Is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation a Branch of the Saudi Foreign Ministry?

Hosseini Jaberi Ansari, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has made thought-provoking statements saying that "unfortunately, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has become a part of the Saudi Foreign Ministry and acts like an office of this ministry." Such a clear statement from an official of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, if true, serves no purpose other than to criticize and condemn the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Furthermore, if these statements are correct in condemning the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, they implicitly demonstrate the strength and power of the foreign policy of one member (Saudi Arabia) out of the 57 members of the organization, which has managed to turn such a large organization, for which each member, including Iran, pays hefty annual membership fees, into an office of its own ministries. Simply put, while the Foreign Ministry spokesperson intends to criticize the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, he has, whether intentionally or not, praised Saudi Arabia. The question now is whether these statements are fundamentally accurate. What evidence supports this claim? A more important question is, if Riyadh has managed to implement such a successful foreign policy to turn the Organization of Islamic Cooperation into "an office of its foreign ministry," why has Tehran (as one of the founding members of the organization) not achieved such success, and in some cases, has even faced criticism from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation? The organization's positions against Iran certainly must have provided significant evidence for the Foreign Ministry spokesperson to believe that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is under Saudi control. What are these pieces of evidence? Below are three of the most important positions of the organization against Tehran. First: The suspension of Hajj. According to the official announcement of the Hajj Organization, no Iranian pilgrims will be sent for Hajj rituals in 1395 (2016). The Hajj Organization has stated that Riyadh has not provided the necessary assistance in this regard; moreover, Ali Jannati, the Minister of Culture, has stated that the Saudis spoke with the Iranian side in a "dictatorial" tone during several rounds of negotiations. The suspension of this year's Hajj occurred after Saudi Arabia, by cutting political ties with Tehran, effectively complicated the issuance of visas for tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims. Since neither Riyadh's dictatorial orders were acceptable to Iran nor was abstaining from Hajj, the Islamic Republic announced that it would complain about Saudi obstructionism to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. With such a position announced, it was clear that the Islamic Republic hoped the Organization of Islamic Cooperation would act in favor of Iran or at least mediate effectively. Now, the criticism of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation by the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson is evidence that this organization has completely sided with Saudi Arabia and, consequently, the Islamic Republic's complaint against Saudi Arabia in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has not been heard or accepted. Second: The Organization's statement against Iran. The severing of political relations between Riyadh and Tehran occurred while the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad were attacked and set on fire. This incident followed the Islamic Republic's strong protest against the execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr, a Shia cleric from Saudi Arabia who had close ties with Iran, which led to some individuals attacking and burning Saudi diplomatic sites in Tehran and Mashhad. Although the official position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned and reprimanded the attackers, the lack of effective police intervention to prevent this incident and the absence of condemnation of the attackers until now have provided enough justification for Saudi Arabia to use this incident as a motive for comprehensive confrontation with Iran. Following the attack on the Saudi embassy, Riyadh condemned the Islamic Republic for violating the diplomatic immunity of its buildings in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Particularly, the condemnation of the Islamic Republic (with an emphasis on the term "Islamic") within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was very costly for Tehran, as the organization's statement condemning the Islamic Republic coincided with Hassan Rouhani's presence at the summit of that organization. Worse still, that statement labeled the Islamic Republic as a supporter of terrorism and categorized Hezbollah alongside ISIS as terrorist organizations. (Refer to the article: The Islamic Republic and Diplomatic Failure in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) Third: The suspension of Syria's membership. There is no doubt that Syria is the Islamic Republic's most important strategic ally in the world. The significance of this strategic alliance between the two countries can be found in the financial, military, and combat support provided by the Islamic Republic to Damascus during five years of civil war in Syria, to the extent that, in addition to billions in cash assistance, Iranian combat forces, including senior Revolutionary Guards commanders (e.g., General Hossein Hamadani), have been killed on Syrian soil alongside the country's army. On the other hand, it is clear that Tehran and Riyadh currently have opposing positions in the Syrian civil war. Tehran seeks to maintain Assad in power, while Riyadh seeks to remove him from power. In such a context, Saudi Arabia hosted an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Mecca on August 15-16, 2012, coinciding with Ramadan that year. The subject of the meeting was the "suspension" of Syria's membership from this organization. It was clear that Saudi Arabia's success in suspending Syria's membership implied that Bashar al-Assad's regime was unfit to remain alongside other Muslim brothers due to its crimes. In other words, Saudi Arabia intended to label Bashar al-Assad's regime as anti-Islamic. The idea that Riyadh could label the Islamic Republic's ally, Syria, as non-Islamic was naturally very costly for Tehran. Therefore, the then President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, traveled to Mecca at the head of a high-level delegation to influence the final decision and voting of the organization. However, the outcome of the meeting was extremely disappointing, as all members, with the exception of the Islamic Republic, voted in favor of suspending Syria's membership. This occurred while the Islamic Republic was present at the highest level in the meeting and did not even manage to secure one vote in its favor from the 57 members. Iran's poor play or Saudi Arabia's good play? Based on the above examples, if we view the issue from the perspective of the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, these examples all demonstrate Saudi Arabia's "good play," as it has been able to secure the positive vote of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation whenever it has desired. Such a perspective compels the spokesperson to, in criticizing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, knowingly or unknowingly praise Saudi diplomacy. However, is this reality? This article, contrary to the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, believes that the achievements Saudi Arabia has obtained in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are not necessarily the result of Riyadh's good play but rather the product of Tehran's "bad play." What expectation can there be when diplomatic sites are set on fire in front of the police and the attackers are not prosecuted, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation does not condemn it? What expectation can there be when the world hears from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that Bashar al-Assad has a "predatory nature," and then the Organization of Islamic Cooperation does not vote to suspend Syria? What expectation can there be that the organization will not vote in favor of the host government when the Islamic Republic seeks to hold a political Hajj in Mecca? (Refer to the article: The Islamic Republic Trapped in the Political Hajj Trap) There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia, as a member of the G20 (the twenty largest economies in the world), spends huge oil revenues to advance its goals of preventing Iranian hegemony in the region. However, does Tehran not also spend money to advance its goals? So why should Saudi Arabia succeed while Iran does not? At the very least, Tehran faces the question of why, as the current president of the Non-Aligned Movement, it cannot secure the organization's vote in its favor? Why can Tehran not even win the votes of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, which are part of Iran's cultural sphere? Is it really that Saudi Arabia plays well, or has the Islamic Republic played poorly? Bitter admissions of the spokesperson. Mr. Jaberi Ansari, knowingly or unknowingly, has made his audience aware of two bitter points. First, he has shown the world that the Islamic Republic (emphasizing the term "Islamic") does not even have one vote from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and how bitter this admission is. Second, he admits that Saudi Arabia single-handedly carries the votes of all members with it, and how much more bitter this other claim is (with which the author disagrees). Now, if we assume the spokesperson's statements are accurate, does this situation mean anything other than the isolation of the Islamic Republic even among its Muslim brothers? And if so, is the Islamic Republic not more isolated in the international community? If so, escaping this suffocating isolation is impossible without revisiting all the mistakes made in its foreign policy.