Islam, Governance, and the Concepts of 'Kufr' and 'Irtidad'

Kafir, murtad. Few words can evoke as much fear and concern in a devout society as these two. Aside from similar terms like mulhid, baghi, and taghi, which have more limited applications. Should disbelief in God and abandoning religion necessarily lead to the execution of atheists and apostates? Human rights advocates and proponents of unconditional right to life answer 'no.' However, the responses from clerics and religious scholars are not uniform. Some argue that avoiding punishment for denying God and leaving religion contradicts God's command and leads to a decline in followers. Others believe that a kafir who does not fight against the government and a believer who abandons religion based on reasoning and research should not be punished. Meanwhile, in recent decades, some clerics who once supported harsher measures against kafir and murtad have changed their views in favor of tolerance and moderation. In Iran, prior to the 1979 revolution, the government did not execute anyone for kufr and irtidad for decades, although opponents of the regime, including the Fadaiyan-e Islam, did assassinate some of their adversaries by issuing fatwas of apostasy and takfir. However, after the revolution, the government itself became an executor of such rulings in some cases. Ayatollah Khomeini's ruling against the apostasy of Salman Rushdie, the British Indian author of 'The Satanic Verses,' even transcended Iran's borders. Although this ruling was never enforced, Iranian governments maintained their distance from it after Khomeini's death. Nevertheless, recently, with the emergence of groups known as the Islamic Caliphate and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Africa, and al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Middle East, the market for takfir has heated up. In Iran, while the number of executions related to apostasy has been less than in these regions in the last decade, it has not reached zero, and in any case, the implementation of the death penalty for apostasy is permissible under the Islamic Penal Code, which is considered by Iranian courts. What is the position of takfir and irtidad in Islam? Which understanding of religion and which form of governance abolishes the punishment for kafir and murtad? In this week's program, I discussed these questions with Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a religious scholar, and Parviz Dashtmalchi, a writer and political science researcher, both in Germany. Mr. Yousefi Eshkevari, to start the discussion, could you provide a summary of the religious and jurisprudential debates regarding the concepts of irtidad and takfir? Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari: The concepts of irtidad and takfir have not been directly and independently extracted from the Quran. They emerged in jurisprudence from the second and third centuries onward, and scholars have discussed them and articulated their rulings and details. However, these two concepts are not unrelated to the Quran itself during the time of the Prophet. The dichotomy of believer and kafir or mushrikin exists in the Quran as well. This dichotomy was constructed at that time, and the terms Muslim and non-Muslim, believer and kafir, and similar ones are also present in the Quran. At that time, it had a different meaning, primarily social, political, and military. That is, groups that had political and armed conflicts with Islam or the Prophet of Islam or Muslims were criticized or rebuked in the Quran, and sometimes faced severe attacks; at that time, it was not merely a religious or ideological group. Later, in connection with political power during the caliphate and in the second, third, and fourth centuries, these concepts gained political significance and were used as tools for repression, and the term irtidad also exists in the Quran. At one point, it states that those who turn away from their religion will face such and such punishments in the afterlife. However, for those who have converted or changed their religion and have become murtad, there is no punishment mentioned in the Quran. This has also been discussed in jurisprudence, although its roots go back to the 'Riddah' incident that occurred after the Prophet during the caliphate of Abu Bakr. In any case, later, the concepts of irtidad and takfir in the history of Islam were mainly misused by power seekers and rulers and during the caliphate and monarchy, as well as the authority of scholars, to suppress dissenters or intellectual or political opponents. In any case, this became a tool to eliminate rivals, critics, or opponents. When did some Muslims and scholars begin to oppose the punishment of kafir and murtad? Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari: This has been present since the time jurisprudence was organized, although scholars generally, both Shia and Sunni, accepted the death penalty for murtad and have generally believed in it since the fourth and fifth centuries until now. It has been discussed in connection with the repression of dissenters, somewhat like 'sabb al-nabi,' which is a separate concept from irtidad. Most scholars have considered the death penalty for anyone who insults the Prophet, and in Shia Islam, this has been extended to include insults to the Shia Imams as well. Among Sunni scholars, the same rule applies regarding the Prophet. However, at the same time, from the fourth and fifth centuries onward, some scholars did not believe in these punishments or worldly punishments for murtad and dissenters. In our modern era, in the last hundred years, due to the influence of freedom-seeking thoughts after the Constitutional Revolution, some adjustments have been made in this regard, and there are notable scholars in our time who do not believe in the death penalty for murtad at all. One of the most famous of them was the late Ayatollah Montazeri, who explicitly ruled in the last ten years of his life that the death penalty for murtad has no legal basis. We will delve deeper into these internal religious discussions. Mr. Dashtmalchi, from a secular perspective and the viewpoint of those who believe in the separation of religion from government, how do you view the phenomenon of takfir and irtidad and the path to abolishing the punishment for kafir and murtad in a devout society? Parviz Dashtmalchi: A devout society or a religious government are two different matters. For instance, you can see the United States, which is a very devout society but does not have a religious government. Or other societies. Therefore, the issue of government and religion is a matter of personal versus public affairs, two completely different phenomena. The statements made by Mr. Yousefi Eshkevari regarding takfir and irtidad and the references made to the Quran are completely correct. They are based on very contradictory foundations. However, at least in the Quran, I can point out twenty instances where it speaks to believers, for example, Surah Tawbah, verse 23, says that you who believe, do not take your fathers and mothers as allies if they choose disbelief over faith. Or whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted from him, and he will be among the losers in the afterlife, or fight against the kafirs until there is no fitnah left, and so on. This is mentioned in many different surahs and verses, and