JCPOA: A Look at Developments and Reactions Following Trump's Ultimatum

"Despite my strong desire, I have not yet pulled the United States out of the Iran nuclear deal. Instead, I have laid out two paths: either the catastrophic flaws of this agreement are resolved, or the United States will withdraw from it." This was the phrase with which Donald Trump, the President of the United States, began his remarks, then announcing that he would agree to "suspend nuclear sanctions" for the "last time" to ensure that its flaws would be corrected by "European allies." He emphasizes that "this is the last chance" and the United States will no longer suspend sanctions to remain in the nuclear agreement. The U.S. President states, "At any moment I feel that the deal is not flawless, I will immediately exit the agreement, and no one should doubt my word." Although Trump's address is directed at the U.S. Congress and European allies, what he is asking from Congress is essentially the realization of components that involve Iran on one side and European countries, China, and Russia on the other. Trump refers to four vital components: immediate inspection of all sites requested by international inspectors; ensuring that Iran will never approach nuclear weapons; eliminating the expiration date [referring to the sunset clause], so that all pathways for Iran to nuclear weapons are blocked – not just for ten years but forever; and if Iran violates any of these, U.S. nuclear sanctions should be automatically enforceable. The resolution that the President expects Congress to pass must, for the first time, publicly separate the long-range missile program and nuclear weapons program in U.S. law; and also foresee strict sanctions for Iran's development and testing of missiles. The dual nature of the sanctions suspension (every four months) alongside confirming Iran's compliance with its commitments under the nuclear agreement (every three months) is something that the U.S. government, as a party to the agreement, must do for Iran to benefit from this multinational pact. If such action is not taken, it means the U.S. is exiting the nuclear pact, which would deal a fatal blow to Iran. Prior to the signing of the nuclear pact (JCPOA) in 2015, the United States enforced extensive sanctions laws almost worldwide that hindered economic interactions with Iran. As a guarantee mechanism to control Iran's compliance within the framework of the JCPOA, the U.S. maintained its ability through the necessity of reporting to Congress and periodic suspension of sanctions. Thus, we can conclude that the JCPOA, whether willingly or unwillingly, turned the sanctions imposed by the U.S. into a lever that can be used to moderate Iran's performance. The simple interpretation of the matter is that Iran's performance is only within the framework of mechanically executing the conditions of the JCPOA and refraining from any unconventional actions in nuclear activities, and not producing nuclear materials with military applications. Naturally, from this perspective, only the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "guardian" and responsible for its verification, but the reality is not so simple, and if we look at the conditions and circumstances under which the JCPOA gained legal form and the stamp of approval that the UN Security Council placed on it at the last moments (apparently at Iran's initiative), and other margins like Resolution 2231 (regarding missiles) and other details, we realize that the matter is not that simple and can have different interpretations from various actors. The simplest interpretation is the current situation where a new president in the U.S. has come to power, stating that if such and such does not happen, the U.S. will reinstate those sanctions and exit the pact. The other side of this coin is Iran. In the worst case, Tehran's specific reaction could be to interpret Trump's deadline as justification for exiting the nuclear agreement and reviving its nuclear program. In the face of these two extremes, namely the exit of the U.S. and the exit of Iran, and their consequences, it should be noted that other actors are also present in the scene whose reactions could turn this seemingly two-sided coin into a very complex international display. The U.S. Congress The timing of these decisions with the recent protests in Iran has created a suitable ground for not only Republican representatives but also a range of representatives from both parties in the U.S. Congress to see it as an opportunity to exert pressure on Iran. For instance, Republican Senator Bob Corker believes that cooperation with other members from both parties can find a way to address the flaws in the agreement without violating U.S. commitments. Another Republican Senator, Ed Royce, thinks this process could lead to a resolution to "counter Iran's missile activities, destabilization in the Middle East, and human rights violations." While Eliot Engel, a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a Democrat, confirms the continuation of the suspension and the necessity of pursuing the issue, he believes that a path should be taken that provides a more suitable environment for dialogue about new conditions and clauses. From Engel's perspective, "bullying other countries and setting unfeasible deadlines" is not the right path. Other Republican senators like Jim Inhofe, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz each echo aspects of the four components with approval. In contrast, Steny Hoyer (Democrat) and Leonard Lance (Republican) emphasize human rights aspects and the need to support and defend the Iranian people against government repression, wishing to use the created opportunity not only to defend the Iranian people and support human rights but also to limit Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. This collection of reactions indicates that Congress has a more positive stance towards what the President has proposed compared to the previous round, and it remains to be seen if the issue will be placed on Congress's agenda. What has changed? When three months ago Donald Trump asked Congress to intervene and legislate on this matter, Congress was heavily engaged in two significant discussions that had consumed the energy among members for months and had remained unresolved until then. One was the so-called "Obamacare" (Obama's public health insurance) and the other was the tax reform bill. Now, with the passage of the tax reform bill and the direct and indirect impacts that this law has had on Obama's healthcare, known as "Obamacare," a significant burden has been lifted from Congress, and it will be ready to move towards legislation regarding the Iran nuclear agreement. The signing of the tax reform resolution by Congress, which was turned into law by the President before the end of last year, improved the relations of many Republican members with Trump. Human rights issues and individual and social