Is the Establishment of Gallows the Solution to the Economic Crisis?

Ayatollah Khamenei's agreement with Sadegh Larijani's request to establish a new branch in the Revolutionary Court to focus on combating economic disruptors and corrupt individuals reveals a new layer of the government's efforts to address the economic crisis. Accordingly, three experienced judges will be present in this branch and will handle accusations with special powers beyond the usual procedures. According to the granted permission, the names of the accused will be made public before their guilt is proven. The similarity of this plan to the committee that dealt with the status of political prisoners in 1988, which led to the extrajudicial execution of thousands of prisoners, highlights the possibility that the power bloc has decided to use executions, albeit on a much smaller scale, to control the economic crisis. The multi-rate currency system and uncertainty in the market have increased the tendency for hoarding or artificial shortages, alongside the flourishing of excessive profiteering. Given the high penetration of corruption and its deep entanglement in the power structure and governing institutions, it is natural for this significant social plague to expand during economic instability. It seems that apart from the objective aspect of increasing economic violations alongside the spread of chaos and instability in the economic sphere, a security perspective is also influential in the decision-making process. From the perspective of the dominant power sector, it is believed that organized networks supported by the security apparatuses of the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia are active in disrupting the country's economic activities and are pursuing the goal of economic collapse with orders from outside the borders. Methodologically, the Islamic Republic's behavioral pattern in facing crises has been to use police tools and security confrontations. Since the beginning of the dollar price surge and currency fluctuations, as well as the formation of protests and strikes in markets and commercial and production centers, the economic business environment has become security-oriented. So far, dozens of people have been arrested amid extensive propaganda by the judiciary and are under interrogation in unclear conditions. Reports indicate that some officials have apparently been banned from leaving the country, and it now seems that the establishment of the new judicial branch is a prelude to intensifying punitive measures and that the use of the death penalty has been put on the agenda. The goal may also be extra-economic, aiming not only to create deterrence in economic profiteering activities but also to instill fear and terror to stop street protests. However, there are multiple reasons that cast serious doubts on the successful implementation of this plan. First, there are limitations that the government faces in applying widespread violence. The Islamic Republic is currently under global pressure due to high execution rates. Increasing the number of executions does not cost the government. The lack of legitimacy of the judiciary and the questioning of issued verdicts, given the declining credibility regarding the correctness of handling corruption charges, is another vulnerable aspect of the government that is unlikely to see widespread public support for new judicial actions. Another important factor is the structural incapacity of the government to combat corruption. Corruption has so deeply woven into the governing institutions and both main factions of the regime that it has stripped them of the ability to combat and contain it. Pro-corruption factions have such influence and power in practice that they have immobilized judicial and supervisory institutions. Serious pursuit of corruption and bringing it to a conclusion could have foundational consequences for the government. For this reason, actions have not gone beyond a certain stage and reach a deadlock amid the clamor of accusations and bargaining among government factions. Corruption in the Islamic Republic has become systematic, resulting in a reduction of productive activities, with economic actions and public resources primarily distributed as rents among quasi-mafia networks. This approach has also corrupted large segments of society. It should also be noted that corruption in Iran's governing pillars is deep-rooted and has historically been one of the main factors of economic inefficiency. Haji Sayyah describes in his memoirs how government positions during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar were like a shop where everyone tried to maximize their personal benefits instead of serving the people and the country's needs. Meanwhile, the scope and depth of corruption in the Islamic Republic have expanded unprecedentedly. Some of the reasons for the conducive environment for the spread of corruption and wrongful profiteering are the policies of the Islamic Republic. The decision of the Guardian Jurist to adopt an enemy-centered foreign policy and avoid adhering to the requirements of de-escalation with the U.S. has effectively opened the door for the underground economy to circumvent sanctions, inadvertently promoting corruption and economic violations. Directive policies for setting currency rates and other strategic goods, alongside the supervisory weakness of the Central Bank and its independence being violated by the government, are other factors that have laid the groundwork for the spread of corruption. Therefore, those who made these wrong decisions should be prosecuted, and more accurately, the regime should first hold itself accountable! Given this situation, intensifying judicial and security activities, considering the regime's high vulnerability to economic corruption, has no capacity to resolve the economic crisis and may even increase tensions and conflicts within the government. From another angle, creating a security environment increases capital flight and further stagnates the business environment. The history of the Islamic Republic's judiciary in handling 'economic corruption' cases has reflected more factional settling of scores and security projects than addressing the theft of public assets. Thus, for the reasons mentioned, it is unlikely that these actions will be implemented as stated. Their implementation would mean prosecuting a significant number of agents and forces affiliated with the political system. In the case of the misuse of the allocated 4200 Toman dollar, bankrupt financial institutions and the purchase of currency and gold involve affiliated forces of the regime. On the other hand, the finger of blame for hoarding goods and extensive purchases of gold and currency has pointed towards state and non-governmental public institutions. The private sector and ordinary people have neither the capacity nor the necessary connections. So far, officials have not explained how the allocated 4200 Toman dollars have been spent or who has purchased nearly 60 tons of gold coins. Considering the above considerations, it can be concluded that this action is more of a propaganda scenario that is unlikely to target the main sources of corruption and economic disruptors, and at most, will deal with individuals from lower ranks. The failure to adhere to fair trial procedures will preemptively undermine confidence in the correctness of the judiciary's claims and raise concerns that some may become victims of the government's inability and ineffectiveness in managing the escalating crisis. The views expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect Radio Farda's perspective.