Khamenei, IRGC Missiles, and 'National Security'

In the context of an economic crisis and simultaneous efforts by the moderate government to leverage international relations in the post-JCPOA era, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) suddenly conducts missile drills and publicizes them. Following this, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in a year he has tied to the theme of 'resilient economy,' speaks of the necessity to rely on and enhance missile capabilities to achieve security. Do the IRGC's missiles ensure Iran's national security? Oversight of the military-security actions of the IRGC can confidently describe the IRGC as a 'shadow government' in Iran. The Supreme Leader appoints the Commander of the IRGC, and there is no oversight of the IRGC's actions except through the Leader's office. It should not be forgotten that the apex of the political system in the Islamic Republic is also free from any oversight and is unwilling to respond even indirectly to the Assembly of Experts or accept its oversight. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, stated in an interview: 'The Assembly of Experts invited officials for accountability. Initially, anyone we invited was happy and thanked us, saying: I will prepare and come to report. After a few days, we would see that they said they would not come. We realized that this acceptance of invitation and then rejection was not a normal issue. None of the invited officials, even the head of the Council of Policy-Making for Friday Prayer Leaders, who was the easiest to invite, came. When we asked him the reason, he said: 'The Leader's office said do not go!' I was surprised and asked the Leader himself; he confirmed it.' With such a report, it is predictable that senior IRGC commanders will not respond to questions or criticisms from anyone other than the Supreme Leader. Legally, according to the IRGC's charter, this institution is 'under the command of the Supreme Leader' and politically and ideologically 'subject to the rule of the jurist.' Article 110 of the Constitution also considers the appointment and dismissal of the IRGC's commander as within the powers of the Supreme Leader. Thus, despite holding filtered elections under the oversight of the Guardian Council, and all the limitations and deficiencies of elections in Iran, which are far from the standards of free, fair, and just elections, representatives of the parliament and the president still do not have the opportunity or authority to effectively question the actions of the IRGC and oversee it. The state of press freedom and the critical and independent media's actions in Iran is also well-known. The issue of the 'popularity' of the system's first figure and his democratic selection is also highly unlikely to be believed by any fair and informed observer. In practice, there is no oversight community over the military-security actions of the IRGC and its missile projects. Defending and justifying the military and missile actions of the IRGC and comparing them with similar actions in developed countries with democratic systems is a kind of playing with reality. In democratic systems (whether presidential or parliamentary), the military-security domain and the defense ministries are subordinate to elected representatives of the people; whether the elected president or the prime minister emerging from the parliament's vote, both are obligated to accountability in addition to their legal powers. In both cases, there is democratic oversight—direct and indirect—over military activities; oversight based on the community's trust in the government and its elected representatives, who have come to power through free, fair, and just elections. In other words, the officials of the executive and legislative branches, backed by the credibility of the majority's votes, also bear the important responsibility of overseeing the performance of the Ministry of Defense, and from the perspective of their 'national interests,' they regulate and critique military outputs and actions. Such a situation does not exist in Iran. It is evident that with the track record of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC in nuclear adventurism, intervention in Syria, the activities of the Quds Force, and the suppression of protesters and political opponents within the country, granting a blank check by civil society and complete trust and confidence in the core of power is unjustifiable and untenable. At a higher level, even the moderate government is critical of some of the IRGC's provocative and illogical actions. When the moderate government also becomes critical, just a few days ago, Hesameddin Ashna, an advisor to the president, criticized the media coverage of the IRGC's missile drills. The advisor to Rouhani referred to an interview with Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, who said: 'The lack of media coverage of the IRGC's drills in the past two years has somewhat emboldened the Americans.' He posed three questions: First; Are military commanders prohibited from such interviews? Second; Do military commanders act based on their feelings or based on issued orders? Lastly; Was the lack of media coverage of missile drills a mistake or an issued directive? It is evident that the questions posed by the moderate president's advisor remain unanswered; just as previous criticisms by Rouhani have not yielded tangible results for him; including his famous statement in the fall of 2014 that: 'If we gather information, guns, money, capital, sites, newspapers, and news agencies together, even Abu Dharr and Salman will become corrupt.' Rouhani emphasized last summer—in the context of the implementation of the JCPOA—that 'we should not think that after reaching an agreement, we can speak and act as we wish and that others will not react to this change in our behavior.' Such statements were quickly met with a strong reaction from the IRGC's commander, Aziz Jafari, who noted Rouhani's words, stating: 'This means the beginning of the erosion of the independence and dignity of the Islamic and revolutionary system of Iran.' He emphasized that the IRGC 'will never allow the growth and implementation of a thought' that, in his words: 'wants to open new avenues for foreign infiltration into the country.' In a new reaction to the IRGC's missile drills, Abbas Araghchi, the deputy foreign minister, indirectly criticized, stating: 'The national interests of the country require that we create a calm and trust-building atmosphere for companies that intend to invest in Iran.' Although the concept of national security is tied to preserving independence and territorial integrity, it simultaneously means the conditions and necessities that protect a country from various political, security, economic, and social insecurities and threats. While military hardware and reliance on military force reflect some aspects of security, they do not elucidate the various dimensions and colorful components of security. The reliance of political systems on democratic processes, human rights, and the rule of law, the formation and realization of human and sustainable development, a broad and empowered civil society, increased levels of welfare, and the possession of a dynamic economy, global responsibility, peacefulness, dialogue, and international reconciliation, and efforts for peaceful coexistence with neighbors and regional cooperation are some of the fundamental components of national security. However, Ayatollah Khamenei and the IRGC do not pay attention to these components. While in the post-JCPOA era, Iran needs calm, stability, reconciliation, and solidarity to emerge from recession and economic crisis, any military adventurism could have numerous negative consequences (including on foreign investment). The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the military-security current aligned with him beat the drum of testing and showcasing ballistic missiles and military power in the region. If for the core of power in the Islamic Republic, militarism is the focal point of attention and the cornerstone of the system's security, for Iranian civil society, the path to achieving national security passes through the transition to democracy and the attainment of human and sustainable development.