Khamenei: We Must Have an Offensive Program in Information Warfare

The leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on Wednesday, April 29, called for the Islamic Republic to have not only a defense but also an "offensive program" in what he termed a "complex information war" with the "enemy." Khamenei made these remarks during a meeting with Mahmoud Alavi, the Minister of Intelligence, and officials and staff of the Ministry of Intelligence. According to the IRNA news agency, Khamenei stated that one of the main axes of this war is to influence the decision-making systems of officials and change the beliefs of the people, emphasizing that in this war, in addition to defense and closing infiltration points, an offensive must also be carried out, and any negligence and simplistic thinking must be avoided. He added that it is necessary to stand firm against the plans of the opposing front and to have an offensive program to determine the playing field by our intelligence apparatus. He also stressed the need for the Ministry of Intelligence and its staff to remain "100% revolutionary" and to be "subordinate" to the policies of the system, like intelligence agencies in other countries. Hussein Aryan, a military analyst based in Britain, commented to Radio Farda that the military doctrine of the Islamic Republic, especially in cyber warfare, has been emphasized by officials as defensive and deterrent. Khamenei's recent remarks about an offensive program in information warfare are a clear confirmation of the actions that the Islamic Republic's intelligence agencies have undertaken in the past. He has called for synergy among the country's intelligence organizations, which have shown signs of competition and even discord in their work. Khamenei deemed any factionalism in the Ministry of Intelligence as a "sin" and announced a "great and complex war of the opposing front" against the Islamic Republic. He also remarked that "the intelligence agencies of the opposing front, despite all their resources, have not been able to do anything significant so far." According to Khamenei, various methods, including "infiltration and information theft," "changing the calculations of decision-makers," "changing the beliefs of the people," "creating financial and economic disorder," and "causing security turmoil" are on the agenda in this "complex information war." Iranian companies and government organizations have faced cyber-attacks in recent years, particularly in 2012, when the Central Bank of Iran's website was attacked, disrupting its internal network and internet. Earlier in May of that year, the Iranian Oil Ministry announced that its electronic systems had been targeted by cyber-attacks, and it was previously reported that a virus known as "Flame" had targeted Iranian computer networks in recent years to collect information from them. Khamenei's call for an aggressive approach in the intelligence field comes as Western countries have long reported the existence of such an approach in Iran. In this context, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on an institution and ten Iranians on April 3, accusing them of hacking hundreds of American and international universities. Khamenei has previously warned about the "enemy's" attempts to infiltrate among the officials of the Islamic Republic, which has led military and political figures close to him to frequently use this term to counter political rivals, especially regarding the JCPOA agreement. Khamenei has also claimed that in the recent fluctuations of the currency market in Iran, "the traces of foreign and their intelligence agencies are evident," and for this reason, Iran must have an offensive program in addition to defense to "overcome the enemy." Khamenei added that the "playing field must be determined by our intelligence apparatus," and this ministry must be able to stand against the "enemy front" with long-term planning and anticipation of future events. Morteza Kazemian, a political analyst based in Paris, commented on Khamenei's remarks to Radio Farda, stating, "Unfortunately, the leader of the Islamic Republic, as in the past, instead of focusing on the internal roots of problems and crises and trying to repair and reform them (especially in the area of social participation and achieving good governance), refers to external factors and the 'enemy.' Even in these remarks, he seeks foreign involvement in the currency crisis. He also warns the Ministry of Intelligence against factionalism while choosing the IRGC's intelligence organization as his primary intelligence and security reference, an entity that operates with a completely factional approach aligned with the hardliners of the government and the far-right. Khamenei has also called for the reflection of the "smallest doubt about the competence" of individuals who are to be appointed to government positions by this ministry. He has also requested "cooperation, synergy, and professional competition" among Iran's intelligence agencies. Khamenei's remarks come at a time when the Ministry of Intelligence typically has closer ties with the government in power. Other intelligence agencies in the country, including the IRGC's intelligence organization, the intelligence and security organization of this institution, the protection of the judiciary, and even the prosecutor's office, are closer to the Supreme Leader. Khamenei's call for professional cooperation and competition among these agencies comes amid reports of the intelligence activities of organizations under the IRGC being referred to as "parallel intelligence organizations" in Iran. Despite the establishment of the Ministry of Intelligence in Iran, the parallel activities of other organizations are not permitted, and only this ministry is authorized to conduct security actions regarding Iranian citizens. In many arrests and case formations, including the issue of dual nationals and the detention of several environmental activists under the pretext of "espionage," there are differences of opinion between the Ministry of Intelligence and other parallel organizations. However, these differences do not influence the Ministry of Intelligence's decisions, and in most cases, it is the opinions of the parallel institutions that prevail.