JCPOA: A Beginning for Reviving Iran's Relations with the Global Community?

A year ago, when Iran and the P5+1 reached a consensus on a comprehensive action plan known as the JCPOA, many regarded this diplomatic move as a historic example, with many considering its outcome as a substitute for military options. When the agreement was finalized in July 2015, numerous analysts described it not only as a nuclear agreement but as a beginning for reviving Iran's relations with the international community after years of isolation and a new approach towards the West, especially the United States. However, many disagreed with this perspective, emphasizing that these negotiations were solely about Tehran's nuclear program and would not necessarily lead to the 'optimistic' outcomes predicted by the first group. The fact that these negotiations were focused solely on the nuclear issue is among the prominent criticisms from those who have vehemently opposed this agreement over the past year. John Tierman, the executive director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, believes that the West could not negotiate with Iran on all issues and expect results. He told Radio Farda: 'The experience with the Soviet Union and other countries has shown that negotiations on nuclear issues rarely address matters outside this domain. This applies to Iran as well, as the six countries focused on Iran's fuel cycle and technology, which could potentially pose a threat if militarized. These negotiations did not address other issues such as terrorism, Syria, human rights, Yemen, and other regional matters because reaching an agreement on the nuclear issue, with all its technical and political aspects, is inherently very difficult. Therefore, I think it was a rational decision to focus on the nuclear issue, and the U.S. pursued it and was able to achieve results with expert researchers in this field.' Many, like Mr. Tierman, believe that although Iran negotiated with six global powers—Russia, the U.S., the U.K., China, Germany, and France—and reached an agreement, the turning point in the negotiations was the moment Iran and the U.S. were ready for bilateral dialogue on this issue. It was still during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency that Omani officials informed the U.S. that Iran seemed ready for dialogue. At that time, confidential discussions took place, which, according to both sides, yielded no results. With Hassan Rouhani's election as president in Iran, these discussions resumed, mediated by Oman, and their results were brought to the negotiating table with the P5+1. However, in public view, it was for the first time that the foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S. met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2013, which initiated multiple meetings between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif up to the present day. These meetings, handshakes, and walks were initially evaluated as breaking a taboo and historic, but as months passed, they seemed to become an ordinary piece of the complex puzzle of international relations. Nevertheless, observers of Iranian affairs from different factions still do not interpret this as a fundamental change in Iran's approach to the U.S. Gary Sick, a former White House advisor during the 1979 Revolution, considers the nuclear agreement a historic achievement but emphasizes its limitations. He told Radio Farda: 'Kerry, Zarif, and other officials like Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Salehi spent countless hours in a room discussing intensively, and I think a kind of trust has developed between them to the extent that if the phone rings and the other is on the line, they will answer it and not ignore it. And this is a change, but it is not institutionalized and does not mean that the next U.S. Secretary of State will necessarily act in the same way towards Zarif. They may have the same behavior, and of course, all this depends on who the next Secretary is and what the future president's agenda regarding Iran will be. For over three decades, diplomats from both sides were not allowed to talk to each other. Now that iceberg has broken. But we must wait and see.' Critics of the JCPOA in the U.S. view the diplomatic relations of senior officials from both countries as a kind of mistake by the Obama administration, believing that there has been no change in Iran's approach towards the West, especially the U.S. Cliff May, founder of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, who views the JCPOA with skepticism, agrees with this perspective and states: 'The current U.S. government's policy towards Iran is different compared to previous administrations, but no change in foreign policy towards the U.S. is seen in Iran. We know that Ayatollah Khamenei constantly speaks of America's enmity towards Iran and warns about it. If there has been an effort for renewed friendship, it has been very one-sided and from the U.S. side.' On the other hand, during the nuclear negotiations and now in the post-agreement period, Iranian diplomats have continuously emphasized that negotiating over the nuclear issue does not mean Iran's attempt to normalize its bilateral relations with the U.S. Although senior diplomats from both sides are still in contact and discussions about bilateral dialogue on other issues, including the Syrian crisis, are being raised, what is generally recognized as Iran's fundamental policy is the statements of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who still considers the U.S. as Iran's number one enemy. He stated on June 15: 'America does not hide its enmity. Now the U.S. President might set a Haft-Seen table on Nowruz, but they also shoot down a passenger plane; in the U.S. Congress, everything that can be used against the Islamic Republic is approved, and the U.S. President signs and implements it. The position of words and diplomacy is different from the position of action, even different from the position of political statements. You can now observe the statements made by the U.S. President, Secretary of State, U.S. security officials, and the Secretary of Defense regarding Iran; these are not friendly words, they are the words of an enemy, and an obstinate enemy at that.' Such statements from the Supreme Leader, whose words are decisive in Iran's policies, have been raised in various forms in almost all of his recent speeches. These remarks repeatedly cast doubt on observers regarding Iran's approach to reviving its relations with the international community. However, many believe that what we have witnessed in Iran-U.S. relations in the past year or two is a new phenomenon and should not be overestimated. John Limbert, a former American hostage during the embassy takeover in Iran, comments on