Khamenei and the 96 Elections

The institution of the Supreme Leader is the main pillar of the flawed electoral structure that contradicts the principles of free and fair elections in the Islamic Republic, determining the competitive arena and influencing the electoral atmosphere through its interventions. Over the past two decades, the role of the leadership in engineering elections has fluctuated, and its scope has not been uniform. In fact, Khamenei has had different orientations in various presidential election cycles. The main tool for the Supreme Leader's intervention in elections includes entities such as the Guardian Council, military, police, religious, financial, media, and propaganda institutions under his umbrella, and the mass community known as the loyalist and 'Hezbollah' forces. These entities, which can be referred to as the 'deep state,' form a voting machine that can strengthen the position of the preferred candidate in elections if activated. Khamenei has shown during his leadership that while he disregards neutrality and seeks to bring his preferred option out of the ballot boxes, he has not been entirely dismissive of the competitive nature of elections. Essentially, engineered elections have never been devoid of a moderate candidate pushed to the margins of the political system and have maintained a competitive aspect. With this introduction and monitoring developments and positions, two scenarios can be predicted for the final orientation of the leadership in the presidential election. However, it is emphasized that the possibility of actions similar to those in 2009 and the deviation of the election from the conventional path in the Islamic Republic seems almost impossible. Intervention in favor of the president: In this scenario, the voting machine of the government is activated by Khamenei's command and organized efforts are made for the victory of Ebrahim Raisi in the presidential elections. This scenario is similar to that of 2005. Irregularities and influences outside the ballot boxes are conducted at a conventional level, and the election loses its natural state, but the extent of deviations will not be as significant as in 2009. However, the electoral atmosphere will be overshadowed by the explicit bias of the governing institutions loyal to the Supreme Leader. The realization of this scenario does not necessarily require the withdrawal of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf from the electoral competition. However, as the voting day approaches, clearer signs and indications of the leadership's support for Raisi must be issued, and the target community should intensify its activities. Additionally, the destruction of Rouhani should be carried out more vigorously, and his close associates should be subjected to more severe attacks regarding their involvement in economic corruption. Although this scenario is plausible, a thorough analysis of the conditions suggests that the chances for it are slim. The main support for this scenario is Raisi's strange and unexpected candidacy and the difficulty of believing in his potential defeat, similar to Saeed Jalili in 2013. Raisi's prominent presence in speculations related to Khamenei's succession complicates his fate in the elections. However, if this assumption is set aside and it can be imagined that Raisi is not a serious option for managing the future of the institution of the Supreme Leader, then this scenario becomes unstable. It is also not entirely dismissible that, for any reason, a 'melon peel' has been placed under him to burn his potential political position within the hard core of power. The most important sign confirming the scenario of intervention in favor of Raisi is the reports about the IRGC's activities in support of Raisi, which, however, is difficult to verify. It cannot be said with certainty whether this decision was the result of the opinions of senior IRGC commanders or was made with the green light of the leadership. However, other existing signs weaken the realization of this scenario. Leadership support has not been observed to a significant degree so far. While Raisi shares the most discourse and political commonality with Khamenei, there has been no documented and decisive evidence to consider his candidacy as stemming from the will and coordination with the leadership. The only conjectures that have favored conservative candidates have been Khamenei's request for candidates not to 'count on the West in case of victory in the elections.' His criticism of Rouhani, without mentioning his name, regarding the incorrect claim of distancing the shadow of war from the country by the moderate government has also been noted. However, this public invitation and implicit criticism of Rouhani cannot be described as active support for Raisi and only reflects the desired criteria of the leadership for the future president. In this scenario, Khamenei does not intervene specifically and effectively in the electoral competition and allows the people's vote to determine the president from among the six candidates approved by the Guardian Council. This approach, although similar to the years 1997, 2001, and 2013, is more aligned with the evolutionary trend of 2013. In fact, after summarizing the bloody and crisis-ridden events of 2009, Ahmadinejad's disobedience, and societal changes, the leadership has concluded that his sensitivities should be applied indirectly and through the mediation of the Guardian Council at the qualification review stage and that by engineering the electoral scene, the votes cast in the ballot boxes should be accepted as determining the president within the desired framework. Avoiding a severe polarization of the electoral atmosphere and preventing the crisis-inducing aspect of the election from crossing controllable borders may be reasons that have led the leadership to this decision. In this case, Khamenei has a specific program for each of the candidates to become president and proceeds accordingly, just as he did in 2013. However, this decision does not mean that he will be neutral in the elections. He will strive to promote his desired discourse in the electoral atmosphere, which Raisi aligns with the most, but will not intervene in practice in favor of him or anyone else, similar to what he did with Saeed Jalili in 2013. Reports from meetings of approved and disqualified candidates with the leadership before registration have all contained the common statement that the leadership emphasized the acceptance of the output of the ballot boxes. Additionally, individuals and groups that have reflected views close to the leadership in recent years have repeatedly emphasized that the system (referring to the Supreme Leader) does not have a representative in the elections and has warned against the polarization of elections between supporters and opponents of the system. Khamenei explicitly stated in a meeting with workers on April 30 that he 'never tells people who to vote for or not to vote for.' He also invited everyone who 'loves the country, people, and security' to participate in the elections. He also urged those involved in the elections to ensure the integrity of the votes and their preservation. In this scenario, greater participation in the elections and utilizing it as a maneuver for legitimacy, a political backing for anti-Western sentiment, and highlighting the demand for security in society is more important compared to the winning candidate. On the other hand, none of the present candidates pose a threat to the leadership and the exercise of his absolute rule, and they can be contained. Only the degree of their confrontation and cooperation varies. In a quantitative overview, it can be said that Raisi has 100 percent desirability for the leadership, while this percentage is 80 and 50 to 60 percent for Qalibaf and Rouhani, respectively. What shapes the gap between Rouhani and Khamenei is Rouhani's affiliation with the reformist discourse among the system's officials, which is not pleasing to the leadership, and he feels concerned about its long-term consequences. Therefore, in the recommendations and addresses he has given so far, the strengthening of the positions of conservatives, including jihadist work and revolutionary thought alongside attention to the underprivileged sectors of society, is clearly evident. This issue causes Raisi's presence, independent of Khamenei's intervention, to become a kind of symbolic political weighing for Khamenei in the 96 elections. The coming weeks, especially the last days of the electoral campaign, will definitively clarify which scenario will be realized, with the likelihood of the non-intervention scenario appearing to be stronger.