Khamenei and Sunnis: Dual Behavior or Temporary Flexibility

The response of Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, to the letter from Molavi Abdulhamid, the Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan and one of the prominent leaders of Iranian Sunnis, is an important and unprecedented event. Molavi Abdulhamid had previously published multiple open letters addressed to the leader of Iran, but this time his sealed letter, the contents of which were later published, revolved around two main issues: protesting against 38 years of inequality in employment and the allocation of senior government positions, and a request for the freedom of religions and the unrestricted practice of Sunni religious rites. The indirect response from Ayatollah Khamenei, published by his office head, Mohammad Golpayegani, categorically denies discrimination against all Iranian ethnicities and religions, warning enemies and those seeking to sow discord among the united people of Iran! Decoding the content of this letter raises doubts about whether there will be a change in the regime's policies regarding Sunnis. The relationship between the Islamic Republic and Sunnis has been particularly complex from the beginning until now. Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor have shown more tolerance towards Sunnis compared to traditional clerics and jurists who do not pay attention to politics. They have continued the approach of Islamic unity, which was established by Ayatollah Borujerdi, at the rhetorical and promotional level. The selection of the Unity Week and the emphasis on the connection between Shia and Sunni has been a consistent policy over the past three decades. In the regional and international sphere, the Islamic Republic has pursued cooperation and interactions based on Islamism and has not limited itself to working with Shia movements. However, this apparent aspect of the situation differs significantly from the underlying objectives behind the scenes. In fact, a duality between action and opinion has always existed in this area. The theory of Velayat-e Faqih and the claim of representing the Mahdi by the Supreme Leader form the basis of discrimination at least in senior positions. From the perspective of the dominant power, loyalists and believers in the theory of Velayat-e Faqih should hold the main responsibilities. More precisely, the ideological characteristics of the political system have institutionalized and structured discrimination against religious minorities and Shia individuals who do not believe in the theory of Velayat-e Faqih in the political and social arenas. On the other hand, the effort to promote a Shia-centric Islamic fundamentalism and to establish the Shia Supreme Leader as the leader of the Islamic world has fueled sectarian tensions among Muslims. However, since the theory of Velayat-e Faqih has emerged from the context of Imamiyah jurisprudence, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have inevitably taken into account the sensitivities of religious authorities. The obstacles to Sunnis becoming ministers or presidents are not only governmental but also include traditional jurists and religious forces that do not have a positive view of modernization. According to some reports, the inclusion of the condition of belief in Twelver Shia Islam as one of the candidacy requirements for the presidency was insisted upon by Ayatollah Morteza Haeri Yazdi, a traditional jurist and critic of Ayatollah Khomeini's political approach. This resistance is even stronger in the area of religious practice freedoms. It should be noted that Sunnis are only one segment of Iranians who are deprived of religious freedom at various levels. Other religious minorities, including Baha'is, Jews, Dervishes, Ahl-e Haq, Zoroastrians, and Christians, also face similar and perhaps worse problems. Official statistics do not provide an accurate report of the Sunni population in Iran. Unofficial estimates place the number of Iranian Sunnis between 5 to 20 percent of the total population. They are present among the Kurdish, Baluch, Turkmen, Talesh, Arab, and even Persian ethnicities. The largest religious minority in Iran is predominantly located in the provinces of Kurdistan, Baluchestan, Golestan, and Hormozgan, with a significant presence in the provinces of West Azerbaijan and Bushehr. Moreover, a portion of the population in all cities of Iran is Sunni. In recent years, the geographical distribution of Sunnis has undergone noticeable changes, with the Sunni community growing larger in the cities of Mashhad and Qom. Sunnis constituted the religious majority in Iran for nine centuries until the reign of Shah Ismail Safavi. However, despite their historical background and current intermingling in Iranian society, they suffer from various restrictions. Their religious leaders have been assassinated at different times or have spent years behind bars. Currently, a significant portion of political and ideological prisoners are Sunnis. Sunnis do not even have a mosque in the capital. Discrimination and restrictions against Sunnis have fluctuated over the past four decades, depending on the political conditions. During the reformist period, the situation improved relatively, but with the rise of Ahmadinejad, restrictions increased. During that period, the plan for 'organizing Sunni religious schools' was implemented to ensure that these schools were managed by appointees of the leadership. This policy had been executed on a smaller scale before, where the Supreme Leader appointed some Sunni clerics (Mamosta and Molavi) to religious positions, but during this period, interventions expanded, and tensions increased. Of course, terrorist activities in Sistan and Baluchestan and the reactivation of armed opposition groups in Kurdistan also contributed to the security situation in Sistan and Baluchestan and Kurdistan. It seems that in the past decade, the primary basis for mistreatment of Sunnis has been concerns about Salafism and the presence of Sunni jihadist Islamists in Iran, which, alongside the longstanding fear of 'Wahhabi infiltration,' has made living conditions difficult for them. While the dominant tendency among Iranian Sunnis has been a firm demarcation from extremist Salafism and has acted within the framework of moderation and centrism. Respecting their rights creates the most and most reliable deterrence and, conversely, creates opportunities for extremism by widening the gap between them and society. Now, considering these points, the continuation of dual behavior is the most probable interpretation that can be derived from the recent position of the leadership. From a pessimistic perspective, it can be concluded that these statements from the leadership are promotional in nature and, like the past, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have publicly denied discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities. However, in practice, they pay no attention to this issue, and inequalities and problems continue based on organized and specific policies. Historical precedents support this view. One of the reasons for the leadership's dissatisfaction with Abdullah Nouri's performance in the Ministry of Interior was his conciliatory efforts with Sunnis and ignoring the requests of the leadership's office to halt such activities. Additionally, in this letter, the leadership does not refer to the issue of religious freedoms and lifting restrictions, only emphasizing the general decree of denying discrimination. Monitoring the positions of senior officials of the Islamic Republic highlights that, from their perspective, denying discrimination does not necessarily mean utilizing Sunnis in major political and social positions. They have provided other justifications for this inequality so far. However, despite the multiple pieces of evidence supporting the pessimistic view, it cannot be entirely ruled out that there may be adjustments regarding Sunnis on the agenda. Ibrahim Raisi's meeting with Molavi Abdulhamid also strengthens the possibility that the principlists are seeking to repair their relationship with Sunnis and gain their political support. Analyzing Khamenei's letter and his sensitivity towards the enemy clarifies that potential flexibility has political reasons but also possesses security aspects. In the conflict-ridden atmosphere of the Middle East, the expansion of extremist Salafi activities and increased tensions with Saudi Arabia have made the Islamic Republic vulnerable to intensifying Sunni discontent. The terrorist act in front of the parliament and the intelligence ministry's claims of discovering and neutralizing operational groups linked to ISIS are evidence that concerns about the spread of terrorist actions could push the government towards easing restrictions on Sunnis. Overall, the likelihood of the pessimistic interpretation and the continuation of the duality between words and actions from the recent stance of the leadership is higher, but at the same time, there is a weak possibility that not very extensive changes may occur. In either case, expectations from Hassan Rouhani for utilizing Sunnis in senior government positions, including deputy ministers and governorships, will increase, and the costs of his continued practical indifference will also expand.