Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement with 1+5

Finally, last Tuesday, after nearly 23 months of continuous and intense negotiations, the foreign ministers of Iran and the 1+5 countries announced in Vienna that they had reached a comprehensive agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program. This agreement aims to prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons in the long term. It is also stipulated that if the agreement is approved by the U.S. Congress, the Iranian Parliament, and the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, international sanctions imposed specifically for Iran's nuclear program will gradually be lifted upon its implementation. Last week, the U.S. sought to address Saudi Arabia's concerns regarding Washington's relations with Riyadh following the comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries, clarifying that this agreement would not transform the longstanding U.S.-Saudi relations. On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, after discussions with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, promised to meet with all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council on August 3rd and answer any questions. Following this discussion, Adel al-Jubeir advised Iran to use the economic benefits of the agreement for its people rather than what he termed 'adventurism in the region.' Additionally, last week, the United Arab Emirates expressed satisfaction with the announcement of the agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries. On the other hand, on the same day, Israel witnessed a public debate between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his British counterpart Philip Hammond during a press conference in Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister's office announced that it does not commit to the agreement reached between Iran and the 1+5 and called it a historical mistake. According to Netanyahu, the agreement was reached before the change in the behavior and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region. Philip Hammond attempted to assure Israel that the implementation of the agreement would involve verification, continuous inspections, and the limitation of Iran's nuclear activities. Netanyahu's criticisms of the agreement from the outset of the press conference and Hammond's responses, along with Netanyahu's subsequent reactions and Hammond's brief final response, left little doubt for most observers that in the next closed-door session, Britain, the West, and the 1+5 countries will face a serious challenge in convincing Israel. A key question for the three guests this week is whether addressing Saudi Arabia's concerns is easier for Iran than alleviating Israel's worries. Davood Hermidas Bavand, a senior professor of international relations at Iranian universities in Tehran, Meir Javadanfar, a professor of contemporary Iranian politics at Herzliya University in Tel Aviv, and Mansour Farhang, a former Iranian representative to the United Nations and a senior political science professor in New York. The discussion about the potential separation or lack thereof of the positions of Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding the outcome of the Iran-1+5 nuclear agreement begins with Israel's statement that this agreement is a historical mistake. Mr. Bavand, what conclusion can be drawn from this statement and Netanyahu's comments during the press conference and his meeting with Philip Hammond on Thursday? Davood Hermidas Bavand: A historic agreement has been reached that has been welcomed globally in most countries and is aimed at affirming and confirming peace from an international perspective, and its reflection for the region, especially in the long term, will pave the way for adjustments in the attitudes and positions of regional countries towards a new effort to improve relations with Iran. So, I want to see where Israel stands with this position it has taken. Davood Hermidas Bavand: It confirms the same previous position. Every country is entitled to adopt a position based on its specific assessments. His position is completely clear, previously announced, and currently continues the same policy. Mr. Netanyahu has also stated that military action is not the solution, but an agreement can be reached that leads to a change in Iran's behavior before the lifting of sanctions. Should this emphasis that military action is not the solution be interpreted as a change or is it still in line with previous positions? Davood Hermidas Bavand: The issue that has gained priority at the regional level has been nuclear technology. Therefore, all the efforts of the relevant governments have been directed towards a peaceful resolution of this issue. I believe that the trade of recent years in the region, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, along with everything that has happened in the region that has led to fragmentation, destruction, and devastation, has emphasized that a policy and a soft strategy must be chosen to solve the problems that the international community faces. Therefore, an effort has been made to mobilize global public opinion and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, five members representing the international community regarding this specific issue have chosen a policy. Thus, to resolve this issue that had gained priority, constructive negotiations were conducted in good faith, and what has been achieved is in the interest and benefit of the international community, and even in a long-term view, its positive reflection will also be for us. Mr. Javadanfar, the Israeli Prime Minister's office has stated that the country does not consider itself committed to this comprehensive agreement between Iran and the 1+5. What does this statement mean in practice for you, who follow the positions from within? Meir Javadanfar: In Israel, there is a hypothesis that one of the reasons Mr. Netanyahu has threatened in recent years that Israel could resort to military options is that he wants to compel European countries to take action. That if you do not impose very serious sanctions against Iran, we will attack. One of the reasons Netanyahu has stated that the Israeli government is not committed to such an agreement is that, in my opinion, he wants to remind the leaders and senior officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran that if they do not adhere to the agreement with Obama, Israel could again resort to military options. I believe there is another reason that most people in Israel are very skeptical of this recent agreement. Netanyahu exploits this issue for internal reasons. He maneuvers on it. We have other problems in Israel. The Iranian nuclear program is not our only problem. It seems that Mr. Netanyahu is worried that if the Iran issue is resolved, what will he do in the future? And I think Netanyahu wants to use this issue until the last day that Obama is in the presidency to isolate Mr. Obama and the Democratic Party. Because Mr. Netanyahu