Is Rouhani's Foreign Policy Aimed at Containing Domestic Principlists?

Hassan Rouhani, former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, announced his candidacy on April 22, 2013, and officially registered for the eleventh presidential election on May 17. Two weeks later, his qualifications, along with those of seven other candidates, were approved by the Guardian Council, but it was after Mohammad Reza Aref withdrew in Rouhani's favor that he entered the election campaign as the leading candidate associated with reformists, supported by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. Less than four weeks later, according to a statement from the Ministry of Interior published on June 25, 2013, Rouhani received just under fifty-one percent of the people's vote and was elected as the seventh President of Iran in the first round. Although Rouhani's government officially began on August 12, the recognition of him as the President of Iran actually dates back to June 25. The start of serious negotiations for a final agreement on Iran's nuclear file with the 1+5 representatives on the brink of the third year of Rouhani's presidency provided a suitable opportunity to conduct the first review of his two years in office. This review will be presented in successive sections. - Part One: Structural Problems For about two years, the government of moderation and prudence in the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by Rouhani, has been trying to manage the country in a way different from the era of his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, like everything else, politics and governance in Iran are embroiled in extremes, and thus the rules governing perspectives and evaluations intentionally or unintentionally follow the path of excess and deficiency and are usually met with the extreme attacks of hardliners from both ends of the spectrum. Researching and analyzing Iran's foreign policy, especially for a researcher studying from afar and trying to remain immune from extremes, is not an easy task. Global politics is based on interaction and, in itself, on constant change and transformation, but over thirty-five years of political experience in the Islamic Republic of Iran, instead of interaction—which is actually the current president's slogan—has turned into a continuous movement towards anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism. In the text of Iran's foreign policy, hostility towards the U.S. and the West has become a stable belief in a changing environment and is, in fact, contrary to the principle of constant change and transformation that should form the fundamental philosophy of foreign policy. Of course, during this time, there have been few efforts to change the course so that this unreasonable obstinacy can be overcome through internal reform and efforts to influence the center of gravity, but almost all these movements have faced failure or open and covert suppression from hardline principlists. Creating transformation and change for Iranian governments is tantamount to a death kiss. Generally, the majority of the people welcome the idea of change and support the government; however, in practice, Iranian governments are unable to implement the changes they believe are in the national interest and have popular support. One of the most challenging areas for change is in the text of foreign policy, and thus not only in the past two years but throughout the thirty-five-year existence of this political system, changes have either had no results or have been so slow and implicit that they have made no difference from a lack of change. In other words, the government's efforts for change have been met with the stamp of "structural breaking" and thus deemed undesirable and doomed to failure. This trend has been more or less the same during the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami. For instance, the policy of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia during Rafsanjani's presidency and the policy of resolving the nuclear issue during Khatami's presidency both faced failure, and we see how both individuals are treated to this day. Additionally, the results of the recent eighteen-month nuclear negotiations do not smell sweet, and it seems that the system cannot create a significant change in foreign policy orientations, with the goal being only to achieve momentary and short-term results that resemble "a patch on a blind man's brow." - Foreign Policy in Containing Domestic Principlists Today, Rouhani's government faces numerous problems. Principlists, who often hide behind the central power circle and, if necessary, repeat the "leader's" words with personal embellishments, prevent governments from taking positive steps towards fundamental changes, especially when the aim of fundamental change is in the context of foreign policy and rapprochement or even establishing normal relations with the West. From this perspective, despite the stark difference in language and rhetoric between Rouhani and the previous president, and despite his internal lessons from that specific language, he has still not been able to create a suitable environment for fundamental changes at the level of decision-makers in Iran's international policy. In some cases, it seems that change is just around the corner and will happen today or tomorrow, but this is not the case, and with every step Rouhani takes forward, he is pushed several steps back. This situation causes even international observers to arrive at inaccurate assessments of the situation and become confused. The verbal altercation between the Iranian Foreign Minister and one or two hardline representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly clearly shows that opposition to Rouhani's government's steps reaches the level of insult and hatred, and a member of the Islamic Assembly allows himself to accuse the Foreign Minister of treason under the cover of the leader's shield. Since Rouhani himself does not want or cannot cross certain lines, the reaction to the Foreign Minister's remarks, including his statements that "oppressive sanctions must be lifted for investment to come, and issues of the environment, youth employment, industry, society, and drinking water for the people to be resolved, and water resources to increase, and banks to be revived," is met with severe backlash. Since the management knot operates in a chain-like manner, the reaction to the