Is the Islamic Republic Reformable? Eight Red Lines of Khamenei

Is it possible for Ayatollah Khamenei, as the most powerful figure in the Islamic Republic, to change his approach and accept reforms in domestic policy and a change in the Islamic Republic's foreign behavior? Based on the current realities and Ayatollah Khamenei's perspectives, is the Islamic Republic reformable? An examination of four fundamental areas in domestic policy and four other areas in Iran's foreign policy shows that, according to existing data and practices, there is no indication of Ayatollah Khamenei responding positively to requests for changes in the Islamic Republic's domestic and foreign policies. Four domestic red lines of the leader: An examination of four fundamental areas in domestic policy and four other areas in Iran's foreign policy shows that, according to existing data and practices, there is no indication of Ayatollah Khamenei responding positively to requests for changes in the Islamic Republic's domestic and foreign policies. 1. Accountability of the Leader: One of the central criticisms of the leader of the Islamic Republic is that he holds the most governmental powers in Iran but is accountable to no one and no institution. According to the constitution, the leader is under the supervision of the Assembly of Experts, which is the supervising body over the leadership and its subordinate institutions. However, in the 29 years of Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership, no report on the leader's accountability to the Assembly of Experts has been published, and he has even prohibited his subordinate institutions from being accountable to the Assembly. Those who hope for reform in the Islamic Republic argue that it is unacceptable for a figure like the leader to hold the most powers in the areas of intelligence, security, judiciary, culture, politics, and economy without being accountable to anyone. However, Ayatollah Khamenei has neither paid attention to this criticism nor is there any indication that he will in the future. Lack of accountability is one of Ayatollah Khamenei's primary red lines, even to journalists who have been deprived of a press conference with him for 29 years. 2. Return of the IRGC to Barracks: Many internal critics of the Islamic Republic believe that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), contrary to its duties and the prohibitions established by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, has entered politics during Ayatollah Khamenei's rule and acts like a military party and shadow government, even expanding its powers and operational scope beyond that of the Ministry of Intelligence. Evidence also indicates that the IRGC has not only become a contractor and economic enterprise in politics and security but has also taken a significant portion of the country's budget, bankrupted private sector companies, and transformed into a major economic cartel through ownership of industries, banks, and financial institutions. In recent years, with the establishment of institutions like the Owj organization in filmmaking and documentary production, critics now argue that the IRGC is also seizing the cultural sphere and film festivals after politics and economics. Critics say that if the Islamic Republic wants to reform, the IRGC must return to the barracks and withdraw from its armed presence in politics, economy, and culture. Ayatollah Khamenei has not only ignored this criticism but has also encouraged the IRGC in recent years to show more effort in cultural activities alongside its previous roles. 3. Independent and Non-Political Judiciary: Those seeking reform in the Islamic Republic argue that a necessary condition for fundamental reform of the system is that the judiciary be non-political and independent. From their perspective, the judiciary is currently under the control of intelligence and security institutions like the IRGC Intelligence Organization and the Ministry of Intelligence, and in practice, it is these interrogators who dictate terms to judges and arrest, prosecute, and imprison civil and political activists. Ayatollah Khamenei has rejected and not accepted such criticisms of the judiciary throughout the past 29 years, and he has honored and promoted those judges and officials known for their political and security actions. There is no indication that Ayatollah Khamenei will pay attention to criticisms of the judiciary in the future. 4. End of Guardian Council's Supervisory Authority: Internal critics of Ayatollah Khamenei argue that one of the most important ways to reform the Islamic Republic and preserve it is to end the Guardian Council's supervisory authority. They believe that this authority leads to the disqualification of the elites of the Islamic Republic and the formation of weak councils. They argue that if people can freely choose their preferred candidates, there is a possibility for reform and sustainability of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khamenei, who himself established the supervisory authority since the early 1990s, has repeatedly rejected this criticism and his approach indicates that he increasingly defends the Guardian Council and its supervisory authority over time. A cumulative view of these four factors in domestic policy indicates that Ayatollah Khamenei has never accepted criticisms of the three institutions: the IRGC, the judiciary, and the Guardian Council, and he has not been accountable to anyone regarding his powers and actions. In fact, reforming these four conditions would significantly change the nature and functioning of the Islamic Republic in domestic