is the leader of the Likud Party, which is equivalent to the Republican Party in the U.S. Their waters have never flowed together with the Democrats. One of Netanyahu's biggest supporters in the U.S. is Sheldon Adelson, a Jewish billionaire, who is also very close to Republican positions and contributes millions to the Republican Party. Mr. Farhang, Benjamin Netanyahu, during the Thursday press conference directed at Philip Hammond, stated that the main reason for criticizing the 1+5 nuclear agreement is that the 1+5 countries did not commit Iran to change its behavior or policies in the Middle East. Mr. Hammond also responded, similar to what Mr. Bavand said, that this agreement was supposed to be about Iran's nuclear program, not about the multiple dimensions of Iran's foreign policy and the criticisms that the West and Israel have regarding it. What are the coordinates of Israel's position regarding the Iran-1+5 nuclear agreement from your perspective? Mansour Farhang: Israel's and Saudi Arabia's opposition to this agreement is not that Iran may advance uranium enrichment to the point where it can build a bomb. Because if their concern were genuine, they should be very pleased that based on the 159-page agreement that has so far been approved by the parties, Iran will not acquire such capability for at least the next ten years. The main concern of Israel and Saudi Arabia, which do not share the same reasons at all, is that the reformist faction in Iran may be able to advance the country's relations with the world towards normalization and engage in banking and financial transactions with Western countries, and introduce Iran as the main threat to peace and security in the region, which is currently in the mindset of the Israeli government and a significant portion of Americans, and the main problem in the Middle East, which is actually the occupation of Palestinian territories and the crimes committed by ISIS and others, may become marginalized, and Iran, as Netanyahu says, poses a threat that is many times greater than the threat of ISIS. Israel wants Iran to remain the greatest and most dangerous enemy of the West so that this quasi-apartheid system that Israel has established in the occupied Palestinian territories continues, and the current Israeli government is expansionist and fundamentally opposed to peace, so that it can continue in this way, it wants a larger enemy in the region to attract the attention of the Western world, especially the U.S. Saudi Arabia has completely different intentions and issues. So let us discuss this point later. Also, Mr. Javadanfar, if you would like to react to your interpretation. I will start the question about Saudi Arabia with Mr. Bavand. On Thursday, Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi Foreign Minister, after discussions with his American counterpart John Kerry, suggested that Iran should use the benefits of the nuclear agreement for the development of the country and its people, not for adventurism in the region, and on the other hand, warned that if there is unrest in the region, they will deal with Iran decisively. Based on these statements, Mr. Bavand, and the UAE's and Gulf Cooperation Council countries' positive reception of the nuclear agreement, can a distinction be made between the positions of Saudi Arabia and Israel regarding this agreement? Davood Hermidas Bavand: The issue of Israel is a strategic one. All of Israel's efforts are to maintain the status quo. That is, to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It adopts a policy of delay and procrastination. For this purpose, it needs to use other events and issues as a pretext to divert attention from addressing or resolving this issue and to direct the attention of some regional countries towards the creation of new dangers in the region. The issue of Saudi Arabia has a limited aspect. Especially after the positive reaction of the majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries to the agreement reached, Saudi Arabia intends to gradually adjust its positions. For this reason, the first interpretation that has emerged for me is that the resulting income should be spent solely on internal issues and problems. This is very natural, and every country primarily meets its own needs; if this does not happen, they will adopt another policy. However, I believe that Saudi Arabia will soon adjust its position beyond what it has announced because political wisdom necessitates that it align itself with the realities that have emerged, which will also benefit Saudi Arabia. Because geographical realities cannot be changed. Iran's position in the region is a reality that I think the international community has recognized geopolitically, especially in light of the chaotic and crisis-ridden conditions in the region, the Western world and extra-regional powers' perspectives on organizing Middle Eastern issues have formed on new foundations. Saudi Arabia has sensed this reality. Saudi interests will sooner or later lead it to pursue a path of constructive dialogue with Iran, which will ultimately benefit both countries and the region. Mr. Javadanfar, if you want to respond to the interpretations that Mr. Farhang and Mr. Bavand have regarding Israel's role concerning the nuclear agreement, how similar or different is it from your view? Meir Javadanfar: There is no doubt that Mr. Netanyahu does not want a Palestinian state to be established, and he himself said before the elections that if I am elected, a Palestinian state will never be established. But I disagree with his statement that Israel is an apartheid state. We had an Arab minister in our country; we do not have one now. We have an Arab judge. Israeli Arabs have equal rights in our country. Yes, Palestinians do not. They are a different nationality. It can be said that there is discrimination, but it cannot be called apartheid. Because if they were citizens of Israel and we discriminated against them, then it could be called apartheid. But Mr. Farhang, if I can add another layer to your perspective, this question must be asked: why then is the Israeli opposition against this agreement? Well, when a foreign country has been involved for 36 years... our issue with the Palestinians is that both of us are guilty; between us and the Palestinians. Iran is a foreign country, its government, of course. It has intervened in this matter and killed our citizens and holds Al-Quds Day every year, wishing that this country would disappear. This behavior of the Islamic Republic towards Israel must be considered for a more complete analysis. Very well. Do you see a distinction between the positions of Saudi Arabia and Israel regarding the nuclear agreement, considering that Saudi Arabia at least does not have concerns about the removal of its country and citizens from the map of the world, as you mentioned? Meir Javadanfar: The difference between Israel and Saudi Arabia is that in Israel, Mr. Netanyahu clearly speaks against the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia speaks but from behind.