Is Russia's Goal to Turn Iran into a 'Satellite State'?

In light of recent developments that could profoundly impact the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, visited Tehran on Wednesday, November 1, to further enhance the groundwork for 'strategic cooperation' between the two countries. During Putin's recent visit to Tehran, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic proposed removing the dollar from the foreign trade transactions of the two countries, and the Russian President promised a $30 billion investment in Iran's oil and gas development projects by advancing the managers of Rosneft and Gazprom. Putin's previous visit to Tehran occurred two years ago to participate in a gas exporters' summit and resulted in the expansion of military cooperation between the two countries in Syria. If an economic dimension is added to the close political and military cooperation between Iran and Russia, Kremlin's influence in Tehran will achieve sustainable stability; a goal that can effectively place the Islamic Republic among the 'satellite states' of the Kremlin through the development of dependencies. The formation of 'satellite systems' in seemingly independent countries, but actually under the military, political, and economic influence of the 'big brother,' is a model that the former Soviet Union pursued throughout the Cold War. With Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in 1985 and introducing a 'new look' in the Kremlin along with 'glasnost' (political openness) and 'perestroika' (economic restructuring), the policy of expanding foreign spheres of influence by the former Soviet Union underwent structural revision and was effectively suspended. After a twenty-year hiatus, Putin has once again focused on the foreign policy of creating spheres of influence in developing countries, a strategy that the former Soviet Union pursued from the end of World War II until the fall of the communist empire. Russia's power projection from West Asia to North Africa, its current military presence in the Mediterranean, and efforts to establish a lasting foothold in Iran can be compared to the behaviors of the former Soviet Union during the 1950s to the mid-1980s. The former Soviet Union's view of Iran was influenced by the general theory of creating satellite states under Kremlin control, and for this purpose, Kremlin leaders aimed for a gradual weakening and step-by-step dependency of Iran—a process attributed to Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s: 'Iran is an apple that will fall into our lap after it rots.' With this historical perspective for expanding influence beyond Russia's southern borders, the Red Army, which had been stationed in Iran alongside the British Army under the pretext of securing fuel supplies for Allied forces, refused to withdraw at the end of World War II. Kremlin leaders took advantage of their military presence to weaken the central government in Tehran, creating two fictitious republics, 'Azerbaijan' and 'Kurdistan,' in the north and west of the country. They later intended to strengthen the 'Tudeh Party' and bring it to power in Tehran during the 1950s, aiming to extend Moscow's satellite regimes to the waters of the Persian Gulf. Following the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, which sparked a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow, the importance of using satellite regimes for Kremlin leaders was renewed. The main driving force behind the expansionist foreign policy of the former Soviet Union was ideological, pursuing the spread of communism worldwide. The impetus for today's aggressive foreign policy of Russia, which is considered the main heir of the former Soviet Union, is political and economic. This policy not only aims to gain regional credibility for Russia but also seeks to stimulate domestic national pride; a factor that Putin has extensively leveraged to solidify his position as a strong national leader. Putin's efforts to create satellite countries and political systems under Russian influence represent a revival of an old policy that held validity until Gorbachev's rise to power in the Kremlin and is now framed within the context of 'developing strategic cooperation with friendly countries.' The change of the pro-Western monarchy in Iran provided a golden opportunity for the leaders of the former Soviet Union to expand their influence in West Asia and the Persian Gulf region. One of the 'variables' that prevented the former Soviet Union from fully capitalizing on the change in Iran's status at the end of the 1970s was the Islamic nature of the newly established government and its contradiction with Moscow's ideological (communist) system, along with the depletion of the Soviet Union's economic capacities and the lagging behind of its commitments compared to its previous capabilities. The establishment and expansion of Russia's foreign influence in the Third World required sustainable balance, and in relation to Iran after the revolution, it was largely based on political-security cooperation. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the Kremlin took on the direct and indirect responsibility for some of Iran's military needs, and after the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 1991, Iran's military dependence on Russia increased with the acquisition of air defense missiles known as 'SAM.' Despite purchasing the Bushehr nuclear reactor from Russia, which was finally operational in 2011 after numerous delays, the revolutionary government's cooperation with Moscow remained limited to military and political spheres. The unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran in January 2012, which were promptly endorsed and implemented by the European Union, created a situation where Russia, if it had sufficient and complementary capacities to Iran's economy or possessed industrial production and growth power, could leverage this to establish sustainable influence in Iran. The rise of Hassan Rouhani's government in Iran and subsequently the signing of the nuclear agreement on July 15, 2015, temporarily disrupted the Kremlin's dream of fully subordinating the Islamic Republic. The arrival of Trump in the White House in January of this year and the encouragement to create an unofficial axis of new cooperation with the opponents of the Islamic Republic, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, aimed at limiting Iran's military presence and political influence, posed new challenges for the Tehran government. Trump's refusal to certify Iran's compliance with the 'JCPOA' on October 14 of this year and the beginning of the approval and implementation of new sanctions by the U.S. Congress, which could be seen as the end of the nuclear agreement in its current form, has placed the Islamic Republic on the brink of a new emergency situation, which Russia is trying to exploit to expand Iran's economic dependencies and thereby solidify its influence in Tehran.