Is Mohammad Mokhber the President Desired by Ali Khamenei?

One of the consequences of the death of Ebrahim Raisi is the rise of Mohammad Mokhber Dezfuli in the power structure of the Islamic Republic. Until the end of July this year, he is in the position of managing the thirteenth government; an unexpected situation that suddenly elevated him to a higher level of management in the government. In his youth, Mokhber was a student at Chamran University in Ahvaz and a member of the extremist Islamist armed group 'Mansouroun' that operated against the Pahlavi regime in the 1960s and 70s. Mokhber collaborated with influential figures in the Islamic Republic such as Mohsen Rezai, Ali Shamkhani, and Mohammad Forouzandeh during pre-revolution activities and later during the consolidation of forces known as 'Imam's Line'. His connections and the role he played in dealing with dissenting and political opposition groups, especially during the 'Cultural Revolution', led him to initially play a role in the Dezful branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and then in managerial positions at the telecommunications company in Dezful and Khuzestan province. His tenure as Deputy Governor of Khuzestan elevated him within the governance structure of the Islamic Republic. During Mohammad Forouzandeh's presidency at the 'Foundation of the Oppressed', he established connections with the leadership office while serving as the Deputy of Transportation and Commerce of this foundation and later as the CEO of 'Sina Bank', gradually attracting Khamenei's attention. As a result of these connections, he was appointed in 2007 by Khamenei as the head of the 'Executive Headquarters of Imam's Command'. From this point onward, Mohammad Mokhber became one of the loyal bureaucrats who advanced the desired policies within one of the largest financial cartels of the Velayat-e Faqih framework, expressing loyalty to Khamenei and eventually becoming the first deputy of Ebrahim Raisi. His selection by Khamenei was made to compensate for Raisi's lack of executive experience and unfamiliarity with the country's administrative and managerial issues. Subsequently, with Khamenei's intervention, Mokhber's role in managing the economic affairs of the government increased. In 2022, he became one of the real members of the Expediency Discernment Council. Now, this nearly 69-year-old manager finds himself at the highest political and administrative position of his life. His position in managing the executive branch is not just until the formation of the fourteenth government, but he is also mentioned as one of the candidates to succeed Ebrahim Raisi. Khamenei repeatedly mentioned Mokhber's name during meetings with foreign officials who came to Tehran to pay their respects to Ebrahim Raisi and Hossein Amirabdollahian, assuring them that all agreements made with Raisi could be pursued through Mokhber. Such statements are unlikely to be made about someone who is only supposed to manage the executive branch of the Islamic Republic for a maximum of two months, and naturally, no foreign government would rely on someone whose continuation in power is uncertain. The macro developments of the government, the depletion of elections from meaningful minimal competition after 2019, the emergence of a mafia government, and the emotional atmosphere following the sudden and difficult death of the incumbent president, along with the lack of readiness and short time to form the fourteenth government, are among the obstacles to the competitiveness of the upcoming elections, making it hard to imagine that a normal election will be held. On the contrary, holding an emergency election similar to the third presidential election, in which Khamenei first took the helm of the executive branch, seems likely. In this case, the ninth president will be determined before the voting, and the election will take on a ceremonial nature. Given the current conditions, it is unlikely that the government would be willing to take risks. The emotional atmosphere created and the government's efforts to turn the death of Raisi and his companions into an opportunity to reduce the gap between the nation and the government and display cohesion within the power bloc structurally and technically deprives the elections of the opportunity for competitiveness. In this situation, it is likely that Raisi's replacement will be determined by Khamenei's intervention before the voting. Mokhber's potential presidency would mean a complete delegitimization of the presidency and would effectively indicate a practical transition to a non-presidential state of the presidency. In this case, the Velayat-e Faqih institution, with complete dominance, would advance Ebrahim Raisi's presidential legacy and turn the presidency into a completely obedient executive manager under the leadership's umbrella, just as the Executive Headquarters of Imam's Command has been managed. The cabinet of Raisi represents both the suffering and the simultaneous decline of the system. The head of the government will be a purely executive manager, without interference or comment in political and cultural domains and without acting as a representative of the nation. The justification for replacing Mokhber for various rival factions and groups within the principlist camp could also be the necessity of continuing the activities of the thirteenth government, which begins its second term a year earlier. Although Mokhber has been dominant over economic ministries, his main weakness is his weak political and governing image, which could challenge the ministers' obedience to him. However, if the Pasteur building is to be completely directed from the leadership office, this weakness will not be an obstacle. Another weakness of his is his notoriety for economic corruption and rent-seeking, which, given the expansion of strategic corruption and relations based on a mafia government, is not seen as an insurmountable constraint. However, it is still too early for a final judgment on this matter. The type of performance of Mohammad Mokhber during this short period, which is considered an exceptional situation in politics, will also be impactful. He currently does not have serious opponents among the factions involved in the power bloc and does not face sensitivity, and he holds a neutral position in the international arena. The coming days will clarify the political conditions within the system in the absence of Raisi. Specifically, the status of the fourteenth government and its executive leader will become clear with the start of candidate registration.