Khamenei and Regional Ambitions Centered on Shiism

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as expected, reacted sharply to the recent remarks of Barack Obama, the President of the United States, and his meeting with Arab officials at Camp David. He reiterated his previous positions, stating that imperialism, led by the U.S., is the main factor in the formation of modern ignorance, which he claims is much more dangerous and equipped than the ignorance before Islam. Khamenei borrowed the concept of modern ignorance from the thoughts of Sayyid Qutb, which significantly influences his views. The Supreme Leader intensified his attacks on the Saudi Arabian government, considering them worse than the rulers of the pre-Islamic era, known as ignorance. At the same time, he emphasized that the Islamic Republic can stand against the West and defeat it by relying on the two principles of 'insight' and 'determination and will.' Khamenei's remarks clearly indicated the necessity of continuing the hostile strategy against the U.S. and clarified that the purpose of the so-called 'heroic flexibility' is to de-escalate tensions and reduce the dimensions of the crisis in confronting the hostile government, and normalizing and strategically changing relations with the U.S. is not on the government's agenda. The Supreme Leader dismissed the possibility of reconciliation and rapprochement between the Islamic Republic and the West. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, also expressed similar sentiments in an interview with Der Spiegel, stating that we are not seeking a good relationship with the U.S. The effort to reach a nuclear compromise with the U.S. and accept a retreat in nuclear activities, which is a product of concerns over the increasing destructive impacts of crippling sanctions and the opportunity presented by Obama's interactive policy, reveals a tangible conflict with Khamenei's strategic views. This conflict has led to a relative decrease in his ability to control issues and an increase in confusion within the system. This noted point makes the comprehensive nuclear agreement fragile even if it is approved. Khamenei claimed that American negotiators have proposed new demands and, calling them 'brazen,' announced that the system would not allow inspections of military sites and discussions between agency representatives and Iranian nuclear experts. His words cast doubt on the success of reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement. However, there is still a possibility of reaching an agreement, but the potential ups and downs seem greater than before, making it more difficult to achieve. The output of Khamenei's remarks on the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad's mission and his visit to the graduation ceremony of officer students and the training of guards at Imam Hussein University provides a window to understand his regional strategy. He sought to frame the confrontation with the U.S. as a criterion for alignment, recognizing the Islamic Republic's vulnerability to the configuration of Middle Eastern conflicts within the framework of 'Shiite-Sunni confrontation.' Khamenei is more organized than Ayatollah Khomeini in his aspiration to expand the Islamic awakening movement. On a macro level, he encourages the empowerment of Islamic fundamentalist tendencies whose priority is confrontation with the U.S. and the discourse of religious government with an ideological interpretation of jurisprudence as an alternative to liberal democracy. However, on a lower level, Khamenei seeks Shiite hegemony in the Islamic awakening movement he claims. Therefore, the regional policies of the government, primarily implemented by the Quds Force, are multifaceted phenomena. Wherever the position is favorable for the empowerment of Shiites, the policy of seizing political power is prescribed. In such conditions, the system's intelligence and flexibility dictate that the share of power should correspond to the social bases of the targeted forces. In places where such potential does not exist, limited support and the expansion of spheres of influence and organizational work are recommended. In situations where more important interests with countries like China, Russia, etc., are at stake, prudence dictates ignoring the demands of Shiites and deferring them to an uncertain future. Similarly, this prudence sometimes necessitates temporarily favoring non-Shiites, as in Afghanistan. However, the overall outcome of all these seemingly different policies is the transformation of the Islamic Republic and the institution of the Guardianship of the Jurist into the spiritual center and leadership of the Islamic world. The title of 'Guardian of the Muslims of the World' is not just a formality but reflects the Shiite-centered ambition hidden within it to realize the historical aspiration of Shiites to hold the Islamic caliphate. Of course, this title is also, from another perspective, a religious-Shiite narrative of the title 'Qibla of the World' for the secular kings of Iran, which reveals the deep roots of this perception in the minds and consciousness of Iranian society. Considering the prevailing opinion among Shiite jurists, which emphasizes distancing from the amalgamation of religious and political authority during the occultation, the claim of the government's connection to the appearance of the twelfth Imam of the Shiites is raised. However, aside from the desires and beliefs of the leaders of the Islamic Republic, who