Jannati's Presidency of the Assembly and the Duality of Larijani and Aref in Parliament

On Sunday, Ali Larijani was temporarily elected as the president of the tenth parliament with 173 votes out of a total of 281, while Mohammad Reza Aref managed to secure 103 votes in the competition against him. However, this is not the end of the story, as there are still a few days left to determine whether Ali Larijani will be elected as the permanent president of the tenth parliament or Mohammad Reza Aref. Supporters of the government and reformists are now at a crossroads. This dilemma is whether it is better to retain Ali Larijani, the temporary president of the tenth parliament and the president of the eighth and ninth parliaments, in this position to appreciate his support for Hassan Rouhani's government over the past two years and encourage him to defend the government and reformists against potential opponents, or whether it is more beneficial to elect Mohammad Reza Aref, the first elected representative of Tehran in the tenth parliament and the first vice president of former President Mohammad Khatami, to the presidency of this parliament to unequivocally represent the demands of government supporters and reformists and reward him for refraining from continuing the competition for the presidency in the 1392 elections. Some of Aref's supporters in the tenth parliament raise the issue of the balance of power among government supporters and reformists. They argue that now that Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of the Guardian Council, has been elected president of the Assembly of Experts despite receiving the lowest votes in Tehran, it would be better for Mohammad Reza Aref to become the president of the tenth parliament to balance the factional powers. These are all topics that we will discuss in this week's program with three guests: Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, a member of the central council of the National Trust Party in Mashhad, Ammar Maleki, an assistant professor of political science at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, and Amir Hossein Ganjbakhsh, one of the founders of a political organization called Solidarity for a Secular Republic and Human Rights in Iran. Mr. Javadi Hesari, was Ahmad Jannati's presidency of the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts predictable for government supporters and reformists or was it a miscalculation and unexpected? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: It was neither purely predictable nor unexpected. It depended on certain conditions. In my opinion, one of the main conditions was whether Mr. Hashemi would run for the presidency of the Assembly of Experts given the public atmosphere. If he had run, there were two possible scenarios. The first scenario was that the Assembly would favor Mr. Hashemi and the majority would vote for him, making him the president of the Assembly, which would open a front of confrontation between the two main streams at the highest level of decision-making in the leadership area. This, in my opinion, would not have been good from one perspective. The second discussion was that Mr. Hashemi would run with the backing of the first vote in Tehran, and the Assembly would give him a negative vote and not elect him as president. This would be a disregard for the method and manner of Mr. Hashemi and the constituents of Tehran and the whole country, and that would not be good either. In my opinion, Mr. Hashemi and his team should have seen what option would be more suitable for the other candidates and what goals were considered. One of those goals, in my view, was that Mr. Hashemi, when it was concluded that the conditions were not suitable for him to run, should have aimed for de-escalation. Opening a front of confrontation between Mr. Hashemi's supporters and the leadership supporters in that area was not desirable and could have led to unpredictable results. When Mr. Hashemi withdrew, we should have seen who could be his alternative and replacement based on the conditions. As you observed, Mr. Hashemi Shahroudi was a candidate, Mr. Amoli Larijani, and other candidates including Mr. Amini. Mr. Hashemi, with Mr. Amini's proposal, significantly crossed out those other options that some individuals had in mind as alternatives for leadership in Iranian political society, and by not supporting them, he erased the speculation from people's minds that Mr. Hashemi also had a green light for their future leadership by presenting them as prominent figures in the Assembly and supporting them. In my opinion, this speculation was erased from people's minds. The next discussion was that with the beginning of Mr. Jannati's proposal and his presidency over the Assembly of Experts, a process comes to an end, and that process was the proposal of individuals or personalities who sought to shape their future in the leadership area by presiding over the Assembly. I believe this was initiated and halted. Mr. Maleki, what do you think? Was there a miscalculation on the part of government supporters and reformists that Ahmad Jannati became president of the Assembly of Experts, or was it predicted in advance and they even took actions to reach that destination? Ammar Maleki: In any case, Mr. Jannati's election was a symbolic choice from the opposing side, and the reality is that it shocked many voters and the reformist base. Of course, there is also a point that reformist friends and those who encouraged people to vote are now saying something different from the analysis they had before the elections; I do not want to say it is contradictory or inconsistent, although some of them are. In any case, a large part of the votes cast for the 16-member list in Tehran under the name of the Hope List belonged to those who came with the slogan and a public atmosphere that aimed to eliminate the so-called triangle of J (Mr. Jannati, Yazdi, and Mesbah), and this enthusiasm created a goal that why we should come and vote. Because if we consider the conditions at that time, after the widespread disqualifications in the Assembly of Experts elections, it was obvious that ultimately any outcome would not have more than twenty or thirty supporters of Mr. Hashemi, meaning those who are specifically in Mr. Hashemi's team or moderates. Whatever the outcome, the other side has a dominant majority. Given this point, it was not possible to invite people to vote unless a bipolar atmosphere could be created. And this bipolar atmosphere was created, and no one opposed it. That is, Mr. Hashemi, Mr. Rouhani, and moderates and reformists did not try to reduce the bipolar atmosphere; rather, they even tried to increase it so that they could at least symbolically eliminate these three individuals. This tactic was a mistake, at least analytically, especially since a 16-member list that had eight members in common with the clergy and the teachers' society. And this had a fundamental mathematical flaw because every vote that the reformist base cast in favor of Mr. Hashemi and moderates would proportionally raise the votes of the opposing list. That is why there is a strange discrepancy between Mr. Hashemi's votes and Mr. Imamami Kashani's votes, which is about thirty to forty thousand votes. While such a small difference should not have