these relations: 'In the past, whenever we saw some progress or the possibility of improvement, an uncalculated statement would quickly arise that blocked any advancement. We have seen this repeatedly. We saw it during the time of George H.W. Bush, Carter, or Khatami. These threats are always present. Because both sides have now entered unfamiliar territory, and for thirty-six years, they knew how to insult each other but did not know how to sit down and seriously negotiate and reach an agreement. Now they have entered unfamiliar territory.' However, the U.S. was not the only country with which Iran conducted nuclear negotiations. Another such country was Russia. Tehran and Moscow maintained their relations during the years of sanctions, although Russia, under Vladimir Putin's leadership, was one of the members of the UN Security Council that supported and voted positively for the Council's sanctions resolutions. At various stages of the negotiations, especially in the final months, Russia's role in the talks became very prominent. Russian diplomats, while alongside allies like China, cooperated with Europeans and the U.S. in these negotiations, even as their relations with the West soured due to the Ukraine crisis. Moscow's disputes with Brussels and Washington even led to sanctions against Russia. However, Russian diplomats, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his colleagues, continued to be present at the negotiating table alongside other members of the P5+1 and pursued a common goal. John Tierman from MIT comments on this Russian behavior: 'I think it is very significant that Russia pursued these P5+1 negotiations with Iran in such a way, and at a time when France, Britain, and the U.S. challenged Moscow, they did not leave the nuclear negotiations. This could have led to the negotiations collapsing and failing to reach an agreement, as they had the power to do so as a Security Council member.' The crisis between Russia and the West over Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea, still persists, and Western sanctions are still imposed on Moscow. However, observers note that the level of tension that existed in 2014 and 2015 is not currently observed, and one reason for this decrease in tension is attributed to Russia's cooperation during the nuclear negotiations. Nikolai Kozhanov, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow, states that the Russians demonstrated they could play an effective role in certain areas of international affairs. He, who previously served as a diplomat at the Russian embassy in Tehran for about three years, tells Radio Farda: 'Continuing the nuclear negotiations in that situation did not necessarily mean an attempt to improve their relations with the West or Europeans on issues other than Iran, nor was it about exchanging the Iran issue for their tensions with the West. The reason Russia sought to achieve a nuclear agreement was that, firstly, it found Iran's possession of nuclear weapons unacceptable and sought to create conditions that would prevent Iran's nuclear program from leading to weaponization. Secondly, given the difficult conditions in the Middle East, Russia sought to avoid a military conflict involving Iran due to its nuclear program, which could lead to the country's collapse and have very negative consequences for its political stability. Therefore, Russia did not want to witness another crisis point in the region. Finally, it is important to mention Russia's difficult economic situation, which has become more significant after the sanctions imposed on it, making its relationship with Tehran more important. It was essential to remove the barriers to economic relations between the two countries, so the Russians were very interested in resolving the nuclear issue.' If we view international relations based on a Cold War or a modern Cold War approach, with the U.S. and Russia at opposite poles, since Iran still does not have a diplomatic and institutionalized relationship with the U.S., observers tend to see this country closer to the Russian pole. However, there is serious disagreement among analysts in this field regarding the depth of the Tehran-Moscow relationship and its strategic nature. Cliff May in the U.S. believes about this relationship: 'Putin in Russia and Khamenei in Iran both think that diminishing America and reducing its power and influence is a good thing. Therefore, I think there is, in practice, an alliance based on short-term or medium-term interests.' Russia and the U.S. were on opposite sides of the P5+1 group, which also included China and the European Union. Iran's relationship with China remained relatively stable during the sanctions and China was one of Iran's economic allies during a time when fewer countries were willing to trade with Iran. This relationship continues even after the JCPOA. On the other hand, the European Union, which was alongside the U.S. during the severe international sanctions, has revived its relations with Iran following the JCPOA. Iran's dialogues, both with the West and the East, have taken shape while Hossein Banaei, who teaches and researches at Indiana University in the U.S., speaks of Iran's need for a new approach in this regard: 'The Iranian government now needs to think about an approach that has not been possible since the Islamic Revolution, which is the willingness of countries that viewed the revolution as a radical and unpleasant event and now want to engage in dialogue with the government and recognize the legitimacy of the regime from many aspects in diplomatic and economic behavior. Now Iran must think about how it wants to shape these relations and how to send signals about changing its behavior in terms of the region, economy, and politics to others. And I think these are changes we see, even if they happen very gradually and slowly.' In the weeks and months following Iran and the P5+1's achievement of the JCPOA, and even before that, analysts approached this issue critically, noting that in the years when Iran was trying to revive its relationship with the international community through resolving the nuclear dispute, it implemented its previous policies in the Middle East and somewhat neglected the mechanisms of relations with its surrounding world in the Middle East, especially the Arab countries in the region. Although Hassan Rouhani and his diplomatic apparatus have repeatedly stated since coming to power that improving relations with regional countries is a priority for Iran, no serious action has been taken in this regard, and all efforts have been focused on achieving the JCPOA. The JCPOA, since its achievement, has changed some mechanisms in the crisis-ridden Middle East; a Middle East that is witnessing an all-out war in Syria on one hand and on the other hand...