politics, and on the other hand, without fundamental changes in them, no other change would have the size, weight, and importance to make reforms in the political system of the Islamic Republic meaningful and tangible. Four foreign red lines of the leader: Ayatollah Khamenei, who himself established the supervisory authority since the early 1990s, has repeatedly rejected this criticism and his approach indicates that he increasingly defends the Guardian Council and its supervisory authority over time. A cumulative view of these four factors in domestic policy indicates that Ayatollah Khamenei has never accepted criticisms of the three institutions: the IRGC, the judiciary, and the Guardian Council, and he has not been accountable to anyone regarding his powers and actions. In fact, reforming these four conditions would significantly change the nature and functioning of the Islamic Republic in domestic politics, and on the other hand, without fundamental changes in them, no other change would have the size, weight, and importance to make reforms in the political system of the Islamic Republic meaningful and tangible. 1. Anti-Americanism: Anti-Americanism is one of the most central and important identity features of Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Republic. There is hardly a speech of his in which he does not take a stance against America or use the term enemy, which many interpret as referring to America. The Islamic Republic was anti-American during Ayatollah Khomeini's era, but this emphasis on this feature is more pronounced during Ayatollah Khamenei's period. Ayatollah Khamenei uses anti-Americanism as a lever to garner more support from his followers domestically, justify the various problems of the country, and gain prestige among political and paramilitary groups supporting the Islamic Republic in the Middle East. Anti-Americanism has imposed many costs on the Islamic Republic, Iran, and Iranians over the past 40 years, but there is no indication that Ayatollah Khamenei will abandon anti-Americanism. Even when he accepted the nuclear agreement with America, he did not allow this negotiation and agreement to be interpreted as a discussion about bilateral relations between Tehran and Washington and an improvement in Iran-U.S. relations. 2. Anti-Israel Sentiment: Similar to anti-Americanism, anti-Israel sentiment is also defined as one of the pillars of the Islamic Republic's identity. If Ayatollah Khamenei has been cautious in some cases regarding America, he has never extended this caution to his statements about Israel, addressing it and its leaders with the harshest and, in some cases, insulting words. While Ayatollah Khomeini spoke of the necessity of destroying Israel, Ayatollah Khamenei has set a 25-year period for it. As with previous cases, there is no sign that Ayatollah Khamenei will abandon anti-Israel sentiment. 3. IRGC-Centric Middle Eastern Policy: One of the criticisms from those who believe in preserving the Islamic Republic is that Ayatollah Khamenei has taken the country's Middle Eastern policy away from diplomats and given it to IRGC commanders. A look at Iran's Middle Eastern policy and, in fact, Iran's policy towards the Arab world and Arab countries shows that Iran has continued to support groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad despite international and regional pressures. In recent years, with the formation of Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and the military-political organization of the Houthis in Yemen, as well as the creation of pro-Bashar al-Assad militias in Syria, Iran has expanded this specific policy in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, as the main opponent of this Iranian policy in the Middle East, sees it as Shiite expansionism and influence in its security domain, uniting many Arab and Islamic countries against the Islamic Republic. Contrary to those who believe that the continuation of this policy is detrimental to Iran in the region, Ayatollah Khamenei has not only not agreed with these criticisms but has insisted on supporting such a policy in the Middle East led by the IRGC, with no sign of a change in this approach from him. 4. Continuation of the Missile Program: The Islamic Republic's missile program, as officials say, is one of the main elements of Iran's military deterrent capability. In recent years, whenever the Islamic Republic has wanted to speak from a position of power, it has mostly talked about missiles, missile exercises, and missile cities. The Islamic Republic is under pressure to end this missile program not only from the U.S. and Israel but also from European powers. Countries like Germany, France, and Britain, which have a different position from the current U.S. government regarding the JCPOA and the nuclear agreement, are close to the U.S. position regarding the necessity of stopping Iran's missile program. Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly and explicitly rejected such demands and emphasized the continuation of Iran's missile program. In fact, Ayatollah Khamenei has not been willing to return the IRGC to the barracks, depoliticize the judiciary, end the supervisory authority, and make the leader accountable domestically, nor has he abandoned anti-Americanism, anti-Israel sentiment, IRGC-centric Middle Eastern policy, and the continuation of the missile program in foreign policy, nor is there any sign that he will. This situation can provide a clear answer to the question of whether Ayatollah Khamenei is willing to make fundamental reforms domestically or to change the Islamic Republic's behavior fundamentally in foreign policy.