Khamenei and Rouhani; Intensified Meaningful Challenge

The pressures and attacks from authoritarian forces against Rouhani have noticeably intensified. Following Rouhani's significant victory in the recent presidential elections, the threats and warnings against him have taken on a thought-provoking trend. The negative reactions are significant and not entirely unexpected. A very important aspect of recent events relates to the continuation of explicit criticisms and jabs from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. The top figure of the regime, who explicitly and implicitly supported Ebrahim Raisi during the electoral campaign, has not only expressed his dissatisfaction with Raisi's failure but has also sought to restrain and limit Rouhani as much as possible at the very beginning of his second term. Ayatollah Khamenei became actively involved against Rouhani's success by raising the important issue of the 'UNESCO 2030 Cultural Document' during the electoral campaign. The significance of this issue was such that Rouhani stated after his election victory that he would not tolerate 'lies' and 'misuse' of this document. However, even during the competition among candidates, Khamenei criticized the ongoing 'compromise' with the United States, a critique that was clearly directed at Rouhani. The electoral file was closed with Rouhani's victory; however, the Supreme Leader's work with the elected President did not end there. The top of the political system, agitated by the election results and disturbed by some points raised by Rouhani during the electoral competition, as well as angered by the 'Green' slogans in Rouhani's campaign rallies, has sought to remind the second-in-command of the political system of his 'limits' within the political power structure through numerous criticisms in recent weeks. Ayatollah Khamenei has not only manifested his criticism in direct and indirect forms but has also encouraged his supportive social base to exert pressure on the government. His recommendation to students and 'soft war officers' and 'cultural jihadist thought and action cells' for 'fire at will' is considered an important and meaningful witness. Explicit 'critiques' of Rouhani during a meeting with the system's officials and the Supreme Leader were also a peak point and a manifestation of the agitation of the system's top figure. In a sense, he made his approach to Rouhani in his second presidential term evident. Ayatollah Khamenei not only warned Rouhani that he should become responsible for the 'must be' statements he makes but also sternly warned him to avoid 'polarizing' society. The head of the political system, with a significant reference to the story of Iran's first president (the challenge that led to Banisadr's removal by Ayatollah Khomeini), stated: 'The country should not be polarized, and people should not be divided into two categories; the situation that unfortunately occurred in 1979 from the then-President who divided people into supporters and opponents is dangerous.' Predictably, the Supreme Leader makes no mention of his own role in 'polarizing' society and his disregard for the demands of the majority of citizens. Although Rouhani has continued to express his distinct considerations in the face of the Supreme Leader's criticisms and warnings, what is evident is the upper hand of the head of the political system in this dispute — within the political power structure. This reality has encouraged Rouhani's opponents to attack and criticize him. Meanwhile, Rouhani has explicitly stated that although the President is the representative of all Iranian people, the majority of society has preferred one approach over another. Contrary to Ayatollah Khamenei, who emphasized after the elections that the people voted for the system with their participation and chose only one candidate (individual) from among the candidates, Rouhani insists that the majority of voters voted for a different program and orientation, and 'loudly announced their most important political and social demands.' The challenge between Rouhani and the core of power in the Islamic Republic, however, does not stop here. Following Rouhani's recent remarks about the criteria for the legitimacy of governance, and his emphasis that Imam Ali 'considers the basis of governance to be the opinion and choice of the people,' a new wave of criticism against him has been organized. Not only the clerics aligned with the Supreme Leader (such as Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi) but also Ahmad Jannati, the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, issued a statement in the name of this institution, and the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary released a statement signed by Mohammad Yazdi in response to Rouhani's position. Various layers of authoritarian forces are trying, each with their available tools, to prevent the expansion of Rouhani's authority and to remind him who holds the upper hand in the political power structure. However, Rouhani — for whatever reason — apparently has no intention of retreating from his views and approach. Thus, in addition to reiterating his considerations in another speech, he published a short video of Ayatollah Khamenei's speech from 1987 on his Instagram page, emphasizing that the Supreme Leader had a similar position when he was President. In that speech, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized the importance of the people's vote in choosing a ruler. However, the media arms of the Leader's office are not silent; they produced and released a short clip about Banisadr and his fate, which serves as a serious response and warning to Rouhani and even an indirect threat to him. The deepened and intensified challenge between Rouhani and the central power in the Islamic Republic does not stop here and continues. As another significant witness, after Rouhani and his Minister of Intelligence linked the IRGC's missile attack on ISIS positions in Syria to a decision by the Supreme National Security Council, a fierce backlash against the President began. A main and meaningful witness was the IRGC's public relations announcement; a statement in which it was declared that the missile attack 'was carried out in the military hierarchy and in coordination with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.' This position somehow delineates the 'boundaries' between the security forces governing the IRGC and the President, and beyond that, insists on expressing it to the public. The core of power in the Islamic Republic insists on limiting Rouhani within very specific boundaries and preventing his effective role in the political power structure. The authoritarian forces dominating the political power structure — including the Supreme Leader — agitated by the presidential election results, as well as the slogans of the Greens and Rouhani's promises and campaign programs, are trying to define and refine the 'limits' of the President at the very beginning of Rouhani's second government. In the context of the regional crisis and amid the prolonged economic crisis within the country and other real mega-challenges (from water and unemployment crises to financial and credit institution crises, and from marginalized people to the army of social victims), only the irrationality and unrealistic confrontation of the far-right in the Islamic Republic can create another crisis for the political system. From this perspective, it seems that the efforts of moderate conservatives and pragmatists, and even the expediency and realism of the head of the political system, are aimed at containing the increasing challenge — as much as possible. This point is independent of the importance of controlling and containing Rouhani for the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei insists on defining and limiting Rouhani's playing field and maintaining complete control over the output of political governance and power organization. However, this desire and approach are predictably in conflict with a significant part of Rouhani's promises and programs. Rouhani not only has a distinct orientation in foreign policy and interaction with the West but also in cultural development and political development. Thus, it seems unlikely that the realized challenge will end easily and soon. The new and renewed emphasis of the Supreme Leader on the UNESCO 2030 document and his criticism of 'superficiality' regarding this 'dangerous' issue — despite the cancellation of the document by the Supreme National Security Council — is a new witness. It can be confidently said that authoritarianism and the despotism of the head of the political system in pursuing and realizing its political-ideological projects is one of the important causes of the significant and ongoing challenge. Ayatollah Khamenei, as a political autocrat, has organized power and continues to do so, and to consolidate his unilateral power, he intertwines it with ideological claims. All of this is independent of the existing contradiction in the constitution between the two elected (presidency) and appointed (leadership) sections. The powers of the Supreme Leader in Article 110 and the rights of the people in Chapter Three of the Constitution, and the dual foundations of legitimacy in the Constitution (the vote and will of the people, and divine legitimacy) reflect another important aspect of the roots of the dispute. The President considers himself obligated to pursue the demands of the majority — manifested in elections — while the leadership of the system has its own desired outlooks in its agenda. The outcome of this struggle will, of course, be determined at every juncture in the realm of political realities and as a result of the challenge and interaction of effective forces (from actors and institutions present in the political power structure to active civil society actors). This struggle is unlikely to end soon and is likely to manifest itself again in the selection of ministers for Rouhani's second government.