Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Attribution of 'Treachery'

Ayatollah Khamenei reacted strongly during a meeting with a group of mourners and reciters on April 11 to a tweet published on Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's account. The tweet mentioned that 'the world of tomorrow is the world of discourses, not missiles.' However, Rafsanjani later claimed that this account is managed by one of his admirers and that its content is not related to him! The Twitter account also modified the previous statement, changing 'missiles' to 'intercontinental missiles and atomic bombs.' In his sharp remarks, Khamenei criticized those who consider the future to be 'a world of negotiations, not missiles,' accusing the proponents of such statements of 'treachery' if they spoke knowingly. He also stated: 'The times are such that everything is at stake; otherwise, they will easily and openly consume the rights of the nation.' Khamenei emphasized that 'enemies are constantly strengthening their military and missile capabilities,' addressing critics of Iran's missile activities and questioning, 'In these circumstances, how can we say the era of missiles has passed?' He continued, 'In this jungle-like global situation, if the Islamic Republic only seeks negotiation and economic exchange, and even science and technology, but lacks defensive capability, will even small governments not allow themselves to threaten the Iranian nation?' These remarks are primarily a defense of the government's missile program and a disregard for Western sensitivities. The statement attributed to Rafsanjani has been interpreted by internal critics as aligning with the positions of Western opponents, suggesting that discourse and providing an effective program for the country's progress are more important than developing military capabilities. However, there is a significant difference between discourse as a collection of purposeful thoughts and negotiation as a method. What has caused Khamenei's hasty and angry response is the questioning of government propaganda regarding the benefits of missile and military advancements. These comments come amid increasing attacks by pro-Velayat Faqih forces against the government in the post-JCPOA period and reflect a not-so-extensive intensification of disagreements between two factions of the regime in organizing and guiding the country. Ayatollah Khamenei clarified that he is not opposed to negotiation but, with a critical stance towards the JCPOA and creating doubts about its practical achievements, made it clear that he opposes negotiation in the sense of improving relations with the West and strategic investment in this area. In his position as the individual with the most power and authority in the government, he stands against this perspective, which he believes facilitates Western influence and undermines the regime's value content. He wants negotiation as a tool and tactic in service of what are termed revolutionary and, in fact, adventurous goals based on hostility towards the liberal-democratic system and comprehensive defense of the religious government. For him and aligned forces, increasing the defensive and military capabilities of the Islamic Republic and using them to expand the strategic depth of Shiite fundamentalism in the region and to promote the classical discourse of the Islamic Republic while preventing revisionism is the main issue. Although these remarks, which carry a hint of threat, are aimed at increasing the cost of opposing the development of the missile program within the regime, they also reveal Khamenei's dissatisfaction with the performance of the head of the Expediency Discernment Council during the tenth parliamentary and fifth Assembly of Experts elections. Khamenei's words stem from opposition to the political moderation program and the rise of the centrist faction. In fact, it is a reaction to those political elites of the Islamic Republic who do not practically accept the centrality of his views in guiding the regime and prescribe other solutions. It should be noted that the moderation government, especially Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, has at least outwardly fully cooperated with the appointed sectors and the IRGC regarding missile maneuvers and the expansion of military programs. Zarif has stated in all his interviews that increasing missile capabilities is Iran's right and has rejected any conflict with the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The West also accepts that missile maneuvers do not violate the JCPOA; however, the governments of the United States, France, Britain, and Germany insist that these actions contradict the provisions of the resolution and must be stopped. However, Russia, by using vague terms in the resolution that overshadow the binding aspect of the continuation of eight years of missile sanctions, does not allow for the issuance of new sanctions or deterrent punishments at the international level. In this context, Western countries are currently focusing their efforts on pressuring the UN Secretary-General. The U.S. government has also increased unilateral sanctions. However, it seems unlikely that these measures will have a deterrent effect against the development of the Islamic Republic's missile program. The necessity of proportionality between the dimensions of military activity and the overall development program of the country is a reality in organizing the country, but observing the realities shows that the world currently does not solely revolve around discourse and negotiation, and military power and defensive capability remain a significant factor in the global and regional positioning of countries. The chaotic situation in the Middle East, national security, and the balance of military power in the region, the West's dual policies, and the strategy of profiting from arms trade with Arab countries lend legitimacy and justification to the military growth and advancement of the country with deterrent and defensive goals. However, the confrontation of this need with the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and provocative actions such as writing the destruction of Israel in Hebrew on missiles has created a complex situation in Iran's military and defense policies. This situation has raised concerns about the primary destination of the IRGC's strategic military activities. Therefore, perhaps the country's needs and a correct understanding of the relationship between development and military affairs lie somewhere between Khamenei's remarks and the Twitter account attributed to Hashemi Rafsanjani. The implications of Khamenei's remarks will be significant considering previous positions. Increased tension over the missile program raises the risks of economic and trade exchanges with Iran. Khamenei, understanding this point, wants to repair past vulnerabilities in the face of crippling nuclear sanctions by advancing the resistance economy and further delegitimize Rouhani's interactive approach in foreign policy while reconstructing a confrontational view with the West in the post-nuclear agreement period. Thus, the conditions for realizing Rouhani's government programs become more difficult, and the window of opportunity for the JCPOA and normalizing exchanges with Europe is likely to close or operate at a level below expectations. In this situation, if Rouhani does not change his strategy and programs, he will find himself in a stalemate, and Velayat-oriented and dissenting forces will put the moderate government under pressure from two opposing perspectives. However, these remarks will also intensify the attacks of the extremist faction of the government against Hashemi Rafsanjani and further complicate his strategy of reducing the level of conflict to the Ahmadinejad faction and the worried ones. Khamenei's address has more clearly targeted the disclosure of differences between two old allies and fundamental pillars of the Islamic Republic. Hashemi Rafsanjani assesses the activities of the tenth parliament as an increase in his power within the system, but the nature of power in the system, the existing balance of forces, and previous experiences indicate that this rope is not as strong as Hashemi believes, and his excessive optimism has made him vulnerable. Principlists, especially the radical layers committed to the third of Tir discourse, who seek to maintain the status quo in the post-leadership period, are waiting for a green light to launch a final attack on Rafsanjani and expel him from the system. So far, Hashemi Rafsanjani has tried to maintain a step forward and a step back in the system and serve as a temporary anchor for forces opposed to the current situation in the power bloc, thus returning to the center of the system at an opportune time. However, the system has assessed the costs of marginalizing him as less than completely eliminating him so far. Yet, the growing imbalance in his social standing with his marginal position in established power makes maintaining his current position increasingly difficult. If the accusation of treachery is repeated in the future with clearer indications, then extinguishing the 'Great Sedition' will create a serious crisis for Hashemi. His action of disavowing responsibility for the Twitter account seems more like a tactical retreat to evade potential consequences. However, the existing instability in these interactions does not show a bright outlook for his success in advancing his programs.