Karrubi's Ultimatum to Khamenei and Self-Criticism

Morteza Karroubi's open letter to Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, marks a significant event in Iran's political landscape with clear implications. It should be noted that the importance of this letter is not based on the accuracy of all its contents. Some parts of his historical reading of the origins of problems in Iran after the revolution are controversial and contradict reality. Additionally, a factional perspective shadows parts of Karroubi's writings. However, his courage after enduring seven years of house arrest to openly and candidly criticize the leadership of the Islamic Republic and hold Khamenei accountable for his performance as the Supreme Leader carries political weight that weakens the absolute power structure reliant on the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih, facilitating and accelerating the path to democracy. Karroubi's fourteenth letter to the leader, who was for years the closest figure in the leftist camp of the regime to Khamenei, has a different nature. At the same time, it shares a similar theme with his letters after the formation of the Green Movement. This time, Karroubi directly targeted Khamenei without hints or allusions. Although the tone of the letter is respectful and polite, written from a position of counsel and concern, the most serious claim of the letter is that it invalidates Khamenei's record during his 28 years of leadership. Therefore, this letter not only marks a new chapter in the relationship between Khamenei and Karroubi but also has specific implications for the relationship between reformists and the Supreme Leader. Karroubi warns Khamenei and calls for the acceptance of extensive and deep reforms by him to pull the system out of the current crisis. He speaks of the necessity for structural reforms, although he does not refer to changing the existing structure. It seems he is considering comprehensive changes in the current political situation, especially regarding how Khamenei exercises his authority, so that the system shows flexibility towards the people's demands, allowing representatives of the people to manage elected institutions, and the Supreme Leader to operate within a limited framework bound by law. Additionally, the Assembly of Experts should come out of its nominal state and have effective oversight over the performance of the leadership and its subordinate institutions. Within the framework envisioned by Karroubi, the foundational institutions of the regime, primarily the Velayat-e Faqih, are preserved, but their behavior and outputs must undergo meaningful transformation. In recent protests, Karroubi sided with the dissatisfied and the people, identifying the main source of problems in the last two decades as Khamenei's wrong and extremist policies. The consequences of Karroubi's letter can be categorized on a macro level as follows: the bottleneck of gradual and superficial lifting of the house arrest. Just when both factions had reached an agreement on the gradual lifting of the house arrest in a way that only included their physical freedom and did not allow their distinct political approach to emerge, Karroubi's firm stance showed that he is absolutely unwilling to sacrifice his radical and freedom-seeking politics for a gradual and superficial lifting of the house arrest. His demand is political. It is not personal, and by pursuing the goal of the public good, he is not accepting freedom at any cost. He has endured seven years of confinement behind the walls of his home to prove the validity of his positions and advance his political agenda. Karroubi's strong response sent the message that he continues his political activism from the Green Movement era, and it is Khamenei and the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih that must retreat. This position of Karroubi puts not only the dominant power structure but also Rouhani's government in a predicament. On one hand, their mediating efforts for the physical freedom of the imprisoned and to prevent unfortunate events for them within a framework that respects the regime's red lines are put in a deadlock, and on the other hand, their desired discourse and political approach are weakened by Karroubi's challenge and defiance. By adopting a position contrary to the reformists, Karroubi challenges their conciliatory political approach with Khamenei while reminding them of the goals of reformism. In this atmosphere, the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih views Khatami's and aligned reformists' trust-building efforts with greater skepticism. Additionally, it becomes more difficult for reformists to persuade their targeted social base. Karroubi's fundamental critique of election-centered politics and conditioning it on the transfer of real power puts those who advocate participation in the Islamic Republic's ballot boxes under pressure. Although the gap between their claims and existing realities and Rouhani's performance has already made them vulnerable. Karroubi also warns the government instead of instilling fear and making false comparisons to Syria that insisting on wrong methods will lead society towards an irreparable disaster. The former Speaker of Parliament identifies Khamenei, not Ahmadinejad, as the main culprit for the problems of the years 2005 to 2013, who now, due to Ahmadinejad's disobedience, disregards the previous costly support and unjustly elevates him in the governance arena, failing to respect even the most basic rights of the former president. Karroubi's approach, which can be seen as the last warning to Khamenei for reform, further destabilizes the leadership's position within the regime's forces and, by reducing the costs of criticism, increases the courage to publicly express critical and opposing views. After Ayatollah Montazeri, Karroubi is the second senior official of the regime to explicitly declare Khamenei's leadership record invalid and criticize him for his authoritarian approach and opposition to the people's will and monopolization. Karroubi's letter, which is likely to be ignored by Khamenei, may, under certain conditions, become a turning point in transforming respectful and advisory criticisms into sharp confrontations and demands for Khamenei's resignation within the regime. The expansion of recent protest movements and the resulting increase in concerns within the regime about the consequences of ignoring protests by the Supreme Leader strengthens the possibility of this eventuality. However, independent of these consequences, the essence of Karroubi's open letter to the leadership is the transfer of power to the people. This is necessary but requires different prerequisites than those outlined by Karroubi. Contrary to his attachment to Ayatollah Khomeini and placing the starting point of the country's problems in 1989, democracy requires a return to the early months after the revolution and closing the file on Khomeini's political and ideological legacy and the dissolution of the institution of Velayat-e Faqih. Khamenei has likely followed the same wrong path established by Ayatollah Khomeini, albeit with less negative consequences, while changing the positions of the upper and lower factions in the power bloc. A fundamental solution to the country's problems requires referring to public opinion to determine the governance structure. Only Khamenei and the current bearers of the institution of Velayat-e Faqih are not obstacles to the transfer of power to the people; rather, the discourse and perspective left over from Ayatollah Khomeini is a barrier to the transition to democracy. Therefore, the logical continuation of Karroubi's letter to Khamenei at a transcendental level may require him to address self-criticism and the political and religious discourse of Ayatollah Khomeini.