Is the Green Movement Over?

Seven years have passed since the controversial and ambiguous 2009 elections and the emergence of a wave of protests from millions of citizens bewildered by the official results; protests that took millions to the streets on June 25, 2009, and became known as the 'Green Movement.' The leaders of this protest movement (Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard) have been under house arrest for over 64 months, and it has been more than five years since its last significant and meaningful public manifestation. What is the current status of the Green Movement seven Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebrations after its emergence? Should it be described as having ended for any reason, or is it alive and ongoing? In response to the main written question, at least three groups have prepared answers, so to speak, 'up their sleeves.' The first group consists of supporters and sympathizers of the Green Movement; those who fundamentally cannot accept a negative answer to the posed question. They do not consider the Green Movement to be over due to their commitment to the imprisoned leaders or the families of its victims, the movement's orientation against the apex of the political system during its peak days, or their own activism or that of a circle of allies. In a sense, this group's response is more emotional and psychological, tied to their nostalgic connection to the events and political components related to the 2009 elections. The second group includes observers and political activists who fundamentally do not believe in the emergence of a 'social movement' after the tenth presidential elections (June 2009). They describe the events of 2009 more as an electoral movement and a temporary protest surge. From this perspective, the Green Movement either was never born, or if it did emerge, it ended after the bloody and violent suppression by the regime and has become part of history. The last group consists of analysts and sympathizers aligned with the core power structure in the Islamic Republic. This group views the Green Movement as a 'sedition' linked to foreign agents (the enemy, a favorite term of Ayatollah Khamenei). From this angle, the Green Movement was an electoral protest that was exploited by foreigners and, due to the ignorance, lawlessness, and ambition of some political actors, expanded and imposed heavy costs on the regime. According to this group, the aforementioned electoral protests quickly ended with the wisdom and decisiveness of the regime's leadership, and with the arrest of its leaders, it effectively became part of history. However, from a different angle, there are many activists opposed to the government who share a similar assessment; they consider the Green Movement to have ended due to the suppression imposed. This group mainly points to the lack of public emergence of the Green Movement and, from this perspective, has focused solely on election-centered politics. A response from the perspective of political sociology If the Green Movement is evaluated beyond a temporary protest reaction from millions of citizens to the official results of the 2009 elections, and if the causes and roots of the emergence of protests from various social layers involved in it are considered, then perhaps another answer to the written question (continuation or end of the Green Movement) can be provided. From this perspective, although the Green Movement arose from protests against the election results, its continuation was rooted in political, social, economic, and technological changes. It was a protest movement that initially reacted to the manipulation of the desired candidate by the core of power and then focused on changing the unfavorable established situation, emphasizing the necessity of holding free, healthy, and fair elections. From this viewpoint, the Green Movement was the result of collective action and a manifestation of the feeling of deprivation among various social layers whose conditions and demands were intertwined with the identity of the movement; a protest movement against lies, deception, repression, inefficiency, and authoritarianism. Thus, although the cultural/urban middle class played a prominent and noticeable role in the Green Movement, the number of unemployed, workers, wage earners, and citizens from disadvantaged social layers was not insignificant. This can be documented in the list of victims of the Green Movement or the numerous names of its prisoners. On another level, youth and women also found the born protest movement an opportunity to express themselves and to protest against the obstacles to change in the government. Millions of citizens who felt deprived were upset by the dominant current in the government’s disregard for their electoral participation. The insult, suppression, and violence directed at them strengthened the shared 'feeling' of the protesting citizens and organized a new order compared to the government’s desires. In this way, the Green Movement became a manifestation of the feeling of deprivation of citizens and connected their situation with the shared identity of the movement, pursuing and describing the process of change and the desire for change. Although the Green Movement was subjected to brutal suppression and its public emergence diminished after a few months, with the last significant public manifestation of the protest movement occurring on February 14, 2011, the dissatisfaction and desire for change present in social layers (cultural middle class, youth, women, unemployed graduates, and workers and teachers) continued under the shadow of suppression, manifesting itself in various forms over time: a significant boycott of the 2012 parliamentary elections, a directional uprising of layers of society in favor of Rouhani in the days leading up to the 2013 presidential elections, protests against acid attacks, large gatherings of citizens at the funeral of Morteza Pashaei, sit-ins and protests by environmental activists and workers and teachers, explicit slogans for the removal of the house arrest of the Green Movement leaders during December 7 commemorations and speaking events, clear expressions of political and social demands during political meetings and questioning speakers—especially during parliamentary elections, the expansion of online social network activities, and the formation of a notable electoral wave against the candidates of the authoritarian camp in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections (February 2016). The ongoing narrative The aforementioned points only illustrate some aspects of the process of desire for change and the continuation of the social protest movement beneath the surface of society and under the shadow of prevailing suppression and intimidation. This situation has manifested and continues to unfold while the economic crisis, industrial stagnation, and inflation and high prices since the beginning of the 2010s (immediately after the suppressions) have significantly reduced civil and political activism among the urban middle class in Iran. Nevertheless, the demographic composition of the country (with over 40% of the population aged 15 to 35) and the increasing prevalence of communication technology and information technology in urban society (which encompasses more than two-thirds of Iran) have inevitably revealed their outputs—based on the desire for change among women, youth, the unemployed, wage earners, and social layers dissatisfied with the current situation. What has been presented is independent of the resilience and patience of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi in house arrest or the persistent and courageous civil and political activists. The leaders of the Green Movement have not guaranteed silence if their house arrest is lifted; the prolonged detention without trial serves as a negative witness to their meaningful effectiveness and the continuity of the social movement despite prolonged suppression. This aspect of the story would be incomplete without mentioning Karroubi's important letter from house arrest to the president. Karroubi's request—and also that of Mousavi and Rahnavard—for a public trial has predictably met with a negative response from the core of power; a clear sign of the core of power's fear of the potential of the protest movement beneath the surface of the changing society. This is what Ahmad Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, refers to as 'the fire under the ashes,' or what is continuously mocked and directly and indirectly referenced in the political discourse of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and other effective political players aligned with Ayatollah Khamenei. The sociological realities of Iran today have manifested and will continue to manifest as a basis for transformation and change at 'turning points,' and despite threats and obstacles, they will express themselves. The reliance of the Green Movement on social changes and transformative demands has the potential to manifest itself at any opportunity and turning point when activists (the Greens and change-seeking citizens) deem it reasonable and effective based on a realistic assessment and rational 'cost-benefit' analysis of action. The demand for fundamental and civil rights remains the focal point of this living social movement. The Green Movement, despite heavy suppression and extensive negative propaganda by the government against it and its leaders, still shows no signs of having ended.