can be categorized among the extremist Shiites, other elements also make Shiite orientation inevitable. The government's ambitions and grandeur, which overlap with the historical desire and geopolitical position of Iran in superiority over the Middle East, dictate the use of Shiites. Shiites around the world have a positive view of Iran, especially of a government that values Shiism and Islam. This factor makes Shiites strategically suitable tools for advancing the government's regional policies. On the other hand, the discourse of the Islamic Republic has limited influence in Sunni fundamentalist tendencies. Salafists, Brotherhood members, and Al-Qaeda control the space among Sunni Islamists and are not willing to follow the Islamic Republic. The experience of Hamas is an enlightening example, as its loyalty and ultimate orientation are with the Arab-Sunni bloc, and the financial, military, and political support of the Islamic Republic could not establish a strategic relationship between them. Therefore, only Shiite fundamentalist and state-centered tendencies are potential audiences for the Islamic Republic's desire for leadership in the Islamic world and handing it over to the 'Imam of the Time.' However, it is evident that given the minority status of Shiites, Shiite orientation cannot be a movement's discourse but rather targets the leadership and management of the Islamic Republic. This approach needs to be packaged in a complex manner to conceal Shiite hegemony. The U.S. military attack on Iraq and Afghanistan and the developments following the Arab Spring have brought significant changes to the balance of power in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic has also taken advantage of this opportunity to expand its regional expansionist policies and stabilize and expand its network of affiliated forces in other countries. However, events also occurred in Middle Eastern countries, the main sources of which are local equations; for example, the root causes of conflicts in Yemen and Syria are not religious, but Iranian interventions and the Saudi-Turkish axis have given it a religious confrontation dimension. However, at the core of this religious confrontation lie political and geopolitical rivalries. Yet, the dominant motivation of power in the Islamic Republic is ideologically Shiite traditionalism, which seeks to expand its influence in the region's geography to create a favorable environment for the Supreme Leader to practically implement the Guardianship of the Jurist. Raising his images in Syria and Iraq, strengthening groups whose ultimate loyalty is to the institution of the Guardianship of the Jurist in Iran, and the repeated emphasis of IRGC commanders on the strategic depth of following Khamenei among Muslims worldwide are credible documents revealing the dual policy of the government, which outwardly beats the drum of Islamic unity but inwardly seeks to expand its hegemony. In a situation where the Middle East is transitioning and has yet to find its final shape in the post-Arab Spring era, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are also trying to expand their regional power and have ambitious aspirations for reconstructing the caliphate of the 'Rightly Guided Caliphs' and the 'Ottoman Empire' in their grand policies. These policies and Saudi Arabia's concern over Iran's expanding influence to its eastern borders have led to a collision of the ambitions of the three aforementioned currents, placing the Middle East in a new round of instability and destructive conflicts. Therefore, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, as Saudi policies increasingly become an obstacle to advancing the Shiite crescent, has intensified attacks and delegitimization against the Saudi government. Khamenei increasingly transcends the geographical and political borders of Iran in his speeches, expressing his positions within the framework of a larger, borderless Islamic Revolution. He officially supports the government's intervention in regional conflicts and other Muslim countries. At the same time, Khamenei's remarks regarding the possibility of extending proxy wars to Iran's borders indicate that the harsh positions of Iranian military commanders also have a deterrent and defensive aspect. However, the government's political strategy remains to avoid direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia while increasing the level of proxy wars. At the same time, the sensitive and fragile regional situation is such that an uncalculated action could escalate the situation beyond the control of the involved parties and lead to an unforeseen confrontation. One potential consequence of the path the government has taken in expanding its regional influence is the emergence of the specter of war and military conflict over Iran. The potential war threatening Iran is no longer related to the nuclear crisis as before but could result from changes in the regional balance of power. However, the likelihood of this under current conditions is weak. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic still hopes for an agreement with the Turkish government and does not view it as the main contradiction, similar to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, only resistance against Turkey's actions in Syria and dissuading them from changing Bashar al-Assad is on the agenda. However, if the Turkey-Syria-Jordan coalition intervenes militarily in Syria, then Iran's policy towards Turkey may undergo a significant change.