Karrubi's Political Agenda Against Khamenei's Political Agenda

Mehdi Karrubi, in a letter sent from his house arrest, has provided renewed hope to many who had become disillusioned. He demonstrated that there has been no retreat from positions, slogans, and claims. The 'House Arrest Triangle' - Mousavi, Karrubi, and Rahnavard - has paid a price, standing bravely, and is utilizing opportunities for democratic reforms. Part of Karrubi's letter addressed historical realities that the Sultan - and consequently his courtiers - have denied. These sections - fraud, corruption, repression, and the interference of the IRGC, Basij, and Ministry of Intelligence in elections, etc. - are significant and have attracted considerable attention. With this letter, Karrubi has set forth an alternative 'political agenda' against the Sultan's 'political agenda.' The Sultan, Ayatollah Khamenei, has long begun managing the transition to the post-Khamenei era (refer to the article 'The Future of Leadership in the Islamic Republic after Ayatollah Khamenei'). This political agenda has two pillars: a) the elimination of individuals and groups under the guise of enemy infiltrators, traitors, seditionists, and the oblivious, etc.; b) elevating some as revolutionary believers. The elections of Esfand 7 played a prominent role in this process. On that day, the Sultan faced a significant 'no' from the people. This defeat should not be reduced to the failure of the 'Triangle of J.' The more important issue was that Ayatollah Khamenei has always referred to the British government as 'the wicked Britain' for over a decade (dates provided in the original text). His revolutionary/believing/Basij/Hezbollah forces occupied the embassy of this wicked government (refer to the article 'Ayatollah Khamenei and the Occupation of Embassies: Open Opposition and Unspoken Support'). On 28 Bahman 1394, the Sultan falsely claimed that the wicked Britain had instructed through 'BBC Radio' whom to vote for and whom not to vote for. He said: 'The English radio is instructing the people of Tehran whom to vote for, whom not to vote for... Now they are giving orders through the radio to the people about whom to vote for, whom not to vote for... People should know what the enemy wants; when you know what the enemy wants, you act contrary to it; it is obvious.' Subsequently, the Sultan's courtiers and connected agents labeled the reformists and moderates' list as the 'English list.' However, the people ignored the Sultan's command to act contrary to the wishes of the wicked Britain and voted for the list that Khamenei and the radical conservatives considered 'English' in Tehran. Ahmad Khatami took this lie further by claiming that Barack Obama had said not to vote for them. The people's disobedience was costly for the Sultan and made him very angry. Khamenei's anger was partly expressed by labeling Hashemi Rafsanjani as a traitor for a tweet. In Hashemi's tweet, he stated: 'The world of tomorrow is the world of discourse, not missiles.' A few days after his New Year speech in Mashhad, where he usually does not speak for a while, on 11 Farvardin 1395, in a meeting with a group of eulogists, Khamenei said that if this statement was made knowingly, it is 'treason' to the country. His followers then stated in Friday prayers and in the IRGC media that Hashemi had knowingly made this statement and had committed treason. Labeling Hashemi Rafsanjani as a 'traitor' occurred for several reasons: a) revenge against an individual who has taken a confrontational path; b) making it impossible for Hashemi to preside over the Assembly of Experts again; c) severely diminishing Hashemi's role in selecting Khamenei's successor; d) reproducing the story of Ayatollah Montazeri's elimination by Ayatollah Khomeini. Major General Rahim Safavi, on 23 Farvardin 1395, citing the Sultan's words, said: 'The issue of treason is very important, and the word treason carries significant conceptual and semantic weight... Even now, there are some in the country who are hypocritical, and the hypocrisy of some elites confuses the people... Anyone who opposes the Guardianship of the Jurist is outside the framework of the Islamic Revolution and political system and will be disgraced among the people and ultimately fail and suffer a bad end.' The new term of the Assembly of Experts begins on 4 Khordad. At the outset, a new president and board of directors will be elected. By labeling Hashemi a traitor, the likelihood of his presidency greatly diminished. However, the radical members of the Assembly, led by Khamenei, intend to appoint Ayatollah Jannati as president to take revenge on the people. The newspaper Javan - the IRGC's newspaper - has arranged a detailed interview with Mohsen Heydari, a representative from Khuzestan in the Assembly of Experts, on this occasion. The most interesting point in this interview is that the IRGC newspaper asks Heydari: 'Certainly, we made mistakes in the recent elections for the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, especially in the last Assembly, and this caused the opposition to gain votes in some provinces and cities.' This indicates that the IRGC leadership and radical conservatives are a single current. Ayatollah Khomeini forbade military personnel from entering politics and considered military involvement in politics akin to cancer spreading throughout the entire system and society. However, the IRGC members, under the new Sultan's