Israeli Army Releases First Report on 'Total Surprise' During Hamas Attack

The Israeli army has published the results of its internal investigations into the factors that led to the failure to predict the October 7 attack by the extremist group Hamas on Israel. The report emphasizes the 'total surprise' of the army on the day of the attack against this group. Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union, launched a surprise attack on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, killing approximately 1,200 people and taking 251 hostage. The Israeli army's investigations reviewed its performance over the years but highlighted how the army and commanders ignored all signs of Hamas's preparations for the deadly assault, rendering 'the entire army institution in southern Israel' incapacitated during the critical hours of the attack. The army, accepting responsibility for its failure, acknowledged that it had not understood the real dangers to the security of southern Israel over the years and had followed a 'general inference' regarding the need to maintain 'calm,' which was also the request of the country's political leader. The report released by the Israeli army on Thursday, March 9, determined that the army had severely underestimated and misjudged the capabilities of this militant group and ignored five significant signs of the unprecedented assault by the militants ruling Gaza on the night of the attack. The investigations also described the 8200 unit of the army as 'caught in arrogance and pride' and 'elitism.' The 8200 unit is known for its high military and intelligence capabilities and is considered the long arm of Israeli intelligence and security agencies in conducting operations in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other countries in the region and the world. According to the investigations, only 767 soldiers were stationed at the southern borders of Israel on the night of the Hamas attack, which is less than half the usual number of forces in that area. On the night of the attack, Israel was celebrating a religious holiday, and commanders had granted leave to many troops. The army commanders also allowed a large music and dance festival (Noah Festival) to take place just two kilometers from the Gaza border, where thousands of young Israelis participated for several days. Many of the casualties and hostages were from this location. The investigations added that only 14 tanks were stationed at the borders with Gaza on the night of the attack, and the attacking Hamas forces were able to quickly paralyze the 'command and control' of the Israeli army. Hamas forces had swapped their mobile phone SIM cards with Israeli SIM cards hours before the attack to use the Israeli internet and mobile network, but this sign was ignored in the field by several senior military and security officials who were informed. According to the Israeli army's investigation, about 5,600 Palestinian attackers, including some 'ordinary looters' from Gaza, entered Israeli settlements and kibbutzim in the early hours of the attack in three waves, and the armed militants managed to kidnap 251 Israelis, set many houses on fire, and conduct widespread looting, transferring vehicles, tractors, and other means of transport to Gaza. In its previous assessments, the army had stated that 'in the worst case,' Hamas might attack Israel from eight border points, but on the day of the attack, thousands of Hamas forces entered Israel from 60 routes. The investigation indicated that Hamas fired 3,889 rockets and mortars into Israeli territory in the early hours of the attack, and part of the army's efforts to repel the attack was spent on countering the rocket assault. On the day of the attack, Israel was targeted by a total of 4,694 rockets. The Israeli army assesses that the extremist group Hamas intended to penetrate deep into Israel, including the port of Ashkelon and key air bases in the south. The findings added that General Yaron Finkelman, the army commander in the south, could have ordered the closure of the border through extensive airstrikes but erred by inaction in this regard, and the 16 fighter jets that entered the campaign were occupied with 'irrelevant missions.' The main analytical error based on the investigation was that Israel believed Hamas, after taking control of Gaza in 2007 and expelling the Palestinian Authority from the strip, was interested in managing the area rather than waging war against Israel. This investigation emphasized that the army's studies and its military intelligence organization lacked sufficient understanding of the 'culture of extremist Islam.' The findings published in Israeli media summarize a large internal investigation that has been presented to military and government leaders. Analysts in Israeli media state that this investigation paves the way for accountability for many army commanders and ultimately their dismissal. Aharon Haliva, the then-commander of the military intelligence organization known as 'Aman,' who took responsibility for his and his organization's failure to timely identify the threat, resigned a few months ago. Herzi Halevi, the Chief of Staff of the army, also announced his resignation two months ago and is set to be succeeded by General Eyal Zamir next week. Lieutenant General Halevi stated on Thursday night following the publication of the investigation that he is the only person responsible for the army's failure. However, the findings of the investigations have also increased pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu, who has resisted public calls for the establishment of a national inquiry commission for the past 16 and a half months. Some Israelis believe that the mistakes leading to the Hamas attack go beyond the army and argue that Netanyahu, who has been the country's leader for nearly two consecutive decades, has been the decisive factor in the policy and strategy of 'maintaining calm' regarding Gaza and that the army executed his orders. This group of public opinion and Israeli politicians emphasizes the fact that Netanyahu himself supported the transfer of continuous cash shipments from Qatar to Gaza, which reached Hamas, a rival of the Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu and his supporters viewed Hamas as less harmful than the Palestinian Authority. Bezalel Smotrich, the leader of the 'Religious Zionism' party and current ally of Netanyahu, stated, 'Hamas is a prize.' Over the years, Netanyahu had instructed the head of Mossad to facilitate the transfer of large sums of money from Qatar to Gaza, and senior Mossad officials personally oversaw the transport of dollar shipments from Qatar to Ben Gurion Airport to Gaza. Netanyahu has not fully accepted his responsibility and stated that he will only answer tough questions about this after the war ends. During the war, he has held very few press interviews and has spoken three times with his supportive television network, Channel 14. The families of about 1,200 Israelis who were killed in the Hamas attack, as well as the families of the 251 Israeli hostages in Gaza, are at the forefront of public opinion calling for a national inquiry commission and are supported by the country's president. The Gaza war, which according to the Gaza Health Ministry statistics under Hamas has resulted in the deaths of over 48,000 residents of Gaza and devastated the strip, has been halted for 41 days due to a temporary ceasefire. In the past six weeks, Hamas has delivered 25 live hostages and the bodies of eight deceased hostages to Israel, but 59 Israelis remain hostage to Hamas, and the future of the ceasefire is uncertain.