Is Rouhani Confident About Continuing His Government?

Hassan Rouhani, the president, expressed a high level of confidence and assurance regarding his success in the upcoming presidential elections during his latest press conference. There was hardly any area where Rouhani mentioned the failures of his moderate government; from the economy to culture, politics, and diplomacy, he appeared satisfied with and defended his government's achievements. His reports and data in the recent press conference were considered his last attempt to promote his government's accomplishments before the registration and serious competition and election campaigning began. The Iranian president also criticized his critics and opponents for presenting incorrect statistics and reports against his government. Rouhani emphasized an important point: 'Statistics and figures must be accurate. The people should not be lied to. It is the highest betrayal to the nation for someone to lie to the people; to present false statistics and statements.' This statement seems to serve as another response to the Supreme Leader, who has repeatedly criticized the presentation of incorrect statistics over the past few months, even calling it a 'sin' and a 'great calamity.' The Supreme Leader has also criticized the gap between statistics and reports and the economic and living realities. Furthermore, in his recent remarks, Rouhani saw no need to apologize to the people or his supporters for any shortcomings in any area. He only stated in response to a question about the situation of students and cultural and media figures during his government: 'On average, I am satisfied, but I am not completely satisfied; because some of the tasks were beyond our control, and our efforts could not be very effective, while in some cases, we were able to resolve issues.' Rouhani did not see the necessity to explain further in this regard and somewhat assessed his failures in fulfilling certain campaign promises (including lifting the house arrest of Green Movement leaders) as understandable for his audience and supporters. However, beyond advertising and highlighting his record, Rouhani showed noticeable signs of confidence in the continuation of his government. Regardless of the fact that he is one of the political actors (agents, main activists) in today's Iran who displays significant confidence in his speech and behavior, why is he so sure of his victory in the upcoming elections? It appears that Rouhani does not see a serious competitor for himself in the upcoming elections; he seems confident of winning in the first round and does not see a significant candidate opposing him. It seems that he and his political allies have concluded, based on the number of candidates or the disunity of opponents, that there is no likelihood of consensus among the opponents of the moderate government, and splitting the votes of opposing candidates will lead Rouhani to continue receiving support from the majority of voters—especially the urban middle class—in the first round of elections. From another perspective, Rouhani seems to be more hopeful than observers assess that his reports and the economic consequences of his government's actions will be attractive and tangible for the majority of society. This majority does not only belong to the urban middle class but also includes a significant portion of the underprivileged layers (including subsets of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation). However, will his votes not be fragile against populist advertisements or the enticing economic promises and claims of some candidates? If the central power considers another candidate—other than Rouhani—will his success be guaranteed? Rouhani and the necessity of reformists and transformation-seekers. Additionally, it seems Rouhani is confident in the necessity of reformists and even a significant portion of the opponents of the regime and transformation-seekers and supporters of the Green Movement to support him. It could be said that the importance of the continuation of the 'moderate' government for reformists is somewhat comparable to the necessity of the continuation of Khatami's government for national-religious forces in the 2001 presidential elections. Although the discursive distance between Rouhani and the characteristics of Mohammad Khatami, the reformist president, is significantly noticeable, in both political situations, forces are compelled to strive for the continuation of the established government because they lack candidates and the ability to pursue their aspirations. Rouhani is confident that reformists and transformation-seekers have no option other than him to gradually realize their visions; for this reason, he sees no necessity to apologize to the Greens for his failure to lift the house arrest of Green Movement leaders. Moreover, he does not even show a willingness to provide an explanation about this issue. In the competitive field for the upcoming presidential elections, Rouhani and the reformists and transformation-seekers assume the continuation of the maximum strictness of the Guardian Council; from this perspective, Rouhani may be the only prominent candidate and main option that shows sympathy for aspects of 'political development' and 'cultural development.' The link between political power and society? Is Rouhani the only candidate standing in the middle of the two fields of governance and society? Evidence—such as the 2013 presidential election—supports this claim. In a sense, after the problematic and ambiguous 2009 elections, Rouhani's presidency undeniably repaired the gap that had formed between the government and society to a significant extent. Although Rouhani was not considered the ideal candidate of the central power and is not the best candidate to pursue the demands of civil society. Perhaps from this perspective, Rouhani adopts a position aligned with the core power approaches in some areas. His implicit and explicit support for the repressive and authoritarian government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria is a significant witness to this claim. In his recent press conference, he spoke of 'peace' and 'denying terrorism' and 'the ballot box solution' for the Syrian crisis, even stating that 'there should be reforms in the Syrian government,' while on the other hand, he links Iran's continued military-security presence in Syria to the issue of 'terrorism and terrorists like ISIS and al-Nusra'; a claim that has long been promoted by the Supreme Leader and the security officials ruling over the IRGC. All this occurs while Rouhani again speaks of the continuation of joint cooperation with Russia regarding the Syrian crisis, and as in all previous months, emphasizes Tehran's support for Damascus. This is while a very significant portion of Iranian civil society activists do not agree with Iran's military-security presence in Syria. With all this, Rouhani's position in the middle of the demands and aspirations of the core power and the majority of voters may be the important point that adds to Rouhani's confidence regarding the continuation of his moderate government for another four years. From this perspective, he sees no necessity to appear avant-garde for the change-seekers in society and does not see a reason to fully align his statements and actions with the projects of the central power. The timing and outcome of the upcoming elections will show how realistic Rouhani and his allies' assessments have been.