command, have significantly increased their dominance over politics and no longer hesitate to openly equate themselves with radical conservatives. Heydari claims that the most favorable conditions for Ayatollah Jannati's presidency over the Assembly of Experts exist. He provided several reasons for this claim. First - the behavior of the anti-revolutionary or so-called reformist currents in the recent elections regarding Ayatollah Jannati. Second - Khamenei has positioned him as the equal of Ayatollah Meshkini and stated, 'Ayatollah Meshkini and Ayatollah Jannati are irreplaceable figures of the revolution.' Third - Jannati is a revolutionary figure and has been and is endorsed by the Imam and the leadership. Fourth - Jannati is in complete physical health. Heydari says at the airport's pavilion, I told Jannati that the leadership said, 'The Assembly of Experts must remain revolutionary and think and act revolutionarily.' If you agree, the president of the Assembly of Experts must also be a revolutionary figure. 'So it doesn't make sense when the gentlemen have invited you, to refuse! You must accept and comply, otherwise this request of the leader will not be realized. He smiled, and we took this smile as a sign of consent... Based on the discussions we have had with the gentlemen, we predict that Ayatollah Jannati will be the president of the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts.' Assuming that Khamenei and his followers succeed in appointing Ayatollah Jannati as the president of the Assembly of Experts, the next issue is preparing the members to accept Khamenei's preferred individual for succession. Moving towards the leadership succession, Ayatollah Khamenei is looking to choose his successor. Currently, the members of the 'Triangle of HAKHL' - Hashemi Shahroudi, Mojtaba Khamenei, Sadegh Larijani - are more favored by him than others (refer to the article 'The Triangle of HAKHL: Potential Candidates for Ayatollah Khamenei's Succession' and 'Getting to Know the Triangle of HAKHL Better'). Of course, the chances of these three are not equal. For instance, Sadegh Larijani, by adopting the most radical positions weekly and through repressive performance, has represented Khamenei more than anyone else today (refer to the articles 'Khamenei's Succession Planning and Greater Control over Universities', 'Brain Freeze on the Subject of Urine and Impurities', 'Why Reformists and Moderates Seek to Oust Sadegh Larijani?'). However, the selection of a successor depends on Khamenei's lifespan, the balance of power, and more. If Khamenei can, he will not hesitate to lead Mojtaba Khamenei. Karrubi is well aware of Khamenei's political agenda. He knows that Khamenei and radical conservatives are relentlessly attacking Hassan Rouhani's government to bring a president similar to Ahmadinejad/Saeed Jalili to power. For this reason, he writes: 'I thank God that in the elections of 92 and 94, the people decisively answered the totalitarians with their enthusiastic participation and removed some of the favored individuals of the regime from the scene.' He writes that the Sultan, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his military have imposed 'a deceitful and lying individual' on the nation in 1384 and 1388 'to create the most corrupt government after the Constitutional Revolution in the name of the Islamic Revolution' (we remember that Khamenei considered Ahmadinejad's government one of the best governments after the Constitutional Revolution). Karrubi emphasizes not only the 'national plunder' during Ahmadinejad's era but also criticizes Khamenei's/Saeed Jalili's nuclear policies. He then turns to the Guardian Council and Ayatollah Jannati. Karrubi's radical criticism of Ayatollah Jannati comes at a time when Khamenei and radical conservatives are seeking his presidency over the Assembly. Next, it is Sadegh Larijani's turn. He writes: 'Many times they have destroyed my home and abode, I have been beaten, all my close ones have been pressured, and even one of my children was arrested and beaten to the brink of death... From Bahman 89 to Bahman 92, I was transferred to various places with many deprivations, and then from Bahman 92 until now, I have been under house arrest and unlawful detention with the presence of security agents.' He asks the Sultan, who has arbitrarily ruled, why he has labeled the leaders of the Green Movement and its members as 'unworthy.' He demands that the arbitrary Sultan hold a public trial for him. His defense will not be personal. He will present the reasons for 'the fraud in the 84 presidential election, the engineering of the 88 presidential election' and will inform the public about 'what happened to the children of this country in legal and illegal detention centers.' The atrocities of this period relate to the presidency of Hashemi Shahroudi and especially Sadegh Larijani over the judiciary. In 84, Karrubi explicitly mentioned in a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei the role of Mojtaba Khamenei in the fraud of the presidential election and in imposing Ahmadinejad as president. That letter enraged the Sultan. Karrubi's letter aims to disrupt Khamenei's game of eliminating rivals and succession planning. Karrubi's emphasis on civil society and its prominent role reminds us that if civil society becomes powerful and active, it can push back against the Sultan and Sultanism. Karrubi's letter has implications beyond the objectives he pursues.