JCPOA and Potential Consequences of US Sanctions Against the IRGC and Iran's Missile Program

On Thursday, March 23, 14 American senators, including Bob Menendez and Bob Corker from the Republican Party and Ben Cardin from the Democratic Party, presented a joint proposal for further sanctions against Iran, which could affect not only the nuclear agreement with Tehran but also the current balance of power in the region. The new Senate proposal, titled the "Iranian Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017," has a high chance of becoming law, and according to its sponsors (Senator Menendez speaking to Reuters), it is designed not to undermine the provisions of the nuclear agreement of July 14, 2015. However, if this proposal is approved by the Senate, the House of Representatives, and signed by the President, maintaining the JCPOA, which has been in effect since January 16, 2016, will become very difficult. Given the current situation where the internal security and political structure of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are in a transitional state, canceling the nuclear agreement with Iran would create a backdrop for new tensions between regional and extra-regional powers. In the new proposal by American senators, the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization. Despite sanctions against a large number of IRGC personnel, Quds Force members, and dozens of institutions belonging to or associated with the IRGC, this military-security body of the Islamic Republic has not yet been designated as a terrorist entity by the US and is not on its blacklist. One unavoidable result of placing the IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations would be the loss of legal conditions for any military or intelligence cooperation between American forces stationed in Iraq and Syria and the IRGC's Quds Force. Another consequence of such a development would be a reciprocal action by the Islamic Republic and possibly one or two allied governments in Tehran, labeling American military forces stationed in the region as terrorists. Several senior members of the US armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have previously expressed their dissatisfaction with such a decision. Iran's missile activities have raised significant sensitivities in the US and among regional countries for two reasons: 1) quantitative and qualitative improvements in missiles, including increased range, targeting accuracy, improved propulsion performance, and greater mass production capabilities; 2) the supply of diverse missile products to regional countries; deploying various tactical and short-range missiles in southern Lebanon (Hezbollah), Gaza (Hamas), Syria, and, according to claims by the US and Saudi Arabia, supplying missiles to the Houthis in Yemen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, announced for the first time in November 2012 during a visit to the Young Journalists Club affiliated with the IRGC that Iran had provided Hamas with the technology to produce Fajr 5 missiles (333 mm diameter, solid fuel, 75 km range, 178 kg warhead capacity, capable of reaching Tel Aviv). Regarding the delivery of various missiles to Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less secretive. According to independent assessments, Hezbollah alone possesses about 120,000 to 150,000 missiles, including various types of Fajr 1-2-3 and Fajr 5, Khyber missiles, Zalzal, Fateh 110, and Scud-D. During the past two years of war between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly reported their use of Scud missiles against Saudi Arabia. Before Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor to the US President, resigned, the issue of placing the IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations was raised while warning Iran, a decision that was met with disapproval from the Pentagon and the CIA. A similar view was expressed during George W. Bush's presidency, but at that time, it was opposed by the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, citing that such a decision could endanger American lives. The new proposal from Republican and Democratic senators, if enacted into law, would obligate the President to re-impose sanctions on any individual or institution involved in Iran's ballistic missile programs or human rights violations, even after they have been removed from the sanctions list. Resolution 2231 of the Security Council, under which the JCPOA was implemented, includes restrictions on Iran regarding ballistic missiles and the receipt and export of weapons, obligating the US President to punish violators of the resolution (institutions, banks, and individuals), which is one of the clear provisions of the proposal. Given the different positions announced by the new US President compared to the Obama administration regarding the nuclear agreement, it will be very difficult for the new President to refrain from signing the new sanctions proposal if it is approved by Congress. In the last days of the Obama administration, Congress passed a sanctions proposal against Iran, but the President refrained from signing the bill and did not return it for revision (pocket veto), thus, based on the regulations regarding the legislative process in the US Congress, the representatives' vote became law. Rouhani has introduced the JCPOA as one of the major achievements of his government and is prepared to overlook the issue even if new sanctions are imposed by the US to maintain the framework of the JCPOA. Regarding human rights violations in Iran, Rouhani's government is ready for dialogue and has published a charter in this regard. The remarks made on March 9 by Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stating that "with a threat from the US, our missiles were put into storage," indicate that Rouhani's government has a degree of influence in the military decision-making process that allows it to impose restrictions even on the armed forces and the IRGC. Thus, if Rouhani is re-elected as the next president, the passage of the new US sanctions law against Iran could, like several other sanctions, bypass the JCPOA rather than obstruct it. If Rouhani fails to form the next government and is defeated by conservatives, the situation between Iran and the US will change, and the fate of the JCPOA will also be subject to subsequent changes; repeating the 2005 pattern where government power shifted from reformists to a branch of conservatives.