Israel's Approach to the Iran Nuclear Agreement

As the day approaches when Donald Trump, the President of the United States, must report to Congress about Iran's compliance with the nuclear agreement, diplomatic movements around this issue have significantly increased. In this context, the British Prime Minister has spoken on the phone with her Israeli counterpart, and according to reports, although Theresa May advocates for preserving the JCPOA, she has agreed with Benjamin Netanyahu that they must counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. Regarding Israel's approach to the nuclear agreement, we spoke with Amichai Magan on the sidelines of the 2000 Forum taking place in Prague. Mr. Magan is a professor of diplomacy and strategy at the Lauder School in Herzliya, Israel, and heads the governance and political violence program at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism. This week is significant for the JCPOA, and it is unclear what the future of this agreement will be. How do you see the outlook for the JCPOA? Amichai Magan: First of all, I think it is very important to consider the context of this agreement and the geostrategic situation. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, gave an important speech at the General Assembly two weeks ago, stating that the people and government of Israel do not consider the people of Iran as enemies, and conversely, if someone knows about Iranian and Israeli culture and understands how these two groups live peacefully together in cities like Los Angeles or London, they will realize that we have many similarities. Israelis and Iranians are naturally friends, not enemies. The problem is the combination of an aggressive and imperialist regime, not only in words but in action. We see how the clerics operate from Afghanistan to Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, and how they have formed a land bridge and a Shiite crescent. However, you know that the Iranian government has repeatedly rejected your statement in recent weeks, claiming that Iran has supported Sunni groups as well. This is a fig leaf to cover up the reality. It is true that at times, the clerics have not taken into account the differences between Shiites and Sunnis for their strategic interests. But looking at what is happening strategically, you see a very serious, determined, and rich effort from Iran, led by the Revolutionary Guards and, for example, the militias they have brought to Syria, to establish a land connection from Iran to the Mediterranean. This is very concerning, especially for Israel, given the statements made by Iranian leaders. They say Israel is a cancerous tumor that must be destroyed and that they can destroy Israel with a bomb. As a result, Israel looks not only at the rhetoric but also at the intentions and motivations of this regime. The other side of this balance is the effort to achieve the capability to build nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile program, which was not part of the agreement. On the other hand, Iran's support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Putting all this together, it is logical for Israel to see Iran as a real threat. So you agree with the Israeli Prime Minister that the P5+1 should either amend the agreement or eliminate it? No, I did not say that. But I think it is very important to understand the situation. From Israel's perspective, a very large neighbor like Iran is talking about the destruction of Israel. It is developing its ballistic missile program, supporting Hamas and Hezbollah and other extremist groups that want Israel to be destroyed, and increasing its influence in the Middle East. We are a small country, and our population is concentrated in a small area. Any country in such a situation, whether it is Israel, Britain, Luxembourg, or Indonesia, will conclude that it must be very concerned about its survival. If you were to advise the Israeli government today on what its approach to the nuclear agreement should be, what would you recommend? The position of the current Israeli government, which has been in power for about eight years, and has emphasized this position, is very clear. The Prime Minister has spoken about this many times and it was so important to him that, contrary to Barack Obama's approach, he went to Washington and spoke in Congress about it. I think this is not exclusive to Netanyahu; there is consensus across the Israeli political spectrum, from left to right, about the reality of the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. However, other voices are also being heard. Last week, a former Mossad official held meetings in Washington and defended the JCPOA. And this is not the first Israeli who has supported the JCPOA and spoken about it. We like to say that when two Jews are in a room, there will be three opinions. We have a pluralistic society. You always have people from civil society, the academic space, or former officials who have a different opinion, but when you look at the political and security arena of the Israeli government, the issue of the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is one of the few topics on which there is consensus; not only about the reality of the threat but also about the fact that if nothing changes, we are heading towards this threat. But these are two different issues. I mean the nuclear agreement and Iran being armed with a nuclear bomb. Well, let’s talk about the agreement itself. There are issues in this agreement that concern Israel. First, the agreement allows Iran to continue and increase uranium enrichment, effectively enabling Iran to obtain a level of fissile material that could be used in bomb-making. This means that even if Iran complies with its commitments today, in, say, 10 years, or even less, it will be closer to the capability of making a bomb. Of course, if it decides to build a bomb. Yes, if it decides. After this time frame of the agreement. This agreement is not forever. It is for 10 years. However, not all restrictions are for 10 years. Some are for 10 years, some for 15 years, and some for longer, in addition to the fact that Iran is a member of the NPT and must also ratify the Additional Protocol. Yes, but the 10 years, which has already passed two years, creates a space for maneuvering for Iran, and the Iranians, who are skilled negotiators, will exploit this space to achieve their strategic goal of becoming a nuclear power. Another problematic aspect of the agreement is the exclusion of a very important element that Israel insisted should be part of the negotiations and the agreement, which the Obama administration mistakenly removed from the negotiations. I mean the ballistic missile program, which is a very important part of the threat that Israel and other countries feel. But Iran says that missiles are part of the country's defense system and have nothing to do with the nuclear issue because it does not intend to mount a nuclear warhead on its missiles. Yes, but this should have been part of the negotiations and included in the agreement, and this issue greatly concerns Israel. From our perspective, the agreement is very problematic, and this has always been expressed by the Israeli government throughout the negotiations and afterward. Another issue is sanctions; we know that it was the sanctions that forced Iran to come to the negotiating table. After the agreement, the sanctions regime somewhat collapsed, which in a way legitimized the Iranian government, and the Obama administration legitimized a dictatorial, repressive, and human rights-abusing regime. Then they did not understand how quickly the sanctions regime that they had worked for years to build fell apart. For this reason, I think this agreement has many, many problems. But the agreement has been made, and what to do now is the main puzzle. Do you think Israel would be safer without the JCPOA? This is a billion-dollar question. And it depends on what happens after the agreement is gone. If the Trump administration decides to withdraw from the agreement, that is one issue, but it does not answer your question. The important thing is what to do after the withdrawal. In our view, the worst-case scenario would be for Trump to leave the agreement, allowing Iran to do the same, and then nothing happens. This would accelerate Iran's nuclear program and legitimize it. This scenario is worse than what we currently have, which is already very bad. That Trump leaves the agreement and does not quickly implement an alternative solution would be very bad. My personal opinion is that Israel thinks the current agreement is bad, but that does not mean that any alternative is better. We need to create a much better alternative. This is one of the criticisms of the supporters of the JCPOA, who say that opponents criticize but have no better alternative. Exactly. We need to seriously discuss an alternative. This is important not only for sending a message to Iran or creating an alternative from a policy perspective but also for the issue of legitimacy. Donald Trump does not have many supporters in the international arena today. It is very dangerous for the exit from the nuclear agreement to be compared by the media or Iran itself, certainly, with the Paris climate agreement. These two are very different. But in terms of international legitimacy, what it will create is that President Trump simply exits good agreements. It is very important to distinguish between these two. Of course, this agreement is not only between Iran and the United States. These days, not only Russia and China but also the Europeans have strongly supported the agreement with Iran and called for it to remain intact. Do you think they will join the U.S. government in exiting the JCPOA? I do not think they will technically align with the President of the United States, but I think in the short term, their analysis will be that the U.S. exit from the JCPOA is another step by this country to separate itself from the international system. But it also depends on what the alternative to the JCPOA is, and if the Trump administration provides a coherent alternative and works to unite countries to advance it, then the Europeans and other countries will join, as they will realize that ultimately it is still the U.S. that is the main decision-maker in this regard.