freedoms in Iran, the unrest that has now sprinkled shallow ashes on the fires with the repression of security forces, is another factor that has placed both Democratic and Republican factions in Congress in front of an issue they feel a closeness of vote and opinion towards. Although due to resignations and the election of new members, the composition and number of members of both parties and independent senators have undergone slight changes, it does not seem that there is a major disagreement regarding the current issue. Russia and China The U.S. and Russia have disagreements regarding Iran. This disagreement, in addition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), includes the joint role of Russia and Iran in Syria and Russia's support for Iran in the UN and the Security Council. On the one hand, a significant portion of American society believes that Russia interfered in the U.S. presidential elections. Although Russia has consistently denied interference in the U.S. presidential elections. For the first time, both parties in Congress have agreed on a series of economic sanctions against Moscow and approved a set of sanctions last August that simultaneously limits the President's ability to lift them. Russian sources predict that two more reports will be published in February, along with new sanctions against Russia. Russian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, claim that these sanctions aim to influence the presidential elections in Moscow in March, which are expected to keep Vladimir Putin in the presidency for another six years. Of course, Putin does not have any significant rivals in this election. Regardless of the disagreements between Russia and the U.S. on bilateral issues, Russia has consistently supported the nuclear agreement. Sergey Ryabkov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, has also stated that the decision to withdraw from the JCPOA "could be one of Washington's biggest mistakes in foreign policy." Russia has called on the European Union to support the JCPOA. Immediately after the deadline for amending the nuclear agreement was set by the U.S. President, Chinese officials reacted and called for a constructive role in preserving and implementing the agreement. The Chinese Foreign Minister, in a phone call with Mohammad Javad Zarif, considered the continuation of the agreement the responsibility of all parties to the agreement and the international community. China and the U.S. have many economic and regional disagreements, and the U.S. believes that the Chinese do not provide sufficient cooperation in curbing North Korea's nuclear flow. Both China and Russia can be influential regarding North Korea, and at the same time, both countries believe that the JCPOA is an agreement aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and should remain as such. Naturally, the lifting of sanctions pressure from Iran would revive economic relations between China, Russia, and Iran and ensure significant economic benefits for those two countries. European Union Despite Britain's exit from the European Union, it does not seem that there are major disagreements between Britain and other European countries regarding the necessity of preserving the JCPOA. However, each European country has its specific issues with Iran and pursues its national interests – which are not necessarily aligned with other European countries – in relation to Iran. For example, the detention of dual nationals in Iran is an issue that has put the most pressure on foreign policy actors in Britain, while other countries may not have such a problem with Iran or may have found secret ways to resolve it. A range of primarily economic interests causes Europeans to distance themselves from any pressure that would lead to the collapse of the JCPOA. For instance, for Italy, economic motivations are of primary importance. While Germany, in addition to economic interests with Iran, wishes to maintain its dominant role within the Union or at least not allow support for the JCPOA to overshadow Germany's role as a leading power within the Union. For this reason, it is aligned with broader issues such as Iran's regional role or its missile programs. France, with its leadership in innovative policy and differing views from the U.S. and even Europe in many cases, also sees the JCPOA as an opportunity for its country that opens a valuable economic scope for exports of goods and industrial products to Iran. At the same time, it tries to keep what has been labeled as Iran's destabilizing activities in the region away from the JCPOA. Additionally, France's long-standing relations with Israel and contacts that the Israeli Prime Minister has had regarding the necessity of amending the JCPOA with France, alongside its historical relations with Saudi Arabia, should not be overlooked. Mr. Netanyahu, in a phone call with Emmanuel Macron, has asked him to "take the President's statements seriously." He also considers "improving" the conditions of the JCPOA a rational matter. However, what has brought Europe and the U.S. closer together in recent weeks is the internal situation, the deep dissatisfaction of parts of society with economic performance, social conditions, and the restrictions imposed on individual rights and freedoms in Iran. However, it is unclear whether the group in Europe benefiting from the JCPOA wants all these issues to be examined and acted upon as related to the JCPOA. Undoubtedly, Europe's preference remains to preserve the JCPOA. Iran's Choices The factors described have combined to limit Iran's choices and place it in a position of weakness and defense. From the tone of the U.S. President's remarks, it seems that the Trump administration's goal is not to enter direct negotiations with Iran but rather to have these negotiations take place between Europe and Iran, with the results reported back to the U.S. This mechanism allows the U.S. to influence the direction and content of negotiations without facing Iran directly. Of course, Iran's Foreign Minister has immediately reacted to the U.S. conditions, deeming the nuclear agreement non-negotiable, and the head of the National Security Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly has stated that "Iran will not retreat an iota from its missile policies." However, if there is an interest in negotiations in Iran, it could (a) make the most of the leverage from Europe and (b) positively exploit the U.S.'s disinterest in direct negotiations and sell it to hardliners as a lack of direct negotiations with the U.S., while at the same time engaging in very lengthy negotiations to change the international or political atmosphere in the U.S. At the same time, this possibility should not be dismissed that a significant part of hardliners seems to want a complete exit from the JCPOA and a return to the pre-JCPOA stage and to restart uranium enrichment activities. In any case, they have always been at odds with the JCPOA.