consequently, a source for clergy is primarily their holy book, the Quran, and secondarily, they refer to the behavior and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and then to the twelve Imams in Shia Islam. But to answer your question, as someone who advocates for a liberal parliamentary democratic government, meaning a secular government, what does it mean? In Iranian political literature, the separation of religion from government is discussed, which I find sometimes incorrect and imprecise. The precise expression is the separation of religion and any ideology from government. Because you can separate religion from government, but if you give the government another ideology, meaning the government is not neutral in values, is not liberal, in today's language, it can also lead to a totalitarian regime with a different ideology, which we have seen many examples of in the twentieth century. From my perspective, what is the issue of takfir? It must be defined. Takfir means calling someone a kafir. As long as it pertains to describing an individual who has left Islam or does not accept it (and I will address murtad later), who was a Muslim and later accepts kufr, it is not problematic. But if it becomes a religious government and we refer to the theories of the majority of scholars and jurists, especially the theories of Ayatollah Khomeini, who became both Imam and leader of the Islamic Revolution and the founder of a religious government called the Islamic Republic of Velayat-e Faqih, a kafir is someone who denies God or associates partners with God or does not accept the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad. He states that such a person is inherently impure. Or denies the prayers and fasting of Muslims. Then, in explaining this impure individual, he states that their body is also impure. Their hair is also impure. If the father and mother and grandparents of a child who is underage are kafir, that child is also impure, and so on. Mr. Dashtmalchi, please summarize. I will say two or three more sentences to conclude my point. Then, in explaining this impure individual regarding impurities, he states that there are eleven things that are impure: human urine, feces, and semen, dogs and pigs, and so on, and kafir. That is, a person who does not accept Islam is placed on the same level as urine and feces and dogs and pigs. This, from the perspective of a democratic system that is committed to the Declaration of Human Rights, and the right to choose belief and religion and faith is a free right of an individual, therefore, from my perspective and a democratic system, it cannot be accepted at all. Mr. Yousefi Eshkevari, what do you think about Mr. Dashtmalchi's considerations? In his remarks, he suggests that if there is something in the Quran, it cannot be interpreted in a specific way or ignored, and as they say, there is no ijtihad against the text. Or that they give examples of the Quran's view on the phenomenon of kafir and murtad, and in contrast to Ayatollah Montazeri, you mention Ayatollah Khomeini, whose ruling on Salman Rushdie became very famous and newsworthy. Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari: There is no doubt that there are verses in the Quran that draw a line between believers and non-believers or differentiate between kafir and mulhid and mushrik, defining them as different and sometimes contradictory groups, and that one group is approved and the other is rebuked. I also pointed this out at the beginning of my talk. It is also true that during the time of the Prophet, dozens of wars occurred, with believers and Muslims on one side and, so to speak, kafirs and mushriks on the other, as described in the Quran, and that there is a ruling of irtidad in our jurisprudence and a ruling of sabb al-nabi, which has been said to carry the punishment of death, there is no doubt about this, and I have pointed this out. That our scholars generally think this way, both Shia and Sunni, is correct, or issues like the impurity of kafir, which many scholars have acknowledged. It is not only Ayatollah Khomeini. Other figures have also stated this. Ayatollah Montazeri himself has mentioned these in his treatise, although in recent years, he has issued new fatwas and fresh ijtihads. However, the essence of the matter is whether a particular interpretation of the Quran and religious texts or jurisprudence or Islamic history can be presented or not? I do not know, of course, what our friend Mr. Dashtmalchi's opinion is in this regard. I did not infer from his remarks that only one interpretation can be offered. What can be claimed theoretically and also practically, or in the terminology of philosophy, retrospectively and prospectively regarding Islam and Islamic history, is that, like the approach to all religions throughout history, we see that an essentialist view is naturally not acceptable today. If we look at Islam, Islamic concepts, Islamic texts, Islamic history, and Islamic beliefs in an essentialist way, we see that while specific thoughts have often prevailed, just as they do today, and that same perspective is what I and others criticize today, and unfortunately, it is prevalent and operational, at the same time, I believe that all of these can have different readings and interpretations, and they do. If you go back to Islamic history, you will see that from the very first century after the Prophet, during the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the issue of the Khawarij rebellion, the Battle of Jamal, the Battle of Siffin in that first half-century, later you also see that among scholars, mystics, philosophers, and theologians, various interpretations of the same Islamic texts and sources have been presented. Is the Islam of Rumi the same as the Islam of Ghazali? Is the Islam of Avicenna and the Islam of Ghazali the same? They are completely different and often contradictory in many of these matters. Now, at that time, the discussions of hermeneutics, epistemology, the West, human rights, and similar issues were not even raised. In summary, while affirming the texts and sources that Mr. Dashtmalchi refers to, I have two or three points to make. One is that they are not interpreted essentialistically. Rather, they have the capability for various interpretations, and this has been the case in the past and is still the case today. The second issue is that I believe that yes, we have kafir and mumin and mushrik, and this also exists in Christianity and Judaism and all religions in some form. These borders also exist. However, at the same time, I believe that in religious matters, in matters of belief, there is, first of all, freedom. La ikraha fid-din is also present in the Quran, and that a person has the right to enter a religion and can also leave a religion. Just as Ayatollah Montazeri explicitly ruled on this. Ayatollah Ghoravi Isfahani and Ayatollah Sanei have also issued fatwas on this. Today, the right to leave a religion, which is Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is recognized by many scholars as well. There is sin and transgression, but at the same time, these do not carry legal punishment. The third point is that because I believe in a secular government, not a religious one, therefore, in my opinion, part of the problems we have faced in Islamic societies from the past to the present and these repressions...