Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel?

A week after the tragedy of the Plasco building collapse, it is almost clear what the cause of the incident was (electrical connection as the primary cause of the fire and the explosion of gas cylinders and diesel tanks after the fire in a dilapidated building as the cause of the collapse), who is to blame (Tehran Municipality for not enforcing regulations and the Mostazafan Foundation as the owner for neglecting the deteriorating state of the building), the composition and number of the injured (over 200 people) and the deceased (so far 16 firefighters and four non-firefighters, likely employees of the building in the engine room, elevator, and security, plus six others who are missing), and fundamentally, what the situation in Tehran is regarding this matter (about 3000 buildings in conditions similar to the Plasco building). There is much disagreement on these issues, but the above points represent a common denominator based on presented realities. Now the question is how society and the government will react to this tragedy in the short and long term? Short-term reactions are underway. Based on the close relationship that the market has always had with the Islamic government in Iran, the first action has been to address the situation of the tenants of the building by the Foundation and other government entities. They had no role in the building's collapse and no responsibility for its repair and maintenance. So far, several buildings and shopping centers have been considered for their relocation, and it is clear that they will gradually reopen their shops (it is unclear whether with the same capacity or in the same line of work). Regarding the workers, the government has considered packages for urgent assistance, and they will receive aid in a short period, but these packages will mostly benefit those who were insured. However, it is highly unlikely that the four thousand people who worked in this building will return to their jobs soon. The bodies of the deceased will also be buried with respect under public pressure, although the government faces difficulties in naming individuals other than Islamist martyrs (Basij and IRGC members) as heroes. In long-term reactions, it seems that nothing will change: neither will the municipality enforce its regulations like in cases where buildings are indebted, nor will government, state, and semi-state institutions that own most of these large buildings be willing to abandon their immediate interests (like the monthly seven billion tomans rent from the Plasco building before its collapse) to engage in renovation and reconstruction. Merchants and tenants will also ignore warnings (if any are issued) due to their immediate interests. Iran is in a process of decay. If we set aside the nature and policies of the government and focus solely on society, we see that today's Iranian society is undergoing stages of decline and collapse from various perspectives. Trends are not improving. Currently, changes in policies (as a result of a change in government) do not alter trends and directions but rather slow down the process of decay and collapse. Statements such as Iran is becoming a superpower or the seventeenth or even eighth power in the world serve only a propaganda function. This downward trend is the result of four decades of mismanagement and abuse of power, an unscientific and irrational approach to governance, hostility towards reforming current processes, neglect of investment in infrastructure, and opposition to meritocracy, accountability, and transparency. This downward trend can be well illustrated in four areas: 1) Social harms. During the rule of Khomeini and Khamenei, social harms in Iranian society have increased astronomically. The number of alcohol addicts (over one million), smokers (over 20 million), and drug users (3 to 7 million), the number of sex workers, child laborers (1.5 to 7 million), the number of people living below the poverty line (two-thirds of society), and the number of crimes and prisoners have multiplied several times compared to four decades ago (in some cases, such as the number of prisoners, dozens of times) while the population has increased by 2.3 times, and the government (alongside the elimination of independent civil institutions) has done nothing to reduce these harms. 2) Lack of safety and deterioration of infrastructure (roads, structures). In the past four years, the country's development budget has been close to zero - and if a small budget has been allocated, about 12 percent of the total budget has ultimately been spent on current affairs - while there is no independent private sector in Iran, especially in large and infrastructural projects. Islamic Republic officials love inaugurations, but Rouhani has attended fewer inauguration ceremonies in the past four years because there have been no projects to inaugurate. The Shia clergy and their guardians have always been dependent on the infrastructural facilities of the Pahlavi era. During the Islamic Republic, apart from some urgent projects (such as power plants that were bombed during the war, Tehran Metro, or oil facilities to continue privileges and plundering resources) or symbolic ones (dams and airports), not much construction and infrastructure work has been done. After four decades, the only large stadium in the country is still the same as it was forty years ago; the number of cinemas in the country (mostly state-owned) has