khatami possesses such courage. Because reputation and credibility often become more precious than human life. Let alone political goals. The intellectual aspects of Khatami's character often outweigh his political aspects. Secondly: From another perspective, this action is a form of "political suicide." By denying the occurrence of significant fraud and apologizing for it, the reformists, Greens, and Khatami may become entirely discredited. In other words, this action is "self-defeating." That is, to open the path for dialogue and national reconciliation, an action is taken that negates dialogue and national reconciliation. Would Khamenei and the principlists be willing to engage in dialogue with a group of liars who have completely discredited the regime with their lies and bring them into governance? Conclusion: Certainly, a "national figure" with "social capital" must be spent for national interests and collective benefits. "National reconciliation" is a justifiable goal, but it is currently unattainable. Khatami and the reformists must demonstrate that they have an actual social base. The "virtual space" is a new power. One way is for them to showcase their power and social base through this medium. However, first: this power is filtered...