Is the Judiciary's 'Therapeutic Terror' a Show of Anti-Corruption?

Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, agreed to a proposal by Sadeq Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, who requested the establishment of branches of the 'Islamic Revolutionary Court' with three judges to address the cases of 'economic corruptors.' This comes as officials themselves have stated that the governance of administrative corruption in Iran has reached a high level, meaning institutionalized and systematic corruption. Therefore, oversight institutions like the judiciary, which have become tainted by corruption themselves, cannot resolve Iran's economic and managerial corruption. Recently, Ahmad Tavakoli, a former parliament member, stated: 'Today, we have reached a critical stage in terms of the extent and depth of corruption; in the literature of political economy, this stage is referred to as systemic. This means that the institutions responsible for oversight and addressing corruption have themselves become tainted by corruption to varying degrees, and in a more serious form, corrupt individuals or their supporters infiltrate decision-making channels. For example, when the esteemed head of the judiciary must change the judge in a case involving a powerful individual twice, and in a decisive action, 170 judges are dismissed, or similar actions occur within the police force, it indicates that we are at a stage of systemic corruption.' Given such conditions, the question arises whether such an action, based on the judiciary's 'therapeutic terror' to combat widespread economic corruption within the governance, can address the overarching challenge of financial-managerial corruption in the Islamic Republic? Why are current oversight and security institutions ineffective in combating corruption, and can the addition of the 'Revolutionary Court for Economic Corruptors' solve any problems? It should be noted that more than 10 oversight institutions are active in Iran, established specifically to prevent financial-managerial corruption. Some of these oversight institutions include the security departments of each ministry and government agency, which are branches of the Ministry of Intelligence of that ministry and agency, the Ministry of Finance and the National Tax Administration, the Intelligence Organization of the IRGC, the General Inspection Organization, the judiciary, the Court of Accounts, the Audit Organization, the Government Trading Organization, the Central Headquarters for Combating Smuggling of Goods and Currency, various parliamentary commissions, and so on. In Khamenei's agreement to establish a special court for 'economic corruptors,' rather than emphasizing financial-managerial corruption as a dynamic, hidden, and complex process, the focus is placed on a special court for 'corruptors' and the punishment of individuals. However, from a technical and managerial perspective, corruption has an ecosystem or vital system that continues to be sustainable and hidden in its dynamics as long as its structure exists and repairs itself despite any blows. This system plays the main role in the emergence of financial-managerial corruption, and the accused individual is a small and complementary part of systemic corruption. A chain of real, legal, economic, and political factors explains the emergence and dynamics of financial-managerial corruption in Iran. Iran's economy is a single-resource oil-based economy, and the government exclusively controls oil revenues. Furthermore, according to the constitution, the governance embodied in Khamenei has extensive powers in political, economic, and social areas. Various political-economic institutions dependent on the leader of the government, such as the Executive Command Headquarters of Imam's Order, the Foundation of the Oppressed, the Khatam Headquarters of the IRGC, and religious institutions exist alongside government institutions, which circumvent laws and, free from oversight and competition, tighten the space for the private sector and non-governmental institutions, holding the Iranian economy in their grip. This political-economic monopoly and lack of transparency and accountability are the roots of Iran's financial-managerial corruption. One of the significant motivations for anti-monarchical revolutions in Europe and the separation of church and state was the struggle against the concentration of absolute power and the intertwining of religious and power institutions. The global human experience—at least in developed Europe—shows that the concentration of absolute power, whether in the hands of a king or the church, leads to unaccountability, lack of transparency, and corruption. For this reason, Europe's economic development began where political development in the form of public votes as the source of government legitimacy, periodic power transfer, separation of powers, and the separation of power, wealth, and religion commenced. The experience of developing countries also shows that the lack of financial, human, and technological resources, although a constraint for increasing productivity, economic growth, and improving quality of life, is not the only problem for transitioning societies. More importantly, financial-managerial corruption squanders those limited resources. The loss of resources reduces economic efficiency, thereby questioning economic growth and societal development. What do international organizations say? International organizations that research corruption-related issues and propose managerial solutions emphasize structural political and economic reforms and 'transparency' and 'accountability' of centers of power and wealth towards civil society and non-governmental organizations. Governments must be held accountable to organized and powerful civil society organizations independent of power and wealth, such as human rights institutions, professional organizations, and unions. What is the solution? Today's literature on managing financial-managerial corruption is based on transparency and accountability through a comprehensive and structural process, not the activities of the 'Revolutionary Court.' Thus, any serious action in Iran requires the independence of power institutions from religious institutions and officials, and the accountability of power institutions must be conditioned on the free election of citizens within the framework of organized civil society and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, reducing the size of the government and its interference, which means reducing the political and economic power of the government, is also a requirement of this process. Such actions are contingent upon significant legal and real changes in the fabric and structure of the Iranian governance; therefore, it will face significant obstacles from those who benefit from the plunder of management and economic corruption and hold the levers of power.