existed. This was one of their mistakes. On the other hand, there was a kind of ethical issue that we know there were individuals in Mr. Hashemi's list who had very bad backgrounds. In terms of the suppressions of the early revolution and execution issues, and even many reformists could not defend those individuals. Given this incident and the fact that people came with enthusiasm, now when they see that Mr. Jannati, who received the last vote, becomes president of the Assembly of Experts, it shows that Mr. Hashemi and the team he gathered could not even minimally demonstrate that for the people's demands, we were able to take a step forward. That Mr. Javadi Hesari says Mr. Hashemi did not run because he made a tactical move might be acceptable, assuming he thought he would not receive a high vote. However, Mr. Hashemi, given the list he had and the reception he received from people, should have been prepared for that afterward. In any case, between Mr. Hashemi supporting Mr. Amini - and Mr. Amini receiving a low vote - and Mr. Hashemi running himself and receiving a low vote, in my opinion, there was no difference, but the difference was that if Mr. Hashemi had entered himself, perhaps those who received votes through him would have been tested to see if they would be willing to do so in the future when a moderate leader is to be elected. It seems that now there is a significant disappointment for those who voted. Not to mention that the way the joint list was formed was a wrong move because it could have even formed an eight-member list. Besides all this, those who oppose the entire institution of the Velayat-e Faqih as a non-democratic institution, whose criticism is why we should have entered these elections at all, I do not discuss because I think the perspective that Mr. Javadi Hesari has is not to consider this institution as a non-democratic institution. Mr. Ganjbakhsh, what do you think about Ahmad Jannati's presidency of the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts being a miscalculation of government supporters and reformists, or was it based on pragmatic calculations by this group after they managed to secure those votes in the Assembly of Experts? Amir Hossein Ganjbakhsh: This election can be viewed from two perspectives. One is from a macro and symbolic perspective that the election had. The second is in the details that later occurred, and the issue of the Assembly of Experts and later the parliament can be examined in that angle. From a macro perspective and the angle that the relationship between voters and the people is raised, this was a significant victory. Because at least we, who are outside the establishment, set our main goal to defeat those who are immersed in the Velayat. We did not differentiate between the Assembly of Experts or parliament. We said wherever you can give your vote in a way that defeats those immersed in the Velayat, do it. In this regard, I think a significant success was achieved, especially in Tehran, both in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts. As you know, Mr. Jannati was the last person and was forcibly included in this group. From this perspective, it has been a significant victory. We did not differentiate and did not provide a list because our issue was not this person or that person. Rather, it was fundamentally about defeating those immersed in the Velayat. When we enter the details of the Assembly of Experts, as mentioned, it was never intended to become a majority based on the arrangement that had been created in favor of this anti-Velayat group. The intention was to create a minority. But what happened should be viewed from the perspective of the people and the confrontation that has arisen between the Velayat and the nation, how someone who was not even supposed to be elected today becomes the president of the Assembly of Experts by the command of the leader. And again, this shared experience that the Iranian people have brings to light the destructive role of the Velayat in all areas, whether foreign policy, opposition to the JCPOA, or in the area of citizen rights; this experience is also very positive from the people's perspective. This continues. One thing should not be forgotten. The retreats of the Velayat are changing the stronghold. Every time there is even a pretense of retreat, he advances his policy from another stronghold. And certainly, in some areas, he can also have a movement like this case. It seems to have a successful appearance, but the essence of the confrontation between the nation and the Velayat is what matters. And this is the victory that has significance for freedom-seeking forces. Mr. Javadi Hesari, do you have a reaction to the analysis of Mr. Maleki and Mr. Ganjbakhsh? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: The friends' remarks cannot be dismissed. It cannot be said that there is no possibility in these areas. But considering Mr. Hashemi's pragmatism and his team, as I mentioned, Mr. Hashemi's intention was to create a coalition with the composition of the Assembly and to create a kind of heart-to-heart connection. They did not want the confrontation to continue. Mr. Hashemi, especially after the election results, saw the atmosphere as one that had collective grievances, especially from the leadership apparatus, and it was sensed in the Assembly that due to this situation, they might not vote for Mr. Hashemi. He decided that instead of being the president of the Assembly, he would take on the field leadership of the Assembly to create a kind of interaction and impactful behavior. I believe Mr. Hashemi is doing something that was done in the Assembly after Imam. He is creating a foundation that can play that role when necessary in the Assembly. Now, let's turn to the presidency of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Some supporters of the government and reformists believe that it is better for Ali Larijani to become the president of the tenth parliament. Others say it is better for Mohammad Reza Aref to be the president of the parliament. What is your opinion, Mr. Javadi Hesari? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: I have previously expressed my opinion that Mr. Aref should be the president, and I still believe that Mr. Aref is a moderate reformist connected to the ruling apparatus with a clear political sphere of action and the ability to mobilize all currents within the parliament, even his critics. An example of this behavior was the Supreme Policy Council. You know that there were previously critics in the Supreme Policy Council who even opposed Mr. Aref's candidacy before the elections as president. But his impactful and logical management in this council made even the critics no longer appear as critics today. Some are concerned that if Mr. Larijani is not president, he may think of confrontation; they argue that I believe this concern is not justified, and Mr. Larijani's character is not such that if he does not receive votes in parliament, he will confront those who did not vote for him. I believe Mr. Aref can be a good president for the parliament. Mr. Maleki, what is your opinion about this duality that exists? Some believe Mr. Aref should be president, while others believe if Ali Larijani becomes president, it would be less harmful for the government and reformists.