Jalili: Iran Has Been Seeking the Lifting of Sanctions Since 2005

Saeed Jalili, former Iran's nuclear negotiator, stated in a report to the commission reviewing the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) that the Islamic Republic has pursued three strategic goals in its nuclear program since 2005, including the lifting of 'oppressive sanctions.' The first UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran's nuclear issue was issued in July 2006, and the most severe sanctions were imposed on Iran a few years later during Jalili's tenure. On Tuesday, September 10, the Mehr News Agency reported Jalili's remarks, which reflected his perspective on the ups and downs of the nuclear negotiations, as conveyed by Hossein Naqavi Hosseini, the spokesman for the JCPOA review commission. This member of parliament quoted Jalili as saying that after the suspension of nuclear activities during negotiations with three European countries, 'the system concluded that due to the failure of the West to fulfill its commitments, nuclear activities should resume.' Jalili added that 'in 2005, when Ali Larijani was in charge of the Supreme National Security Council, Western countries demanded the destruction and elimination of Iran's nuclear activities after two and a half years of suspension; therefore, the system set three strategic goals.' The spokesman for the JCPOA review commission then listed these three goals as 'establishing a nuclear Iran, realizing Iran's nuclear rights, and lifting oppressive sanctions.' Meanwhile, during the period when opposition to Iran's nuclear program intensified, the country was subjected to several sanctions resolutions. The first sanctions related to this issue date back to December 2006 and the issuance of Security Council Resolution 1737, a few months after Iran's file was sent to the Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had requested Iran to abandon its nuclear program in Resolution 1696 (August 2006). Subsequently, due to Iran's insistence on continuing its nuclear program, five other sanctions resolutions were issued: Resolutions 1747 (April 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), 1887 (September 2009), and 1929 (June 2010), four of which were passed during Jalili's tenure as the nuclear negotiator. Iran also faced various sanctions from the U.S. and its Western allies during the pursuit of its controversial nuclear program, but all sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program were imposed after the referral of Iran's case to the Security Council after 2006. Jalili also stated in the JCPOA review commission meeting that Iran responded to six ambiguities and issues raised by the IAEA in 2007, and the Agency officially stated that 'the responses were convincing and the ambiguities were resolved.' Jalili added that the fourth Security Council resolution regarding Iran's nuclear program was issued simultaneously with 'ElBaradei's written report on resolving ambiguities by Iran.' At that time, Mohamed ElBaradei, the then Director General of the IAEA, stated that the Agency's inspectors had clarified all issues regarding Iran's nuclear program, and only one issue remained within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ElBaradei emphasized that 'there are no remaining issues' and this was 'encouraging.' However, France, Britain, and Germany, as the main supporters of Resolution 1803 in the Security Council, assessed Iran's cooperation with the Agency more negatively than the picture painted by ElBaradei. Jalili's remarks at the JCPOA review commission indicate that, from his perspective, the achievement of nuclear negotiators during his tenure was to turn 'the serious challenge posed by the West' into 'an opportunity.' He stated, 'Our diplomatic art during this period was to invert the serious challenge that the West created for us and turn it into an opportunity, forcing them to shift from confrontation to interaction and dialogue, even discussing non-nuclear regional issues with us.' He added that during the second round of nuclear negotiations in Istanbul, the U.S. 'retreated from its red lines on enrichment and the nuclear rights of the Islamic Republic.' He further stated that 'the next step took place in Baghdad... coinciding with the Islamic Awakening, which presented new regional challenges to the West... the U.S. and its allies were forced to discuss regional security issues with Iran.' Jalili also mentioned that the Americans repeatedly requested bilateral talks during his management of the negotiations, but he did not accept. He pointed out that during his time, there were no visits to the Parchin area and claimed that at that time 'the 1+5 had retreated from all their red lines, set aside their confrontational approach, and accepted dialogue regarding nuclear rights, enrichment rights, and the stabilization of the nuclear industry, while we had the capacity for 20% enrichment and 19,000 centrifuges, and at that time Fordow had entered production operations, and the other side was ready to lift sanctions.' Jalili also stated that 'merely relying on diplomacy' and ignoring 'the elements of power within the country' would yield no results and claimed that the '2009 sedition' was created to undermine 'the elements of national power,' and 'for this reason, [the West] supported the 2009 sedition with all their might and ultimately issued Resolution 1929.' In Iranian government rhetoric, the term sedition refers to the protests following the disputed June 2009 elections, and the Supreme Leader and part of the establishment believe that these protests were directed or supported by Western countries.