Is Venezuela on the Brink of Resolving Its Crisis or Facing Civil War?

The action of the opposition leader in Venezuela swearing in as interim president, along with support from the U.S. and some other countries in the region, has brought the political crisis in Venezuela to a new stage. The dual power structure that has emerged could lead to a dire situation, potentially escalating into civil war if both sides remain obstinate. The early presidential elections in Venezuela last May were controversial from the outset, although there were fewer issues regarding the voting process itself. However, the prohibition of certain opposition factions from nominating candidates, the significantly lower turnout at the polls compared to previous elections, the relative lack of international observers, and subsequent criticisms and non-recognition from Western countries raised significant questions about the internal and international acceptance of the election results and the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro's continued presidency. In other words, the significant decline in support for the Chavez government during its successor (Maduro), primarily due to the government's inability to manage the oil crisis-ridden and corrupt economy of Venezuela, which has now led to astronomical inflation and mass migration, along with the societal divide that has engulfed Venezuela, has manifested itself most prominently in the dual power structure where one side is the Maduro government and the other is the parliament with a two-thirds opposition majority. This situation has also led to extensive international struggles and alignments, particularly as the U.S. has grown increasingly concerned about the rising influence of China and Russia in Latin America through the Venezuelan corridor. The Trump administration has been more determined than previous U.S. administrations to finish off Maduro's government, both due to the role this government has played since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999 in strengthening anti-U.S. countries (Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, etc.) and due to the foothold it has provided for rival powers like China and Russia in economic and even military terms. Recently, on January 5, the Lima Group, consisting of 12 Latin American countries aligned with Washington plus Canada, announced that they would not recognize Maduro's new presidential term. Following this, with the rise of Juan Guaidó, a relatively more radical opposition leader in parliament, Maduro's inauguration ceremony on January 20 and the normal course of his second presidential term faced significant questions. Guaidó, the leader of the Popular Will party, played a central role in the 2014 protests, which escalated into violence and conflict, resulting in over 50 deaths. Since then, Maduro's government has repeatedly imprisoned and placed the party leader under house arrest on charges of inciting unrest and violence. Guaidó's subsequent actions called for widespread protests against Maduro and the stripping of his power on Wednesday, January 23. A day earlier, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, in an article in the Wall Street Journal, implicitly expressed U.S. support for Guaidó's actions to oust Maduro and declare himself interim president, an action that took on practical significance on January 23, with Trump and several regional governments immediately recognizing Guaidó's presidency. It appears that Guaidó's allies, led by the U.S., intend to transfer Venezuela's assets, from the large gas station network in North America to its oil export revenues, to this government, and also to hand over the relatively substantial reserves in the Bank of England that have been blocked at the request of the U.S. and Europe to Guaidó's government. In other words, by economically sidelining Maduro, his limited power, which has managed to retain parts of society amidst the storm of a crisis-ridden economy, is set to be further restricted. Additional sanctions against Maduro's allied governments, such as Cuba and Nicaragua, and all companies that cooperate with his government are also part of the desperate plan to undermine this government without external military intervention. Guaidó will also have the ability to create his paramilitary networks if the army remains loyal to Maduro, thereby militarily nullifying Maduro's power and backing. Since Tuesday, Maduro's government has initiated legal action against opposition parliament members for 'illegal actions and resolutions.' Whether this will yield success and whether the army, which has been the mainstay of power for the government throughout these years of crisis, remains relatively united and continues its support for Maduro is a question whose answer will become clear in the coming days. It is also a reality that the opposition is not unified, and Guaidó's actions do not have the support of all factions within the opposition. Henry Falcon, the opposition candidate in 2013 against Maduro, and the main social democratic faction in Venezuela have described Guaidó's actions as adventurous and irresponsible and have not supported them. Nevertheless, the obstinacy of both sides, each considering itself the sole legitimate power in Venezuela, could, in the short term, even serve as a pretext for civil war. Overall, the crisis in Venezuela has intensified over the years with the exacerbation of authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies in the government, its combination with economic and humanitarian crises, and the predominance of more radical forces within the opposition. This crisis, which has taken unprecedented dimensions since 2015 with the opposition gaining two-thirds of the parliamentary majority and the formation of a dual power structure in the country's political scene, has become increasingly intertwined with greater international and regional struggles and is now entering more perilous stages with an even more ambiguous outlook.