Khamenei-Ahmadinejad: A Media Game of Love and Hate

Recent remarks by Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, prohibiting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's electoral participation and the former president's response indicate another instance of a phenomenon that can be termed a 'media game of love and hate.' This enigmatic game reveals the dual nature of the relationship between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which is reflected not in behind-the-scenes negotiations but in the hidden media competition between the two. There are reasons to support the hypothesis that Khamenei's concern over the negative media repercussions of Ahmadinejad's potential return to the presidential elections in May 2017 was one of the reasons for his request for Ahmadinejad to withdraw from the electoral race. Khamenei states: 'Enemies are listening and will take advantage. Be careful. What does this have to do with Radio Farda or BBC Radio? They will discuss, analyze, and interpret the reasons behind it. This means the enemy wants to take advantage.' According to Khamenei's perspective, the media—specifically Radio Farda and BBC Radio—has no relevance to Ahmadinejad's presence or absence. He views the media as a spokesperson for the enemy, aiming to exploit the issue of Ahmadinejad in the elections. This concern arises even before the elections have begun, indicating that Khamenei fears discussions about Ahmadinejad could lead to topics that are unpleasant for him. Bringing Ahmadinejad into the media spotlight also means bringing Khamenei into a historical period that he prefers to forget, including controversial social, economic, and cultural policies, the turmoil following the suppression of protests against electoral fraud in 2009, and the unprecedented 11-day boycott against Khamenei. Ahmadinejad's position as someone who presents himself as Khamenei's soldier, and Khamenei's past descriptions of being closer to him, consistently places the Iranian leader in a reactive position. For Khamenei, media confrontation with figures labeled as enemies or, more accurately, opponents is less challenging than media engagement with Ahmadinejad. For instance, consider the letter Ahmadinejad published on Tuesday, October 6, in response to Khamenei's remarks, declaring his compliance with Khamenei's request. This letter is filled with formal language praising Khamenei, yet the author uses this situation to solidify his media presence through three propositions: First, 'In the meeting dated September 9 of this year, I explained the programs for elucidating the revolution across the country.' Second, 'Your Excellency advised that it is not expedient for me to participate in the elections, and I have declared my compliance.' Third, 'In accordance with the directives of the esteemed leader of the revolution, I have no plans to participate in next year's electoral competitions.' Thus, Ahmadinejad, by leveraging a situation that seemingly works against him, presents himself as a reserve soldier for the future of the revolution, who, despite having plans for elucidating the revolution across the country, has officially refrained from participating in the elections at the request of the Supreme Leader. He uses the same term that Qassem Soleimani employed weeks earlier to declare his intention not to run: 'small soldier.' The letter's audience consists of two groups simultaneously: Khamenei and his supporters, and Ahmadinejad's own supporters. Ahmadinejad is the only figure among conservatives and hardliners who has managed to create a supportive atmosphere independent of his reliance on Khamenei's name. A significant portion of Ahmadinejad's success in building this mental/social foundation results from the dual media game he plays with his two main audience groups in this letter. Ahmadinejad is one of the most controversial media figures in the years following the revolution. During his two presidential terms from 2005 to 2013, many considered him the most recognized figure associated with the revolution in Iran after Ayatollah Khomeini. Much of this media display stemmed from his personal initiatives in various political and media situations. He is enamored with playing with the media. Even some of his opponents could not refrain from praising his courage and initiative in being unpredictable. Mohammad Nabi Habibi, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Coalition Party, remarked the day after Khamenei's comments about Ahmadinejad's behavior following the Supreme Leader's advice: 'He is unpredictable, and one cannot foresee what he will do.' Perhaps this unpredictability is another aspect that could cause Khamenei concern about reintroducing him into the media space. Khamenei's worries have a dual aspect. He cannot be pleased with Ahmadinejad's support for the leader, nor can he tolerate what Ahmadinejad displays to show his independence. While he cannot rely on Ahmadinejad's support as a positive media factor, he is continually worried about Ahmadinejad's efforts to maintain his position as a leader among the Hezbollahis. Khamenei once needed Ahmadinejad and the group he mobilizes to demonstrate that his policies had social support, but now, with the complexities of his post-JCPOA policies, it may be unwise to rely on this social force that claims a degree of independence. Clearly, in such an environment, Khamenei prefers to use more reliable figures with less media influence and charisma, such as Saeed Jalili, to articulate Hezbollah-friendly messages necessary to provoke hardliners. Controversial media figures are not necessarily those who are loved or hated by all. Well-known media figures are those who have active opponents and supporters. These opponents and supporters react quickly, explicitly, and emotionally. This is the game that turns Ahmadinejad into a controversial figure and ensures that his words are heard. Every statement he makes is simultaneously deemed correct by one group and incorrect by another. Such an atmosphere is intolerable for conservatives in Iran, where only Khamenei is supposed to be visible. This is why conservative leaders view Ahmadinejad as a shadow that could influence Khamenei's media presence. The reason is that Ahmadinejad has managed to create a psychological state that keeps alive the ambiguity: Is he a follower of Khamenei or an alternative to him? Perhaps this media ambiguity is what has compelled Khamenei to erase the issue from the media landscape.