Khamenei's Ambitions for Rebuilding Proxy Forces and a Darkening Outlook

The leader of the Islamic Republic, in a meeting with a group of mourners, outlined what he perceives as the main lines of the roadmap for the 'Resistance Front' following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, and attempted to boost the disheartened morale of the regime's social base by threatening opponents and critics. He also claimed the inevitable defeat of the new Syrian regime. In his remarks, Ali Khamenei denied the 'proxy' nature of the groups within the 'Resistance Front' while asserting that the Islamic Republic does not require 'proxy groups' for regional actions. Part of his audience included Western and Israeli political and security circles, which have recently highlighted the vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic by pointing to the immobilization of the 'Resistance Front.' However, an interesting point in his recent remarks was that instead of addressing those calling for a military attack by Israel and the U.S. on the Iranian government, he indirectly targeted U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken's main point in the referenced interview was the rejection of the 'regime change' policy regarding Iran in the U.S. and the ineffectiveness of that approach, emphasizing only the necessity of defending the demands of the Iranian people. Khamenei once again threatened protesters, and his warnings about those who, following the 'enemy,' seek to intimidate, instill fear, and create despair, recall his attacks on reformist media in the second half of the 1990s. These statements, which serve as a formulation of the regime's propaganda policy and an intensification of pressure from intelligence agencies, may indicate weakness and desperation despite their appearance. The main audience for his remarks and the activities of the government-affiliated mourning network is the hesitant and 'problematic' segment of the regime's base, which has begun to doubt the correctness of official policies and Khamenei's competence to lead the regime. In this atmosphere, a fanciful approach, optimistic explanations, and ignoring realities make the core of power vulnerable. In fact, Khamenei's message that the path is set and projects have not changed, and that the 'Resistance Front' must continue its risky adventures despite the heavy blows it has suffered, increases concerns about the continuation of severe defeats among them. At the same time, the tactical delay in the so-called 'Promise of the Truth 3' operation has also disappointed and dissatisfied the extremist Basijis. The warnings from media close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, such as 'Tasnim' and 'Fars,' regarding the necessity for the movement of 'revolutionary forces' to align with the pace of 'leadership' steps in this context are understandable. However, under current conditions, optimism regarding the possibility of a youth uprising in Syria in the future, given the experiences and current realities, seems overly wishful. Turkey's response to Khamenei's remarks: Your presence in Syria did not prevent genocide in Gaza. Assuming the inevitability of insecurity in today's and tomorrow's Syria, in addition to ignoring the insecurity and institutionalized fear in Syria under the Ba'ath Party's dictatorial rule for the past six decades, reflects the Islamic Republic's investment in destabilization and the spread of insecurity in post-Assad Syria. However, since the Islamic Republic has not succeeded in creating a local militia force in Syria over the past 14 years, its available options for covert cooperation in the short term potentially include ISIS and radical Salafi Islamic groups opposed to Assad, which may separate from Ahmad al-Shara's new 'moderation' policy and raise the banner of armed opposition. The Islamic Republic has a history of tactical cooperation with ISIS and other Sunni Salafi jihadist organizations, which are condemned in its ideological framework as 'takfiri.' In the medium term, recruiting from the unemployed members of the Ba'ath Party, the dissatisfied, and those harmed by the new Syrian situation could serve as a lever for the Quds Force of the IRGC to form a new military-ideological force after restoring Hezbollah's capabilities. However, the realization of this possibility is also weak. So far, in communities where Sunnis are in the majority, the Islamic Republic has not succeeded in forming a proxy or aligned force. Another obstacle is the Sunni (Turkish-Arab) countries in the Islamic world, which, with Western and Israeli support, will respond more forcefully to the Islamic Republic's sabotage. This time, the Islamic Republic does not even have the support of Russia and parts of the 'Resistance Front' like Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen; groups that the United States considers terrorist organizations. The Islamic Republic's treasury is not full enough to cover the financial burden of confrontation and reconstruction of the devastation. The 'defense of the shrine' narrative has also lost its color today, given the open shrines and respect for them by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and other Syrian jihadist Islamist groups. The Secretary-General of Hezbollah: We have lost the path to securing military resources from Syria. The inevitable long-term failure of the expansionist ambitions of a country that is considered a minority in the ethnic-religious and ethnic fabric of the Middle East is another challenge that, after the good fortune resulting from the unintended benefits of some U.S. decisions, is now showing the hard face of reality to the institution of the Velayat-e Faqih. A study of world history reminds us of numerous examples of the failure of territorial and geopolitical expansion, especially when there is an imbalance between internal capabilities and transnational actions. In this situation, not pulling the brakes on foreign interventions deepens the comprehensive crisis of the Islamic Republic and may bring the entire 'Resistance Front' closer to destruction. Currently, the weakness that this collection has encountered encourages opponents to step forward. The credibility of Khamenei's claim in repeating the Islamic Republic's cliché position that they do not have proxy forces fades in the face of the facts and realities of the actions and positions of the Islamic Republic's officials. Of course, the 'Resistance Front' is a combination of dependent, semi-dependent, and independent allied proxy forces, but the so-called pillar of all of them is the institution of Velayat-e Faqih in Iran. All of them have organized connections with the Quds Force of the IRGC and are dependent on Iran for financial, logistical, and military resources. Some of them, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and some units forming Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, were essentially established by the Islamic Republic. The identity of others, such as the Houthis in Yemen, has been ideologically, religiously, and politically nurtured by the Islamic Republic. They are militarily and logistically dependent on Iran, although they have relative independence in decision-making. However, independent groups like Hamas also ultimately consider the opinions of the Quds Force of the IRGC in their policymaking and planning. After October 7, initially, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the former foreign minister of the Islamic Republic, issued multiple warnings from the 'Resistance Front' during regional visits, and later these groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen carried out attacks against Israel. It should not be forgotten that Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force, congratulated Khamenei after launching political propaganda about the defeat of ISIS, while the main role was played by the global coalition and Syrian Kurds, saying: 'On behalf of... the Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Afghan, and Pakistani defenders of the shrine... I congratulate you on this very great victory.' Part of the Islamic Republic's regional power is the leverage of these proxy and allied groups. Without them, the security and military maneuvering space of the Islamic Republic is limited. The issue of having faith, as Khamenei claims, does not necessarily prevent their proxy nature. It is evident that there is a consensus between them and the Islamic Republic around Islamic fundamentalism and jihadist Islam, which differs from the fundamentalist Salafi faction. However, this claimed faith and perspective indicate the dependence of these forces on the Islamic Republic, which has not acted within the framework of a nation-state and considers itself part of the 'Islamic Ummah'; a community that seeks to restore the original relations of the Islamic world, and Ali Khamenei has had and still has ambitions for its leadership. Overall, the existing contradictions in Khamenei's statements and reliance on fantasies and risky actions have darkened the future outlook for the 'Resistance Front.' What happened in favor of Khamenei and his proxy forces in the past decade was an exception that he mistakenly considers a rule and reconstructible. The excessive use of the Houthis of Yemen may also determine the fate of Hezbollah in Lebanon for them. Opponents and rivals of the Houthis and their allies in the Yemeni army are waiting for an opportunity to reignite the flames of civil war. Of course, tactical prudence has always been a concern for Khamenei and the hard core of power in the Islamic Republic, and it seems unlikely that they will move towards major conflicts, but the trend of developments is moving in a direction that their playing cards are dwindling, and the possibility of choosing middle and intermediate options is increasingly becoming more difficult. In this atmosphere, at times, a fatalistic and millenarian outlook may override rational decision-making regarding the examination of outcomes and weighing consequences.