been declining, and most of the country's port facilities still resemble those from forty years ago (see photos of the ports of Gonaveh and Konarak). Many airports that were built with hundreds of billions of tomans have not seen a flight (such as the airports of Arak, Hamadan, and Bushehr), and many others have two or three flights a week. These airports are not maintained and are deteriorating. Even one of Iran's cities does not have sewage for all its residents. Many buildings constructed in recent years (such as Mehr housing buildings) are still unfinished and are crumbling. Contractors who work with the government in Iran (which are mostly companies affiliated with managers) are often corrupt and embezzle the allocated funds for greater profits. The roads built mostly do not meet technical and safety standards (about 20,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of injuries and disabilities annually). After forty years of claims, most provinces in the country are not connected by highways, and a few highways have been built around the capital. 3) Environmental destruction; many rivers (Zayandeh Rud), lakes, and wetlands (Hamun, Parišan, Bakhtagan, Gavkhuni) have dried up, some are drying up (Urmia), and groundwater levels have severely dropped; rivers that flow are also heavily polluted (Karun); air pollution (dust, carbon, and interference waves) covers many days of the year; between 11 to 21 million people (according to various statistics) have turned to urban marginalization, one of the main reasons for which is water scarcity in villages; about 30,000 villages have been evacuated; about three million people in villages receive water by tanker. 4) Decline in social capital. The revolution and war in Iran, instead of increasing social capital (resulting from social relationships among citizens that enhance efficiency), ultimately diminished it because the severe human and financial losses that lead to closer interactions among people resulted in greater fragmentation and distancing due to repression, corruption, fraud, and lies. As a result, individuals, both in government and outside it, only think of their personal and family interests. Furthermore, the repression of civil institutions and parties has hindered the consolidation of non-kin social relationships among Iranians. Many family relationships have been severed due to political and ideological conflicts. For this reason, teamwork in Iranian society is very weak. Of course, over the past four decades, the size of the repression machine, the level of foreign interventions (with billions of dollars in annual costs), and government corruption and waste have increased, preventing public and state investment in the above matters. The state's share. Any tragic event that occurs in Iranian society is not solely due to the policies and decisions of the religious government, but the government in Iran, given its political, economic, and cultural power, can accelerate the process of reform or be a serious obstacle to any reform. The Islamic Republic government 1) is focused on plundering the country's resources and not on public welfare and interest; every manager who comes to power (based on relationships and loyalty) only thinks of securing wealth for themselves and their family for several generations. Look at the list of former managers of the country in the Islamic Republic: how many of them are still active in the public sphere, and what percentage of them have emigrated with the plundered resources? What charitable work are former Islamic Republic managers involved in? 2) Ideologically and value-wise prevents any reform of processes and trends; clerical and IRGC officials in the country break out in hives at the mere mention of the word reform, and reformists (not as a political faction but as individuals seeking change) are constantly pursued by the government and face fabricated cases against them. The ideology of Islamism is focused on creating the ideal human of the school (with totalitarian control over their body and mind) and public domination and intimidation, not on reforming affairs. 3) Religious government officials have hidden and overt interests in all existing problems and destructions; in every destructive act such as smuggling, fraud, waste, and corruption, government and state officials participate, and for this reason, these destructive matters continue. 4) The religious government does not implement any mechanisms (citizen training programs, periodic drills for earthquake and fire preparedness, installation of safety and protective facilities) to prevent incidents such as fires or collapses and to reduce casualties from these disasters. For example, in the forty years I have lived in Iran, there has never been a drill for exiting a building in the event of a hypothetical fire, and there were not even signs for doors and exit corridors in buildings. In earthquake-prone Iran, no drills are conducted for earthquake conditions. Is there room for hope? If the above realities are considered, assuming the continuation of the current political and administrative situation, little light can be seen at the end of the tunnel. Those who draw hope from this situation do not extract hope from trends and processes but hold a belief that they must have hope, even if it is unfounded. They want to see light at the end of the tunnel. The Islamic Republic has thus far succeeded in preventing overthrow but has left society to decay and collapse.