President's words starts from the "leader" and spreads to the underlying layers of the power circle, namely the judiciary, the Assembly of Experts, and the Basij Organization. Each of these layers takes such an extreme position that all economists in the country claim: "...lifting sanctions will have no effect on the country's economy whatsoever." Over thirty-five years of experience has shown that despite the global model of separation of religion from politics, the Islamic Republic has sought to portray the formula of religious governance over politics as unquestionable and to regulate Iran's international relations based on it. Over the past thirty-five years, governments have come to power one after another with this formula and with promises of improvement but have been unable to create fundamental change because changing direction without altering the framework of policy subservience to religion is not possible. What religious leaders have never accepted is that religion cannot have a prescription for the complex issues of the twenty-first century written fourteen hundred years ago that is applicable today. Of course, this does not mean that everything religion says is wrong and incorrect. Shia scholars in the past believed that "the door of ijtihad is open," meaning that new rulings could replace old and rejected ones, and scholars could issue rulings based on the needs of the time regarding issues and problems. However, since the structure of the central circle and the existing center of gravity considers any change to be contrary to and even a threat to its existence, in practice, the door of ijtihad is not open and may even have been deliberately closed. - Has the Theory of Reform from Within Been Successful? Former presidents like Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami tried to implement the necessity of change, especially in relations with the West, through two practical approaches. Khatami attempted to present a model of moderate Islam through domestic and foreign trips and speeches and to improve Iran's external image through internal structural reforms. This earned him unprecedented fame and popularity. However, the point that Khatami underestimated was that he wanted to do these things relying on the people's votes, while the Islamic Republic views the people's votes as a tool and a unique power granted to the central gravity through the constitution as an inviolable principle. Therefore, any government action to reform the system from within is considered a vital threat and opposed by the central power to the extent that today even the publication of images, sounds, and words of Mohammad Khatami is considered a crime. Rafsanjani's approach to change from within was different. He considers himself affiliated with the first leader of the revolution and, as is rumored, fosters the belief that he was one of the elements that created the conditions necessary for Mr. Khamenei to assume leadership. Therefore, he (Rafsanjani) has access to many untold stories from the revolutionary period, the war, after Ayatollah Khomeini, and even the behind-the-scenes of today's system, and moreover, he is aware of the country's interests. With this reasoning, whatever he determines is in the interest of the system must change. Additionally, he even has unspoken realities regarding the opening of relations with the West from the revolutionary period and the first leader, which legitimizes the act of change. However, neither of these two approaches has been able to change the internal structure of the country to date. Essentially, even after the amendments made, the constitution is written in such a way that it does not tolerate change and cannot recognize the principle of power division. The head of the executive branch has less power than a vice president, and the short presidency of Hassan Rouhani has not been an exception to this thirty-five-year rule and has more or less followed it. Rouhani, in his own unique way, is trying to take steps toward change gently and without haste, but the counter-reaction from the principlists is stronger than he can neutralize and take a step forward. - Foreign Policy as Continuation of Domestic Policy Since, in a sense, foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, with the internal policy remaining unchanged, one must still wait for specific and visible changes in fundamental foreign policy issues. The point that has challenged Rouhani's foreign policy thinking is that his government began with a small and aligned cadre in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mohammad Javad Zarif, as the architect of foreign policy, set out to establish Iran's relations with Europe and to take actions regarding improving relations with the U.S. as mentioned in the book "Mr. Ambassador." The only positive action taken in this regard was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' focus on Iran's nuclear issue and the initiation of relatively lengthy negotiations to resolve it, which ultimately led to an agreement at the beginning of 2015. The internal and regional reactions to this agreement showed that Zarif's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in a broader picture, Rouhani's government's foreign policy face serious challenges, and the implementation of the agreement may not be easily achievable. It is now clear that influential elements within are generally opposed to the goals of Rouhani's foreign policy or do not want Rouhani's foreign policy to achieve significant concessions that would overshadow the public's view of the nature and philosophy of managing religion-based foreign policy. Some regional governments are also concerned about any thaw in relations between Iran and the West, but this is primarily a product of Iran's unsuccessful foreign policy at the regional level. When Iran cannot reach agreements with its neighbors on minor issues, resolving major issues with powerful states like Europe and the U.S. is perceived as a threat from the perspective of Iran's neighbors, and they will be more inclined to see Iran permanently engaged with major powers rather than finding the opportunity to address its smaller neighbors. (To be continued)................................................................................................... The author's opinion does not necessarily reflect Radio Farda's viewpoint. Jalil Roshendela, Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University.