Is the Case of the 2009 Elections Closed?

Seven years have passed since the presidential election on June 12, 2009. Aside from the 2010 parliamentary elections, which were held with a significant boycott from the Green Movement protesting the 2009 electoral coup, a significant portion of the protesters participated in the 2013 presidential and 2016 parliamentary elections. Even Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnavard, leaders of the Green Movement, announced their participation in the 2016 elections from within house arrest. In this case, can it be claimed that the case of the 2009 elections is closed? The coup plotters; a case that remains open. Ayatollah Khamenei took a noteworthy stance in the 2013 presidential elections; he spoke of "preserving the trust of the people's vote" as a "public right" and even stated: "Some may not want to support the Islamic Republic for any reason, but they should support their country, and they must come to the ballot box." The outcome of this election, which was accompanied by a surge of effective reformist citizens at the last minute (after the disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani), was Hassan Rouhani; a candidate who most aligned with the demands of civil society and acted as a bridge between the regime and civil society. The 2013 elections and Rouhani significantly repaired the rift created by the 2009 electoral coup. This situation continued with the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February 2016; especially since not only various layers of reformism and a significant part of the Greens participated, but even the leaders of the Green Movement participated from within their house arrest. Prior to that, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized that "all people should participate in the elections"; he also clarified: "Even those who do not accept the regime should participate in the elections for the sake of the country and its credibility. It does not matter if someone does not accept me; the elections are not for the leadership... everyone must participate in the elections." Despite the core power's efforts to repair the rift between the regime and society after the 2009 electoral coup, and despite the meaningful participation of significant portions of the Greens in the 2013 and 2016 elections, the case of the 2009 elections was not closed for the central power. Not only did Mousavi and Karroubi, the two protesting candidates of that election, remain under house arrest, but the Supreme Leader and his authoritarian allies (in the judiciary, the IRGC, the Guardian Council, Friday prayer platforms, and other allied bodies and institutions) repeatedly referred to the "sedition" and referenced the 2009 elections. As the first person of the regime expressed after the Assembly of Experts elections, upset by the failure of Mesbah Yazdi and Mohammad Yazdi, in a meeting with former Assembly members, he stated: "Thank God the elections were healthy and have always been healthy. This showed the invalidity of the words and actions of those who once deemed an election like 2009 invalid and created that harmful and terrible sedition for the country; because they accused the country of having an unhealthy election; no, the elections were healthy; today they were healthy, previous periods were healthy, and 2009 was healthy." In other words, while Ayatollah Khamenei seeks to mend the gap between political authority and society by improving the form of elections and conducting more competitive ones, he still keeps the case of the 2009 elections open from the perspective of the accuser and the victim and does not consider any questions or doubts about it. The Greens; a case that remains open for many. For numerous reasons, some supporters of the Green Movement have ceased pursuing their demands and have shifted from realism to complete realism and from activism to actionlessness, effectively closing the case of the 2009 elections for themselves. Some of these individuals, disillusioned by the acute and violent repression of the coup plotters and hopeless about pursuing demands relying on social movements, have somewhat accepted a change in the composition of the executive branch and later the parliament, abandoning activism within civil society. However, this situation and description do not apply to all Greens. Firstly, the fact that Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard insist on the fundamental demands of the Green Movement and question the 2009 elections clarifies a significant part of the issue. Karroubi's letter to Rouhani in April is the most prominent evidence of this assessment; where Karroubi, from within house arrest and despite being imprisoned for over five years, writes to the president: "Ask the oppressive regime to hold my public trial, according to Article 168 of the Constitution, even with the composition desired by the power holders, so that I can present my evidence regarding the fraud in the 2005 presidential election, the engineering of the 2009 presidential election, and what happened to the children of this country in legal and illegal detention centers to the public. The outcome of this trial will clarify who has turned back from the revolution and who continues the path of the revolution with dignity, which side of the dispute and conflict of the 2009 elections they belong to." In his historic letter, Karroubi speaks of the "ridiculous results of the 2009 elections" which "had no goal other than the destruction of the republic and the Islamism of the regime." He also states in his letter that, aware of the "heavy cost" of not remaining silent against the "power holders," he has remained and will remain with the people. Karroubi's position is merely a new emphasis on previous claims regarding the 2009 elections in the post-Rouhani presidency and the two elections of 2013 and 2016; otherwise, his words might echo the emphasis made by Zahra Rahnavard in spring 2012. Rahnavard had said: "We have told these [security agents] that we stand by all our previous words and beliefs. All those issues remain. Even if you hang us on this mulberry tree [the tree in the house where we are under house arrest] and bury us under it, nothing will change, and we will not be afraid; because we believe we have spoken the truth, and if it were otherwise, we would not be in prison now and would be free." Regardless of the banner that the leaders of the Green Movement have raised in protest against the 2009 electoral coup and in defense of the fundamental rights of citizens, it is essential to acknowledge the pursuit and right-seeking of a significant number of families of victims and prisoners of the Green Movement and civil society activists; those who still ask about the reasons for the coup, fraud, repression, and violence in the 2009 elections and have not turned it into a "memory." In addition to these, and beyond what is visibly observable in online social networks, lecture sessions at universities, electoral gatherings, and political circles have also become venues for the emergence and expression of demands and slogans intertwined with the issue of the 2009 electoral coup. Although affected by repression, violence, economic crises, and daily livelihood struggles, various social layers refrain from engaging in politics, this does not mean total indifference of society to political developments. Notably, the younger generation that was in high school during 2009 and was a teenager now asks about the 2009 elections, chants for the lifting of the house arrest of the Green Movement leaders, and is concerned about the quality of elections. In other words, despite all the repression, intimidation, official propaganda, distortion of truth, and misinformation by the regime's media over the past seven years, serious and fundamental questions about the 2009 elections remain alive and present in civil society. When will the case of 2009 be closed? In a situation where the 2009 elections remain a point of contention and claim from both the coup plotters and the Greens, will this case be closed? The answer to this question is "not for the foreseeable future." As long as the illegal imprisonment of the two protesting candidates of the 2009 electoral coup continues; until an independent truth-finding committee has not judged the quality of that election; until citizens who have been harmed in any way due to that election (families who have lost loved ones, those who have been imprisoned or subjected to violence and torture, or forced into migration/exile) are not compensated and acknowledged; and until free, healthy, and fair elections are realized in Iran; it seems unlikely that the case of the 2009 elections will be closed. At least until then, and at every electoral juncture, the bitter memory of the 2009 elections will re-emerge and its consequences will be evident. The political-security approaches of the core power in the Islamic Republic (continuing repression, resorting to intimidation, glorifying violence, distorting truth, applying supervisory oversight, and beating the drum of authoritarianism) indicate that the case of the 2009 electoral coup remains open for the foreseeable future. A case that is intertwined with the significant issue of the transition to democracy and serves as an important witness to the complexity and difficulty of democratization in Iran.