Khamenei and Managing Post-JCPOA 'Threats'

The leadership of the Islamic Republic, in a meeting on the occasion of Government Week with Hassan Rouhani's cabinet, identified foreign policy as one of the key areas of government activity. He once again criticized the JCPOA, stating: 'My criticism of the JCPOA relates to the bad faith and malice of the other side, not our own elements; because our negotiators made efforts day and night to the best of their ability, and we appreciate their efforts.' Decoding Khamenei's recent statements indicates his confidence in managing issues related to the JCPOA. In fact, a hypothesis has strengthened that the Supreme Leader considers concerns about potential challenges to be minimal and under control. Continuing his previous positions, the Supreme Leader did not associate his negative view of the JCPOA with the negotiating team, especially Mohammad Javad Zarif and Hassan Rouhani. This perspective reflects the reality that Rouhani, given the secret negotiations several years prior to his presidency, was tasked with concluding the nuclear deal within the framework of the regime's red lines and bargaining power with the U.S. and other European countries. However, at the end of the process, some of the Supreme Leader's red lines were crossed. The high costs of continuing the nuclear confrontation forced Khamenei and the dominant power structure to yield, despite their preferences. The relatively higher capability of the new negotiating team and the newly created atmosphere helped to break the deadlock in negotiations, ultimately leading to the realization of the JCPOA. The success of Rouhani's government was in the execution aspect of the work and did not play a role in policymaking and decision-making. Additionally, the flexibility that the Obama-Kerry axis exhibited in the U.S. ruling body, and the Democratic Party's defense of their conciliatory policy, played a significant and decisive role in this success. However, from the day after the JCPOA, Khamenei had several serious considerations. First, this agreement did not turn into a trend or model in foreign policy, nor did it alter the confrontational strategy in foreign policy and the irreconcilable confrontation with the West, especially the U.S. He packaged this consideration in the form of a revolutionary foreign policy and, with renewed warnings, called for its continuation in the post-JCPOA period. Another concern of his was the lack of expansion of negotiations between Rouhani's government and the U.S. and the expansion of interactions between them. This began with an open opposition to Rouhani's phone conversation with Obama and continued with the presentation of the danger of infiltration and its repetition and highlighting, creating a scenario to contain Rouhani's government and prevent their gaining power in domestic politics and the global arena. Khamenei's approach from the beginning was critical support for the negotiating team and keeping them within the ranks of the revolutionary forces. Attacks from hardline conservatives and commanders of the IRGC were used as a tool to contain and control while also preventing the negotiating team's popularity. Therefore, although in some layers of the forces known as 'Wilayat Madar,' Zarif and Rouhani are accused of 'treason' and 'espionage' for the U.S., the Supreme Leader generally and not very decisively supports them. The existing conflict is likely justified for the social base of the 'Velayat Faqih' institution internally in the form of the theory of 'leadership constraints.' This situation places the future position of Zarif and other members of the negotiating team in an uncertain condition. Their fate may be tied to the outcome of the JCPOA. It seems that Khamenei, relying on aligned forces to navigate threats or at least weaken the likelihood of their occurrence, has been able to manage the JCPOA and create deterrence against changes in major policies in domestic, foreign, and cultural arenas in the post-JCPOA era. Another significant concern for Khamenei is the impact of the JCPOA on changing the balance of internal power and energizing the protest movement. The demand for extending the JCPOA to domestic problems and adopting a win-win approach, as well as agreements based on mutual concessions by reformists and critical and protest forces, has been raised. The natural consequence of the JCPOA, which was accompanied by a departure from the extremist approach in foreign policy, was the strengthening of moderation in domestic politics and the cultural arena. However, Khamenei, by stating that the enemy is seeking other JCPOAs, has resorted to open confrontation and emphasized that the comprehensive nuclear agreement with six global powers was merely an event and an exception and is not intended to be a program or a process. His supporting forces also entered the fray and distorted the proposal for JCPOA 2 as 'the enemy's conspiracy and an anti-revolutionary plan.' The passive approach of Rouhani and other officials and their entanglement in a theoretical deadlock to create change without conflict with the Supreme Leader, as well as their practical ties with the power structure, have allowed Khamenei to neutralize the aforementioned dangers with minimal effort and his calculations regarding the ability to manage unforeseen and uncontrollable consequences of the JCPOA have proven somewhat correct. Of course, the weak response of the opposing forces to the current situation and their incorrect analysis of how the JCPOA was formed have also influenced this event. A significant portion of the political forces and civil society hastily and simplistically assumed that the high capability of Rouhani's government led to this event, and merely relying on a top-down reform approach and a government-centric strategy could meet other demands. Some even went further, believing that Khamenei's views had changed and the top of the power pyramid had tilted towards moderation. This mindset prevented political and social forces advocating change from utilizing the opportunity of the JCPOA to increase movements and community-centered reform approaches and create social pressure for achieving the logical outcomes of the JCPOA in moderating the political and social atmosphere of the country. Now it seems that Khamenei, relying on aligned forces to navigate threats or at least weaken their likelihood, has been able to manage the JCPOA and create deterrence against changes in major policies in domestic, foreign, and cultural arenas in the post-JCPOA era. Therefore, Khamenei currently agrees with the continuation of the JCPOA within the framework of commitments and timelines. However, if the next U.S. President moves towards deviating from the provisions of the agreement, then he will move towards canceling the JCPOA. As he has stated, the Islamic Republic will not be the initiator of the cancellation of the JCPOA. However, in various opportunities, he criticizes the JCPOA in the propaganda arena and questions its credibility to undermine the 'great victory' narrative desired by Rouhani in the political arena of the system. Khamenei also, with repeated emphasis on resistant economy, seeks to eliminate the country's economic vulnerability to international sanctions as quickly as possible. His calculations regarding when this capability will be achieved, independent of whether it is real or imaginary, play an important role in the life of the JCPOA. Additionally, from the platforms of the dominant power in the U.S., Iran continues to be perceived as the 'Great Satan' and an unchangeable enemy in the political sphere, and the JCPOA is rejected as a model in other areas of foreign policy conflict. It seems that the capacities of the JCPOA for significant and sustainable changes in the country's foreign and domestic policy have not been realized, and the likelihood of their activation is on a downward trend. Khamenei sees himself as successful in managing the post-JCPOA atmosphere. The potential of Rouhani's government to safeguard the JCPOA and turn it into a forward-looking strategy is decreasing. In this environment, the dominant power remains committed to implementing the JCPOA in the short term, and the plan for U.S. sabotage currently has a propaganda utility, as the oversight committee for the implementation of the JCPOA, while its composition aligns with the institution of Velayat Faqih, has not taken any practical action to deter against alleged negative actions by the U.S. However, the fragility of the JCPOA has increased. What ultimately determines its fate will be the economic situation of Iran. As long as Iran's economic situation remains in a crisis state, it seems unlikely that the regime will move towards another major adventure and endure global sanctions.